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 Baltimore has been plagued by persistently high rates of firearm violence for decades, even 
as gun violence rates across the country have declined.  City and law enforcement officials in 
Baltimore have employed various approaches to reduce homicides and nonfatal shootings.  This 
research project evaluated the use of three strategies aimed at gun violence reduction in 
Baltimore: drug law enforcement, the Cure Violence model, and focused deterrence.  Negative 
binomial regressions were used to estimate the effects of drug law enforcement and focused 
deterrence on homicides or nonfatal shooting counts at the police post level, while synthetic 
control analyses were used to estimate the effects of the Cure Violence model.  Key informant 
interviews were also conducted to gain greater understanding of the focused deterrence program.  
Analyses indicate that drug law enforcement interventions were associated with no reductions in 
homicides but at times with increases in nonfatal shootings in the months following the 
interventions.  Findings also reveal that the beneficial effects of the Cure Violence model have 
diminished since the program began in Baltimore.  The focused deterrence replication was found 
to be harmful in one of the two police districts where implemented, and threats to the program’s 
success, per key informant interviews, included concerns about accurate identification of 
individuals most responsible for violence, frequent leadership changes, a lack of financial 
support for law enforcement and of services for those sought for the intervention, and the lack of 
engagement by law enforcement with community members on issues of legitimacy, shared 
vision, and strategy.  The dissertation project highlighted the importance of placing priority focus 
on violent individuals, adhering to program fidelity when implementing and executing evidence-
based violence prevention programs, continuously monitoring, evaluating, and evolving 
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programs as needed, and addressing the contentious relationship in Baltimore between law 
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 Gun violence in urban cities across America is one of the most challenging and devastating 
public health problems of our time.  Although homicides and nonfatal shootings have dropped 
dramatically since the 1980s and 1990s (Cooper and Smith, 2011), gun violence continues to 
prematurely end and permanently alter the lives of tens of thousands of Americans each year.  In 
2016, 14,415 individuals were killed in firearm-related homicides, excluding encounters with 
law enforcement (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018).  The percentage of all 
homicides that are committed by firearms has gradually increased over the past eighteen years, 
from 64% of homicides in 1999 to 74% of homicides in 2016.  Data on total numbers of nonfatal 
shooting incidents in the United States are more difficult to obtain because federal crime 
reporting systems like the Federal Bureau of Investigations’ Uniform Crime Reporting Program 
and the National Incident-Based Reporting System do not require jurisdictions to record nonfatal 
shootings separate from all aggravated assaults, and hospitals do not have a standardized system 
for tracking nonfatal shootings.  However, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
estimated nearly 89,000 non-law-enforcement-related shooting injuries in America in 2016, 
using data collected via the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2018).  The burden of mortality and disability from homicides and 
nonfatal shootings falls disproportionately on black and brown communities in central cities 
across the country.  In 2016, black Americans made up 14% of the population but accounted for 
59% of all firearm homicides.  The disparity is even higher for black males 15 to 34 years old, 
who, in 2016, made up 8% of the total (male and female combined) population for that age group 
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but accounted for 60% of all homicides in that age category.  Black Americans also accounted 
for over one-third of all nonfatal shooting injuries – nearly 33,000 - in 2016. 
 In addition to the trauma, pain, and suffering related to gun violence in communities, there 
are also great economic losses incurred by local jurisdictions when gun violence persists.  In 
addition to millions of dollars in medical costs and productivity lost due to gun violence (Fowler 
et al., 2015), research has found that increases in gun homicides or shootings in neighborhoods 
negatively affect housing values (Tita, Petras and Greenbaum, 2006) and have adverse impacts 
on local business establishment numbers, employment, and sales (Irvin-Erickson et al., 2016).  
Thus, city leaders have multiple motivations for wanting to reduce gun violence and have sought 
various ways to increase public safety for their constituents.   
 Baltimore has long been plagued by high rates of homicides and nonfatal shootings; from 
2003 to 2017, nearly 4,000 Baltimore residents lost their lives to homicide and over 8,000 were 
victims of nonfatal shootings (Baltimore Police Department, 2018).  City and law enforcement 
officials in Baltimore, as in many urban cities, have attributed much of the gun violence to the 
illicit drug economy.  For many years, the most visible and direct approaches employed by the 
Baltimore Police Department (BPD) to curb gun violence focused on the enforcement of drug 
laws to reduce violent crime associated with the drug trade.  However, in recent years, the city 
has also implemented other programs – namely, street outreach/violence interruption and focused 
deterrence – that are designed to directly reach those individuals most at risk for violence 
perpetration and intervene in ways that ideally deter future violent behavior.  While all three of 
these tactics have been used in cities across the United States that are similarly grappling to 
achieve steady reductions in gun violence, evaluations of the interventions have been shown to 
have varying degrees of success in different jurisdictions.  Understanding the impact that these 
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strategies have had on gun violence reduction in Baltimore can greatly inform policymakers and 
local leaders on how to best improve public safety for the city’s residents. 
 
Literature Review 
 A review of the literature was undertaken to understand the theories, applications, and 
evaluations of three defined gun violence reduction approaches used in Baltimore over the past 
fifteen years: drug law enforcement, street outreach/violence interruption, and focused 
deterrence.  The review began with searches of the PubMed, PsycINFO, and Google Scholar 
electronic databases.  Initial search terms included “drug enforcement,” “drug prohibition 
enforcement,” “violence interruption,” “Cure Violence,” “Ceasefire,” “focused deterrence,” and 
“gun violence prevention.”  The review was limited to primarily research in the United States, 
although several international studies were considered when highly relevant to the topic of 
interest.  Article titles and abstracts were reviewed to determine which were most appropriate.  
The reference lists in informative articles were used to identify key authors and additional works 
or review.  Books, white papers, and grey literature were consulted. 
 The summaries of the literature reviewed for this dissertation project are organized based on 
the presentation of the three violence reduction strategies examined for this thesis work: drug law 
enforcement, violence interruption, and focused deterrence. 
 
Drug Law Enforcement 
The Relationship Between Drugs and Violence 
The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 established U.S. federal drug policy for regulating 
and scheduling substances based on medical value, potential for misuse or dependence, and 
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harmfulness, and laid the foundation for how violations of such regulations would be sanctioned 
(21 U.S. Code § 812, 1970).  Most drugs known to be used and sold in the underground market, 
including marijuana, cocaine, heroin, opioids, and benzodiazepines, are thus known, particularly 
to law enforcement and legal practitioners, as “controlled dangerous substances” (CDS).  The 
dangerousness of these substances, specifically as it relates to their potential for inciting or 
contributing to violence, has been studied for decades (e.g., Malmquist, 1971; Zahn and 
Bencivengo, 1974; Daniel et al., 1983).  However, the pioneering research paper by Paul 
Goldstein (1985) on the drug-violence nexus provided a valuable typology for examining this 
association.  Through in-depth interviews and ethnographic fieldwork notes, Goldstein 
determined that drugs and violence are related in ways that can be characterized by three 
different conceptual models: psychopharmacological, economically impulsive, and systemic.  
The psychopharmacological model suggests that through the short- or long-term intake of certain 
substances – examples include alcohol, barbiturates, and stimulants –, individuals may become 
irrational or excitable and exhibit violent behavior.  The economically impulsive model posits 
that violence occurs when some drug users engage in economic-driven violent crime, such as 
robbery, in order to acquire money to support their drug use.  The systemic model proposes that 
violence is intrinsic to markets for goods or services that are illegal and can erupt over disputes, 
robberies, or retaliation.   
 While much of the earlier research on the connection between drugs and violence focused on 
violence associated with the psychopharmacological or economic impulsivity models, more 
recent findings have been mixed (Resignato, 2000) and do not provide concrete evidence of a 
consistent relationship between overall drug use and violence (Goldstein, 1985; Goldstein et al., 
1989).  Recent research has shown that psychopharmacological effects of drugs on violence 
 
5 
differ by substance, and most commonly used illicit drugs – marijuana, opioids, and cocaine – 
are not typically violence-inducing, while evidence to support a trend for economic impulsive 
motivations for gun violence is limited (McGinty, Chosky and Wintemute, 2016).  However, 
numerous studies have found that a substantial number of violent incidents that can be linked to 
illicit drugs appear to be tied to the systemic dynamics of illegal drug markets (Goldstein et al., 
1989; Klofas, Delaney and Smith, 2005; Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000; McGinty, Chosky and 
Wintemute, 2016).  This suggests that the bulk of drug-related violence is not driven simply by 
drug consumption or addiction, and that more active players on the supply side of these markets 
interact with violence in different ways than do those on the demand side.  The presumed link 
between the illegal drug trade and violent crime has motivated law enforcement agencies to 
devote time, resources, and strategic planning toward curbing illicit drug activity with the goal of 
reducing violence, particularly in communities that have high rates of both. 
 
Drug Prohibition Enforcement in the United States 
 The primary objective of the enforcement of drug control policy, both in the United States 
and throughout the world, is to reduce supply and demand of illicit drugs by disrupting supply 
and increasing the risk of arrest and incarceration for both sellers and buyers (Shepard and 
Blackley, 2005).  In 2008, local and state law enforcement agencies spent approximately $26 
billion on drug prohibition enforcement in America (Miron and Waldock, 2010), in addition to 
the estimated $3.5 billion spent by the federal government on domestic prohibition enforcement 
(Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2009).  The results of increased enforcement of drug 
prohibition in America via drug-related arrests since the 1980s have been well documented.  
Between 1980 and 2014, the arrest rate for drug possession or use more than doubled, from 
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198.6 arrests per 100,000 in 1980 to 406.2 arrests per 100,000 in 2014, with a peak of 520.4 in 
2006 (Snyder, Cooper and Mulako-Wangota, 2016).  Although the arrest rate for drug sale or 
manufacture peaked in 1989 and gradually fell over time, it was still 68% higher in 2014 than at 
its lowest point in 1981 (Snyder, Cooper and Mulako-Wangota, 2016).  In 2016, law 
enforcement agencies across the United States arrested nearly 1.6 million people for drug law 
violations, representing 14.7% of all arrests and the highest number by arrest category (United 
States Department of Justice, 2017).  
 
Figure 1.1: Drug Possession Arrest Rates in the United States, 1980-2014 
 
 






















































 While many state and federal policymakers in the United States have expressed a desire in 
recent years to shift drug policy priorities in this country away from punitive actions towards 
drug users and low-level dealers (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2015; Brownstein, 
2016), law enforcement agencies continue to direct resources toward addressing the systemic 
violence of illegal drug markets.  In 2013, for example, over 13% of all police departments in the 
country and more than nine out of ten police departments that serve populations of 100,000 or 
more – including 100% of police departments in cities with over 1,000,000 people - were 
participating in multiagency drug task forces (Reaves, 2015).  These task forces focus their 
operations on local-level drug possession and distribution violations, in addition to more 
sophisticated drug rings that supply narcotics across jurisdictions and state lines.  Furthermore, 
since 2017, the Trump administration has directed federal prosecutors to seek the maximum 
penalties available in cases against drug dealers (Ford, 2017) and to even use death penalty 
statutes when prosecuting certain drug-related cases, such as those involving specific 
racketeering activities or “extremely large” amounts of drugs (Office of the Attorney General, 
2018). 
 In addition to reducing illegal drug supply and demand by increasing the risk of arrest and 
incarceration for both sellers and buyers, another intention of drug prohibition enforcement is to 
restrict supply sufficiently to reduce availability and increase price to the point where drug use 
becomes less attractive (Caulkins et al., 2005).  However, this relationship between supply, 
demand, and retail prices for illicit drugs is far from straightforward, complicating law 
enforcement’s direct ability to influence price or demand.  Researchers have detailed numerous 
ways in which drug law enforcement might lead to either increased drug prices and reduced 
consumption (Bright and Ritter, 2011; Caulkins et al., 2005) or reduced drug price and 
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competitive markets (Poret, 2012).  Other research has found no evidence that increasing the risk 
of seizure, arrest, or incarceration raises the price of illicit drugs (Pollack and Reuter, 2014; 
Bushway and Reuter, 2011).  Thus, the notion that drug law enforcement at the local level 
successfully disrupts illicit drug markets by increasing real or perceived risks and costs to sellers 
and/or buyers has not been consistently supported in the research to-date. 
 
Illicit Drug Market-Related Violence and Drug Law Enforcement  
 Illegal or underground markets, including those involving the illicit drug trade, are not 
necessarily inherently violent.  For example, illicit marijuana markets in general have not 
generated remarkable levels of violence over disputes or competition (Reuter, 2009).   
Additionally, the United States has one of the highest rates of illegal drug use in the world, yet 
there is not a consistently correlated high rate of violence wherever illegal drug use exists.  
However, numerous studies have found that the underground drug market is a key source of 
violence, particularly in urban areas, such as New York City (Goldstein et al., 1997; Johnson, 
Golub, and Dunlap, 2000), Chicago (Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000), Washington, DC, and Los 
Angeles, (Ousey and Lee, 2004).  Various methods or situations by which this systemic violence 
may occur have been supported through research.  Being involved in an illegal activity with 
punitive consequences for involvement leads people to be less likely to have disputes resolved or 
retributions and reparations paid by traditional or governmental institutions. (Jacques and Allen, 
2014).  The formal, traditional systems for dispute and conflict resolution increase the risk of 
being arrested or punished oneself for his or her involvement in the illegal trade, or the resolution 
that comes from formal justice systems is not deemed satisfactory, due to the inability of the 
system to fully redress the victim in money or drugs as compensation for illegal market 
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participation.  Engagement with law enforcement or the criminal justice system also increases 
one’s risk of being labeled an informant.  With the additional knowledge that police and 
prosecutors are typically less aggressive in their pursuit of justice for individuals that engage in 
illegal activity themselves, individuals in the illegal drug market see the involvement of 
governmental entities like law enforcement as too risky and having too high of an opportunity 
cost (Jacques and Allen, 2014; Jacques and Wright, 2013).  This constellation of factors can lead 
to two distinct types of systemic drug market violence: predation, which is the taking of one's 
possessions or market share turf through robbery, burglary, or assault with the assumption that 
formal justice will not be sought by the victim; or retaliation, which is the pursuit of informal 
justice and could include vigilantism.  Several studies have found evidence of both predatory and 
retaliatory drug market-related violence, or the use of violence to gain or maintain market share, 
as well as to settle drug-related disputes (Donohue and Levitt, 1998; Brownstein, Crimmins, and 
Spunt, 2000; Blumstein, 1995). 
 The association between the illicit drug market and violent crime has helped to justify the 
substantial increase in the late 1980s and 1990s in resource allocation and commitment to drug 
control policies by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies nationwide (Sacco, 2014).  
Billions of dollars are spent in the United States each year at the local, state, and federal levels on 
domestic enforcement of drug control policies (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2015), 
yet there are relatively few published studies that have quantitatively examined the impact that 
drug law enforcement in the United States has had on decreasing supply, consumption, or 
violence associated with illicit drug markets.   
 A 2006 meta-analytical review of street drug law enforcement examined the reduction of 
street-level drug problems by four types of drug law enforcement approaches: community-wide 
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policing (general, nonspecific partnerships with non-law enforcement entities), problem-
oriented/partnership policing (directed partnerships with non-law enforcement entities in 
geographic hot spots for drug activity), hotspots policing (law enforcement focus on geographic 
hot spots for drug activity), and standard, nonspecific law enforcement efforts (e.g., routine 
patrols, arrests) (Mazerolle, Soole and Rambouts, 2006).  The analysis included studies that 
evaluated interventions launched, managed, and/or implemented by local law enforcement to 
prevent or reduce illegal drug use, illegal drug selling, and associated problems in drug selling 
locations. The researchers assessed pre- to post-test intervention effects on a number of outcome 
variables, including drug- and nondrug-related calls for service, property crimes, and violent 
offenses.  None of the reviewed studies that measured impact on reported crimes against persons 
or calls for service for violent crimes demonstrated significant impact.   
 A 2011 systematic literature review to assess the relationship between drug law enforcement 
approaches and drug market-related violence reduction yielded eleven United States-based 
studies that employed longitudinal data analyses of empirical data (Werb et al., 2011).  Nine of 
the eleven quantitative evaluations they reviewed reported a significantly positive (harmful) 
relationship between drug law enforcement and drug market violence.  For instance, an in-depth 
economic analysis on financial activities of a drug-dealing street gang in Chicago found that the 
lack of official dispute settlement channels and pressure from drug law enforcement contributed 
to high levels of violence (Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000).  A longitudinal observational study of 
67 counties in Florida and found that drug enforcement measures such as resource allocation, 
number of sworn officers, and number of drug arrests and convictions were positively correlated 
with Part I violent crimes (Benson, Rasmussen and Kim, 1998).  An examination of violent 
crime rates to the proportion of drug arrests to total arrests in 24 United States Metropolitan 
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Statistical Areas (MSAs) in 1992 and 1993 revealed a significant and positive association 
between the two rates (Resignato, 2000). 
 Looking beyond the United States, there is also evidence that drug prohibition enforcement 
may contribute to violent crime.  The Johns Hopkins Lancet-Commission on Drug Policy and 
Health reviewed existing literature on public health issues stemming from drug policy and found 
that much of the drug-related violence worldwide is associated with the protection of illicit drug 
markets by drug cartels against armed government or paramilitary forces.  The researchers also 
highlighted that “some experts have suggested that heavy crackdowns by drug police can lead to 
major increases in violence when disruption of a criminal network leads rival groups to intensify 
their efforts to capture the territory of the weakened group" (Csete et al., 2016, p. 7), using 
Mexico and Central America as examples.  Mexico has experienced a historic rise in homicides 
in since 2006, unprecedented for any country not formally involved in war.  This dramatic 
increase in homicide has been linked to the government's decision to utilize the military to fight 
drug traffickers in civilian areas (Heinle, Ferreira and Shirk, 2015).  Other research found that 
approximately 25% of Colombia’s homicide rate between 1994 and 2008 could be explained by 
law and militarized enforcement of drug laws surrounding the illicit cocaine trade, and that 
homicides spiked when drug law enforcement was most intense (Mejia and Restrepo, 2014).  
While it is important to recognize that there are substantial differences between the United States 
and Mexico or Colombia, given the findings in existing literature, the potential correlations 
between drug law enforcement tactics and violence associated with the illicit drug trade in this 






Violence as a Contagion 
 The Cure Violence model for violence reduction is based on the fact that, like other 
infectious diseases, violence is contagious (Cure Violence, 2018).  Similar to an infectious 
disease, violent behavior exhibits characteristics indicative of clustering, transmission, and 
spread effects (Institute of Medicine, 2013).  In virtually any city across America and the globe, 
violence is not distributed uniformly across geographic areas.  The map in Figure 1.3 illustrates 
the locations of homicides and nonfatal shootings in Baltimore City between 2003 and 2017, 
illuminating the clustering of these events.   
 
Figure 1.3: Homicide and Nonfatal Shooting Locations in Baltimore, 2003-2017 
 
 
 As with many other health disparities, a concentration of homicides is generally found in 
highly disenfranchised and structurally disadvantaged communities experiencing other poor 
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quality of life indicators, including high rates of residential segregation and poverty, high rates of 
unemployment or underemployment, and extremely limited economic opportunities.  These 
communities are also often plagued by a historically consistent prevalence of violence, 
supporting the notion that violence does not occur randomly and unpredictably.  Substantial 
research has shown that exposure to violence increases one’s likelihood of perpetrating or even 
being victimized by violence in the future, validating the idea that violence can be transmitted 
from person to person (Institute of Medicine, 2013; Bond and Bushman, 2017).  Furthermore, the 
persistence of violence in these communities suggests that violence is spread through underlying 
social and behavioral norms in these areas.  Research has shown there is a strong relationship 
between deviant behavior and an individual’s peer group, or social network (McGloin and 
O’Neill Shermer, 2009), and that a considerable amount of violence, particularly in urban areas, 
is concentrated among a small number of high-risk individuals (Papachristos, Braga and Hureau, 
2011; Braga and Wiseburd, 2015; Papachristos, Wildeman and Roberto, 2015).  If the spread of 
violence is facilitated via social and behavioral norms, then reducing violence, or disrupting the 
transmission, requires challenging norms and expectations that support resolving conflict or 
anger with violence (Cure Violence, 2018).  Using these basic understandings of the dynamics of 
violence and likening violence to a contagious disease that acts and thus can be treated like any 
other infectious disease, Cure Violence aims to identify and interrupt the transmission of 







Cure Violence Program Model 
 The Cure Violence program is a multi-component, community-level intervention that 
employs street outreach workers to develop relationships and engage with individuals at high 
risk for committing or being victims of violence.  The program model entails three key 
components: interrupting transmission of violence by mediating conflicts and limiting the 
likelihood of retaliation; identifying those at highest risk of perpetration of violence and reducing 
their risk through behavior change and linkage to needed services; and changing community 
norms around violence through community organization and anti-violence messaging (Cure 
Violence, 2018).  The outreach workers often themselves have had extensive criminal histories, 
previous incarcerations, and/or former gang affiliations and are generally well known in the 
communities in which they work.  They have also undergone their own personal transformations 
and are tasked with helping to steer the individuals with whom they work away from lives of 
violence.  Being formerly engaged in and familiar with the very behaviors and activities they 
hope to change increases the likelihood that the outreach workers will be seen by their intended 
clients as credible messengers and thus potentially trustworthy resources.  The outreach staff, 
then, serve as role models who can exhibit prosocial behavior while also helping to link 
individuals to critical supports and services (educational, financial, health, job training, etc.).  
Through the relationships built by the outreach workers and the connections to systems and 
supports that can help address the needs of clients and their families, the at-risk individuals will 
ideally choose positive paths of development and conflict resolution.  The program also employs 
special outreach workers who operate primarily as violence interrupters, working to identify, 
resolve and de-escalate potentially dangerous conflicts that could lead to shootings.  These staff 
play an essential part in working with individuals with high risk of violence perpetration to teach 
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them how to resolve conflict and situations that elicit negative affect without resorting to lethal 
violence, recognizing that while the program cannot always intervene at the initial act of 
violence, it can minimize the spread of violence by interrupting transmission through conflict 
mediation.  The third key component of the intervention involves community mobilization and 
addressing social norms that perpetuate violence.  The program staff help to organize responses 
to homicide and nonfatal shooting incidents and engage with community partners to promote 
anti-violence messages and an intolerance for using guns to resolve conflicts, often through 
public events or social campaigns (Butts et al., 2015). 
 The Cure Violence program model has been implemented and evaluated in numerous cities 
around the United States.  Impact studies of the program have found mixed results of the 
intervention’s success at reducing gun homicides and nonfatal shootings (Butts et al., 2015; 
Cerdá, Tracy and Keyes, 2017).  For example, in Chicago, an interrupted time series analysis of 
the program found that the program was associated with 16-28% reductions in nonfatal shootings 
in four of seven Cure Violence communities and variation across sites in the program’s impact 
on outcomes such as gang involvement in homicide and retaliatory shootings by gang members 
(Skogan et al., 2008).  An early analysis of a program site in New York City found that the 
program was associated with an 18% reduction in nonfatal shootings, although the decline itself 
was only significant when compared to the change in gun violence rates in comparison sites 
(Picard-Fritsche and Cerniglia, 2013).  A more recent evaluation of two program sites in New 
York City found statistically significant gun injury decreases (32-65%) in the neighborhoods 
where the programs had been implemented (Delgado, Alsabahi and Butts, 2017).  An 
independent evaluation of Philadelphia’s Cure Violence program found that the intervention led 
to a statistically significant 30% reduction in nonfatal shootings after two years (Roman et al., 
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2018), while an analysis of a program based upon the Cure Violence model in Phoenix, Arizona, 
found that the intervention was actually associated with a significant increase in nonfatal 
shootings and a significant decrease in assaults (Fox et al., 2014).  
 Several evaluations of Cure Violence model replications have also examined the program’s 
influence on attitude changes about the acceptance of violence to handle conflicts and the 
program’s ability to engage the community to reduce gun violence.  In New York City, 
researchers surveyed young men in eight neighborhoods with matching crime rates and 
demographics; four of the neighborhoods had Cure Violence programs.  The researchers 
recruited and surveyed respondents on whether they would use violence in various conflict 
scenarios and found significant differences in the willingness to use violence among young men 
in the neighborhoods with Cure Violence programs (Delgado, Alsabahi and Butts, 2017).  
Another study in New York City used a convenience sampling recruitment strategy to survey 
residents in public places, such as parks and street corners, immediately after the implementation 
of a Cure Violence program and again one year later.  The survey respondents reported an 
increased awareness of antiviolence messages in the community and increased confidence in the 
intervention but also no change in their feelings of safety one year following the program’s 
implementation (Picard-Fritsche and Cerniglia, 2013). 
 
Cure Violence (“Safe Streets”) in Baltimore 
 In 2007, the Baltimore City Health Department received a $1.6 million grant from the U.S. 
Department of Justice to implement the Cure Violence program model in Baltimore (Webster et 
al., 2013).  The program, named Safe Streets, serves youth ages 14 to 25 who are at the highest 
risk of perpetrating violence and living in communities that experience high rates of gun 
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homicides and nonfatal shootings.  Safe Streets was initiated in single police posts within four 
neighborhoods – McElderry Park, Elwood Park, Madison-Eastend, and Cherry Hill - between 
2007 and 2008.  A fifth site was planned in a police post in the Union Square neighborhood but 
encountered substantial implementation challenges and was terminated within one year.  The 
Safe Streets program expanded to Baltimore’s Mondawmin community in 2012 and to Lower 
Park Heights in 2013.  Following the civil unrest that occurred following the death of Freddie 
Gray, Jr., in April 2015, and the sharp increase in gun violence across the city but particularly in 
West Baltimore, city officials opened a Safe Streets site in the Sandtown-Winchester community 
in 2016.   
 Researchers published an analysis of Safe Streets’ impact on gun violence in the first four 
communities, comparing homicide and nonfatal shooting incident rates in intervention sites to 
rates in bordering areas and other areas with high rates of violence, and controlling for law 
enforcement activities and arrests (Webster et al., 2013).  The researchers found that only the 
Cherry Hill program was associated with significant reductions in both homicides and nonfatal 
shootings.  Cherry Hill saw a 56% reduction in homicides and a 34% reduction in nonfatal 
shootings, and neighboring communities also experienced significant homicide reductions.  
However, the other program sites had mixed success.  McElderry Park saw a 26% decrease in 
homicides but a 22% increase in nonfatal shootings, while Elwood Park saw no significant 
change in homicides but a 34% reduction in nonfatal shootings.  The Madison-Eastend 
community experienced a large increase in gang violence during Safe Streets’ operational period 
and saw significant increases in homicides but significant decreases in nonfatal shootings 
(Webster et al, 2013).   
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 Following the first evaluation, researchers have also examined the Safe Streets program’s 
influence on youth’s attitudes about the acceptability of the use of guns to settle conflicts (Milam 
et al., 2016a).  The researchers surveyed youth ages 18-24 on randomized street blocks in Lower 
Park Heights and a comparison, non-intervention community.  Respondents were surveyed in 
two waves, once pre-implementation of Safe Streets in Lower Park Heights and again one year 
post-implementation, using a 37-question validated instrument to measure changes in personal 
attitudes and shifts in social norms related to violence and retaliation (Milam et al., 2016b).  The 
surveys were anonymous and self-administered.  Using explanatory structural equation modeling 
and chi-squared tests to assess differences in the first and second survey waves, the researchers 
found that respondents in Lower Park Heights had significant improvements in attitudes towards 
violence and a greater magnitude of improvement in violent attitudes to personal conflict than 
did those in the intervention community.  (Milam et al., 2016a).  They also found that the 
presence of anti-violence signs and interactions with Safe Streets workers led to significant 
increases in nonviolent attitudes toward conflict. 
 
Focused Deterrence 
The Concentration of Violence 
 As earlier mentioned, research has shown a strong relationship between deviant behavior and 
an individual’s social network (McGlowin and O’Neill Shermer, 2009).  There has also been 
consistent evidence demonstrating that a considerable amount of violence, particularly in urban 
areas, is concentrated among a small number of high-risk individuals (Papachristos, Braga and 
Hureau, 2011; Braga and Wiseburd, 2015; Papachristos, Wildeman and Roberto, 2015).  This 
research has largely been done through the creation of social networks based on police records of 
 
19 
co-arrests; in other words, if two or more individuals were arrested together (co-offend), the 
assumptions are that they have some affiliation with one another, and that their involvement in 
illegal behavior suggests that they are part of a larger social network of individuals that may also 
engage in risky behavior (Papachristos, Wildeman and Roberto, 2015).   This approach is 
limiting in that it depends solely on police observation to detect social network participation.  In 
doing so, it substantially underestimates the extent of one’s network and provides a conservative 
approximation of the relationship between violent victimization and one’s social network.  
Nonetheless, the findings regarding this association show just how highly concentrated these 
networks are.  For example, in a study of shootings in Newark, New Jersey, nearly one-third of 
the city’s shootings occurred among just four percent of the population, and researchers found 
that being directly connected to a gang member increased non-gang associate’s probability of 
being shot by 94%, while being a gang member in the network increased odds of victimization 
by 344% (Papachristos et al., 2015).  A similar analysis in Chicago revealed that 70 percent of 
gunshot victims during the study time period were in a social network involving under six 
percent of the city’s entire population and that being in the network component with a homicide 
victim increased homicide risk by 900%, with each unit increase in social distance removed from 
a victim, or each additional “handshake” or measure of social distance away from a homicide 




 Focused deterrence, or “pulling levers” policing, is a crime reduction strategy designed to 
identify and reach individuals and groups believed to be most responsible for crime in a given 
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area.  Similar to the Cure Violence model, the intervention is supported by research showing that 
a substantial amount of crime in a given community or city is committed by a small percentage 
of individuals.  However, focused deterrence relies on the threat of law enforcement intervention 
for those who do not heed warnings of severe consequences if crime continues.  Focused 
deterrence has been used to address various crime concerns, although it has most frequently been 
used to identify and connect with violent, group-involved individuals in communities with high 
rates of gun violence (Braga, Weisburd and Turchan, 2018).   
 The program model is comprised of several key components: 
1. It is directed toward a specific crime concern, such as gang shootings or illicit drug 
dealing.   
2. It involves the formation of a cross-agency enforcement team including local police, city, 
state and federal prosecutors, federal law enforcement agencies, and parole and probation 
departments.   
3. It relies on intel and knowledge from front-line police officers and detectives to identify 
key group-involved individuals responsible for the concerning crimes.   
4. The enforcement team then develops a strategy to direct at those individuals and groups 
and influence their behavior by using all possible legal actions against them.  
5. Once the strategy has been determined, the intended population is directly contacted, 
usually by way of a group “call-in” or personal notification meeting, and informed of the 
increased scrutiny to which they are being subjected and why.  The individuals and 
groups are also told what severe sanctions and enforcement actions will be taken against 
them if the illegal behavior does not stop, as well as what actions they can take to avoid 
the harsh penalties.   
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6. The message from law enforcement that the unacceptable behavior will no longer be 
tolerated is accompanied by messages from community members who have been 
negatively impacted by the behavior and implore the individuals to cease the harmful 
activity.   
7. A focused deterrence program also includes an offer of services from local agencies and 
community-based organizations to support lifestyle and behavior changes, including 
substance use disorder treatment and assistance finding employment (National Network 
for Safe Communities, 2018; Braga, Weisburd and Turchan, 2018). 
 The focused deterrence program model was first developed and implemented in Boston 
under the leadership of criminologist David Kennedy in the 1990s; it has since been replicated in 
dozens of cities across the country.  A 2018 systematic review found that 19 of 24 evaluations of 
focused deterrence programs were associated with strong, statistically significant crime 
reductions where implemented (Braga, Weisburd and Turchan, 2018).  For example, Project Safe 
Neighborhoods, in Lowell, Massachusetts, was associated with a 44% reduction in gun assault 
incidents and no displacement effects of the intervention (Braga et al., 2008).  The Group 
Violence Reduction Strategy in New Orleans, Louisiana, was credited with a 17% reduction in 
total homicides and firearm homicides, a 17% reduction in nonfatal firearm assaults, and a 32% 
reduction in group member-involved homicides (Corsaro and Engel, 2015).  Boston has 
implemented two versions of the group-member violence reduction strategy - once to address 
youth violence and again to curb a growing gang violence issue - and saw significant reductions 
in gun violence in both iterations of the program (Braga et al., 2001; Braga, Hureau and 
Papachristos, 2014).  The authors of the systematic review noted that the strongest crime 
reduction impacts have come from focused deterrence strategies concentrated on the most violent 
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actors, and that focused deterrence approaches aimed at reducing crime associated with illicit 
drug markets had the smallest effects (Braga, Weisburd and Turchan, 2018).  Additionally, 
several evaluation studies have found that threats to treatment fidelity can occur at several stages 
of program implementation, potentially undermining the success of the intervention in a given 




 In addition to the fact that relatively few published research studies on the relationship over 
between law enforcement-led drug market disruptions and violent crime in the United States 
exist, the quantitative research is primarily based on data from the 1980s, 1990s and very early 
2000s.  Furthermore, the majority have either been descriptive studies in one city (Goldstein et 
al., 1997) or cross-sectional analyses across multiple localities (Rasmussen, Benson and Sollars, 
1993; Benson, Leburn and Rasmussen, 2001), so they do not allow for estimations of changes in 
trends.  Over the past 20-30 years, substantial changes in the prices, purities, and substances of 
choice in illegal drug markets in the United States (Fries et al., 2008) may have led to different 
responses to drug law enforcement than what was previously seen during the powder and crack 
cocaine epidemics and related high rates of homicides and shootings of the 1980s and 1990s 
(Reuter, 2009).  The latest systematic review article on drug law enforcement noted that an 
analysis of the association between homicide rates and drug law enforcement expenditures in the 
early 2000s suggested a possible reversal in the positive association and posited that the drug 
control policies and actions in the past twenty years may have contributed to reductions, rather 
than increases, in homicides (Werb et al., 2011).  Given the incredible resources devoted to drug 
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law enforcement each year, its effectiveness on reducing gun violence is an important one for 
policymakers and law enforcement agencies of all levels to understand. 
 The Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research recently examined various 
interventions, including drug law enforcement, violence interruption, and focused deterrence, in 
Baltimore that were implemented to reduce gun violence (Webster, Buggs and Crifasi, 2018).  
The researchers’ findings from their analysis on drug law enforcement were largely in line with 
prior research conclusions across the United States.  Major drug busts, as well as drug possession 
and drug trafficking arrests, were not found to significantly reduce homicides or nonfatal 
shootings, while increased numbers of drug trafficking arrests, or “surges” in arrests, were 
associated with significant increases in nonfatal shootings.  The researchers found no aggregate 
effects of all Safe Streets sites on homicides or nonfatal shootings from 2007-2017 and only 
statistically significant reductions in homicides in one neighborhood.  They also found that 
focused deterrence, known as Operation Ceasefire Baltimore, was not associated with decreases 
in either outcome.  However, the researchers noted that future research would examine some of 
the interventions with analytic methods designed to more finely isolate intervention effects and 
determine if the findings in their analysis were related to actual program impact or statistical 
noise.  This dissertation study further explored the findings of the recent Johns Hopkins Center 
for Gun Policy and Research report by incorporating additional data and different statistical 
approaches to provide a greater understanding of the effectiveness of drug law enforcement, 






 There is not an existing conceptual model that illustrates all the possible relationships 
between drug law enforcement and drug market-related violence.  Thus, one has been created to 
show the existing theoretical and evidenced connections based on sociological and 
criminological research.  The model outlines how the primary activities of drug law enforcement 
– namely, apprehending drug sellers/buyers, increasing risk of apprehension for drug 
sellers/buyers, and seizing illicit drugs – might precipitate a host of secondary effects, or outputs, 
which have the potential to either incite or suppress violence.  It is possible for more than one 
activity or output to simultaneously occur.  There is also the possibility that one output could 
precede another in time.  For example, the removal of buyers and/or sellers via a drug bust could 
initially reduce violent activity, but conflicts over unpaid debts or competition for customers 
could result in an increase in violence over time. 
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 A conceptual model that supports the Cure Violence and focused deterrence interventions is 
shown in Figure 1.5.  Though their mechanisms for changing behavior and achieving program 
outcomes are different, Cure Violence and focused deterrence program models are both directed 
at the individuals most at risk for violence perpetration.  They also both aim to disrupt violence 
via a reliance on community partnerships to provide assistance to those individuals in need.  The 
model in Figure 1.5 was slightly adapted from one created by Dr. Caterina Roman at University 
of Pennsylvania, who was integral to an evaluation of both strategies implemented in 
Philadelphia. 
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Research Questions and Objectives 
 The research questions and objectives for this study were as follows:  
Question #1: Has the enforcement of drug law prohibitions in Baltimore been associated with a 
decrease in gun violence in Baltimore?  
Objective 1.1: Examine the spatial-temporal association of drug law enforcement interventions 
– drug possession arrests, drug trafficking/distribution arrests, and major drug busts – and gun 
violence in Baltimore.   
Objective 1.2: Examine whether there are differential effects of the spatial-temporal association 
between major drug busts and gun violence in Baltimore if the arrests in those busts are of 
individuals alleged to be violent actors in the illicit drug trade.   
Objective 1.3: Examine whether the spatial-temporal association between major drug busts and 
gun violence in Baltimore differs based on the involvement of at least one federal agency in the 
arrests.   
Objective 1.4: Determine if the spatial-temporal association between drug law enforcement in 
Baltimore and gun violence changed following the civil unrest in April 2015 following the in-
custody death of Freddie Gray, Jr, given that during the unrest, law enforcement reported that 
hundreds of thousands of prescription pills were stolen from dozens of pharmacies throughout 
Baltimore and flooded into the streets, causing major drug market disruptions and likely driving 
much of the subsequent violence, and that following the unrest and the appointment of a new 
police commissioner, the Baltimore Police Department acknowledged a shift in strategy for 
drug law enforcement, publicly stating that the department was prioritizing the arrests of violent 
actors in the drug market.   
Question #2: Has the Safe Streets program continued to reduce gun violence in Baltimore? 
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Objective 2.1: Evaluate the impact that the Safe Streets program has had on gun violence in 
each of the sites where the program has been implemented.  
Objective 2.2: Examine whether Safe Streets site-specific program effects on gun violence 
changed following the civil unrest in Baltimore in April 2015.   
Objective 2.3: Examine whether the program effects of Safe Streets have changed over time in 
the communities where the program has been operating for years. 
Question #3: What was the impact of Operation Ceasefire Baltimore on gun violence, and how 
might insights from individuals involved with the program enhance our understanding of the 
intervention’s effects? 
Objective 3.1: Examine the spatial-temporal association between Operation Ceasefire Baltimore 
and subsequent gun violence in the districts where the call-ins occurred.  
Objective 3.2: Supplement the quantitative findings from the Operation Ceasefire Baltimore 




 To analyze the impact of the interventions in this research on gun violence in Baltimore, it 
was decided that homicides and nonfatal shooting counts would be the outcomes of interest; 
they are the most reliably tracked incidents of violence, given their gravity and more acute 
nature.  Furthermore, over 84% of all homicides in Baltimore in the past six years were 
committed with firearms (Baltimore Police Department, 2018).  The primary data used for the 
dependent variables in all three studies within this dissertation were homicide and nonfatal 
shooting data from the Baltimore Police Department.  The Baltimore Police Department (BPD) 
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directly provided individual-level information on all homicides and nonfatal shootings between 
January 1, 2003, and November 30, 2015.  The homicide and nonfatal shooting data from BPD 
included the date and physical location of the incident, as well as the victim’s date of birth, 
gender, and age.  Data for homicides and nonfatal shootings occurring between December 1, 
2015, and December 31, 2017, were obtained through the city of Baltimore’s Open Data catalog 
for BPD Part I Victim Based Crime Data (Open Baltimore, 2018).  These data are updated 
weekly by BPD and, in addition to the incident date, include the street block, weapon type, 
premise, and XY coordinates of each reported crime incident, but they do not include any 
victim-specific information. 
 To measure BPD’s enforcement of drug law prohibitions, individual-level arrests for drug 
possession and drug trafficking or distribution violations between January 1, 2003, and 
December 31, 2015, were obtained directly from BPD.  To attempt to account for any influence 
that BPD’s utilization of proactive policing and prioritization of illegal weapon carrying may 
have had on homicide or nonfatal shooting counts, we also obtained data on weapon possession 
arrests for the same time period from BPD.  The drug- and weapon-related arrest data only 
included the arrest date, time, location, and arrest charge(s).  Drug possession, drug 
trafficking/distribution, and weapon possession arrests from January 1, 2016, through 
December 31, 2017, were obtained by downloading all arrest data from Baltimore’s Open Data 
catalog for BPD Arrests (Open Baltimore, 2018) and then using relevant key words to extract 
arrests for drug possession, drug trafficking/distribution and weapon possession.  The Open 
Baltimore database is updated with individual-level arrest data weekly by BPD and includes the 
arrestee’s gender and race, in addition to the arrest date, time, street block location, XY 
coordinates of the arrest, and arrest charge.  The Open Baltimore database for BPD arrests 
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includes a statement that the data on the site represent the most serious arrest charge of an 
individual processed at the city’s Central Booking and Intake Facility, and that arrests for 
individuals who were processed at the city’s Juvenile Booking Facility are excluded from the 
site.  This limitation suggests that some arrest data that could be relevant to our analysis may 
not be included in the Open Baltimore database.  However, a comparison by count and arrest 
type (drug possession, drug trafficking, or weapon possession) of Open Baltimore arrest data 
from January 1, 2012, through December 31, 2015, with the corresponding arrest data provided 
directly by BPD yielded a net 95% match between the two datasets, so Open Baltimore data 
was deemed a suitable substitute for this project. 
 To measurer larger-scale, more resource-intensive and coordinated drug law enforcement 
activity, information was extracted from articles from The Baltimore Sun, the city’s largest print 
media source, that detailed arrests and indictments for illegal drug sales between January 1, 
2003, and December 31, 2017.  A ProQuest Central search was conducted using the Baltimore 
Sun publication identification number (46036) and the following keywords: ("drug" OR 
"narcotic" OR "cocaine" OR "heroin" OR "marijuana") AND ("arrest" OR "prosecution" OR 
"prosecute" OR "indict" OR "indictment").  The ProQuest Central search yielded 3,693 articles, 
of which 809 were reviewed.  Any event documented in a Baltimore Sun article that mentioned 
an arrest and/or indictment of individuals for drug law violations as a “bust.”  The ProQuest 
Central article search was supported by an article search in Google, using the same keywords as 
above but adding “Baltimore” and each year of the study period in separate searches, to ensure 
that no major drug-related arrests were missed.   A drug bust was categorized as “major” if any 
of the following conditions were met: 1) five or more individuals were arrested in the bust; 2) 
charges included drug conspiracy, drug kingpin statute, running a violent drug gang, continuing 
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a criminal enterprise, or Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act 
violations; or 3) one or more suspects faced federal charges and/or federal agents were 
described as being involved in the bust.  If the media article mentioned an indictment only, and 
the arrest date could not be located, the incident was excluded from the analysis.  Articles that 
mentioned arrests for simple drug possession (i.e., the individual was not charged with intent to 
distribute) and articles that described law enforcement action being driven by an offense other 
than illegal drug activity were also excluded from the major drug bust category. 
 Maps for the police posts in Baltimore (n=142), similar to police beats, were obtained from 
BPD.  Previous criminology research has utilized comparable units of analysis to understand the 
impacts of various violence reduction interventions (Sherman and Rogan, 1995; Heissel et al., 
2017; Weisburd et al., 2017). 
 Data on the police posts in which the Safe Streets sites were located, as well as the sites’ 
dates of operation, were provided by the Baltimore City Health Department, which has 
overseen Safe Streets since its inception.  The Safe Streets site location in Madison-Eastend was 
not bounded by police post borders but instead encompassed two different posts.  To account 
for this, a composite “faux post” was created to represent the program boundaries in Madison-
Eastend. 
 The dates and districts for the Operation Ceasefire Baltimore call-ins were obtained from 
the Baltimore Mayor’s Office on Criminal Justice, which staffed the Ceasefire program 





Each analysis in this research project was conducted separately for homicides and nonfatal 
shootings to isolate the effects of the interventions on two different gun violence outcomes.  The 
rationale for this distinction between homicides and nonfatal shootings was that the motivations 
and intentions that led to either outcome may be dissimilar; many homicides are planned acts of 
violence, while nonfatal shootings are often spontaneous or not intended to be lethal (Felson and 
Messner, 1996).  Thus, it is possible that the interventions applied in Baltimore had differential 




Dependent Variables: Homicides, nonfatal shootings 
Independent Variables: Major drug busts, drug possession arrests, drug  
trafficking/distribution arrests 
Control Variables: Weapon possession arrests, post-unrest time period 
The homicide, nonfatal shooting, arrest, and major drug bust locations were geo-located as points 
and then aggregated to the police post polygon level using a shapefile of the Baltimore Police 
Department’s police posts (142 police posts in Baltimore).  The data were then totaled for each 
post for each month between January 2003 and December 2017 (n=180 months per post).  The 
outcomes of interest, homicides or nonfatal shootings, were individually coded as monthly count 
dependent variables.  The monthly count of major drug busts was coded as a series of 
independent variables to measure the additive effects of the busts after one, two, three, four, five, 
six, nine, and twelve months.  Arrests for drug possession and drug trafficking/distribution were 
 
32 
also coded as monthly count independent variables and temporally lagged by one month (t-1) to 
avoid endogeneity concerns (e.g., an increase in shootings may increase enforcement in the same 
month).  Additionally, to test for distinct effects of BPD arrests of large numbers of individuals 
for drug trafficking/distribution within the same month and police post, a “surge” in drug 
trafficking/distribution arrests was defined as 15 or more arrests within a given post and month 
and coded as an independent indicator variable.  The one-, two-, three-, four-, five-, six-, nine-, 
and twelve-month temporally lagged variables for drug trafficking arrest surges were created to 
estimate the duration of any association between homicides or nonfatal shootings in time t 
following arrest surges that occurred in the previous months (t-1, t-2, t-3, etc.).  To attempt to 
account for any influence that a focus by BPD on illegal weapon carrying may have had on gun 
violence, a monthly count of weapon possession arrests was included in the analysis and lagged 
by one month (t-1). 
Analytic Strategy 
A police post-month panel dataset was created and negative binomial regressions were run 
to estimate the incident rate ratio of the relationship between the interventions on monthly 
nonfatal shooting or homicide counts at the police post level.  Negative binomial regression was 
used for these analyses to account for overdispersion in the outcomes of interest.  Both 
homicides and nonfatal shootings are rare outcomes with wide variance across police posts in 
Baltimore, so the variances in counts across the panel dataset were much greater than the means. 
In negative binomial regression, monthly post level counts of homicide or nonfatal shooting 
counts are modeled as a function of covariates through a log-linear link function,   
 ln(it) = 0 + 1X1it + 2X2it … kXkit, 
where it = the log of the count of homicides or nonfatal shootings in post i at time t; 0 is the 
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intercept; and 1X1it … kXkit represent the set predictor and control variables in the model.  The  
general analytic models for each study objective were as follows:   
Objective 1: Examine the spatial-temporal association of homicides or nonfatal shootings in 
Baltimore between 2003 and 2017 as a function of major drug busts (DRUGBUSTS), drug 
possession arrests (DRUGPOSS), drug trafficking arrests (DRUGTRAFF), weapon possession 
arrests (WPNPOSS), and drug trafficking surges (DRUGTRAFFSURGE) 
 ln(it) = 0 + 1DRUGBUSTit + 2DRUGPOSSit + 3DRUGTRAFFit + 4WPNPOSSit +  
 5DRUGTRAFFSURGEit              
Objective 2: Examine whether there are differential effects of the spatial-temporal association 
between homicides or nonfatal shootings and major drug busts if the busts are of individuals 
alleged to be violent actors in the illicit drug trade (DRUGBUST_VIOLENCE). 
 ln(it) = 0 + 1DRUGBUST_VIOLENCEit + 2DRUGPOSSit + 3DRUGTRAFFit +  
4WPNPOSSit   
Objective 3: Examine the spatial-temporal association of homicides or nonfatal shootings as a 
function of major drug busts for which at least one federal agency is involved in the busts 
(DRUGBUST_FEDINVOLVEMENT). 
 ln(it) = 0 + 1DRUGBUST_FEDINVOLVEMENTit + 2DRUGPOSSit +  
3DRUGTRAFFit + 4WPNPOSSit      
Objective 4: Determine if the spatial-temporal association between homicides or nonfatal 
shootings and drug law enforcement changed following the civil unrest in April 2015 
(POSTUNREST) following the in-custody death of Freddie Gray, Jr. 
 ln(it) = 0 + 1DRUGBUSTit + 2DRUGPOSSit + 3DRUGTRAFFit + 5WPNPOSSit +  
 5DRUGTRAFFSURGEit + 6POSTUNRESTit + 7DRUGBUST*POSTUNRESTit +  
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 8DRUGPOSS*POSTUNRESTit + 9DRUGTRAFF*POSTUNRESTit +  
10WPNPOSS*POSTUNRESTit + 11DRUGTRAFFSURGE*POSTUNRESTit  
Generalized linear models were used with robust standard errors to specify that intragroup 
correlation may occur by police post.  To identify and account for any potential displacement 
effects of law enforcement activity, spatial lag versions of the predictor and control variables 
(drug possession arrests, drug trafficking arrests, major drug busts, and weapon possession 
arrests) were included in all models.  Neighboring police posts were defined as those that shared 
a contiguous boundary with the focal police post, with contiguity defined as “at least one point 
on the boundary of one polygon is within the snap distance of at least one point of its 
neighbour,” or analogous to the “queen” move in the game chess (Bivand, 2018, p.2).  A spatial 
lag variable was defined for each focal police post as the mean of that variable in the neighboring 
police posts.  For example, each model considers the monthly count of drug possession arrests in 
the focal police post as well as the average number of drug possession arrests in the neighboring 
police posts.   
A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was conducted to confirm the use of fixed versus random effects 
due to correlation between the unobserved effects and the explanatory variables.  Dummy 
variables for month and year were included in the models to control for seasonality and other 
unmeasured time-variant changes in factors.  To control for post-specific trends throughout the 
study period that could contribute to variance in homicides or nonfatal shootings by post, a 
dummy variable for post was also included.  All models were run with and without the 






 In addition to the analyses and objectives specified above, all analyses were considered at the 
city level in addition to the post level, given that certain drug law enforcement activity, 
particularly major drug busts, may have ripple effects beyond a small geographic area.  
However, the city-level analyses yielded no additional information than the post-level analyses 
presented in this paper and suggested that the smaller unit of analysis offers better precision of 
the estimates.  Two other stratifications of major drug busts were explored as well.  First, the 
differential impact of the number of suspects arrested during the drug busts was examined, 
assuming that the coordinated arrests of larger numbers of individuals at a time could have a 
more noticeable effect on their respective illicit drug markets.  Also, in the media reports of drug 
busts, there were sometimes multiple geographic areas alleged to be illicit drug market locations 
tied to the arrestees.  Thus, the effects of major drug busts were analyzed using two different 
ways of estimation: one that took into account the primary street location of the bust listed in the 
media article, and one that coded each geographic area (street intersection or neighborhood 
linked to a corresponding police post) mentioned in the news article as being impacted by the 
bust.  The first study objective was analyzed using both the stratification by suspects per bust and 
the stratification by single versus multiple locations of the alleged illicit drug market activity.  
The initial results from those analyses generated estimates that varied little from the simpler 
methods of stratification presented here.  Thus, those stratifications were excluded from the final 
models and analyses, and the analyses in this study used the primary street location of the major 







 Dependent Variables: Homicides, nonfatal shootings 
Independent Variable: The presence of the Safe Streets intervention in a police post 
Control Variables: Drug possession arrests, drug trafficking arrests, weapon possession  
arrests 
The homicide, nonfatal shooting, and arrest locations were geo-located as points and then 
aggregated to the police post polygon level using a shapefile of Baltimore’s 142 police posts.  
The data were totaled for each month between January 2003 and December 2017.  All police 
posts were then coded to delineate the respective Safe Streets posts and months in which the 
program was/has been in operation, taking into account periods of inactivity.   
Analytic Strategy 
 The synthetic control method was used to estimate the effects of Safe Streets in each of the 
police posts where the intervention was implemented.  Given the substantial heterogeneity 
among neighborhoods in Baltimore and the inability to directly measure factors that impact 
trends that vary from one neighborhood to the next, it is challenging to find fitting comparison 
police posts to compute the intervention’s effect.  The synthetic control method creates an 
estimate of the counterfactual for the treated police post, or a “synthetic control,” that is 
generated from a weighted combination of comparison police posts from the donor pool, where 
the weights are chosen based on the comparison posts’ ability to most accurately predict the pre-
intervention trends in the outcome variable in the treated police post (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 
2003; Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2010; Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2015).  
This approach creates a vector of weights that minimizes the root mean squared prediction error 
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between the homicides or nonfatal shootings during the pre-intervention period and the weighted 
vector of outcomes and covariates in the control police posts during the pre-intervention period.  
Because the method uses data from only those police posts in the door pool that best fit the 
trends of the treated post prior to the intervention, it can produce a more accurate estimate of the 
counterfactual for the treated police post and the impact of the intervention post-implementation 
than analytic approaches that estimate the treatment effects on a much broader set of data, 
including non-intervention posts which may be substantially different from the intervention post.  
The synthetic control method also avoids the assumption that an intervention’s effects are 
constant across all observations, which underlies estimates gleaned from traditional regression 
analyses.  This methodology is appropriate for comparative case studies and allows for the 
separate estimation of the effects of each Safe Streets site on homicides or nonfatal shootings. 
To construct the appropriate synthetic controls for each Safe Streets site and both outcomes 
of interest, the donor pool of comparison police posts was restricted to the 136 Baltimore City 
police posts that have not implemented a Safe Streets program.  Annual logged averages of 
homicides, nonfatal shootings, and arrests for weapon possession, drug possession, and drug 
trafficking for each year leading up to the intervention were used as pre-intervention covariates 
to estimate the trend for the synthetic control prior to the implementation of Safe Streets in a 
particular police post.  Due to the volatility of homicide or nonfatal shooting count data and to 
ease interpretation, the use of six-month cumulative averages, twelve-month cumulative 
averages, three-month moving averages, and five-month moving averages of the dependent 
variable was tested (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller 2015; Rudolph et al., 2015; Crifasi et al., 
2015).  The five-month averages (t-1, t-1, t, t+1, and t+2) created the most consistent fit and were 
a logical approach for this analysis when considering that the impact of Safe Streets would likely 
 
38 
not be seen for a couple months following the program implementation.  Homicides or nonfatal 
shootings that occurred during the intervention month were excluded from the pre-intervention 
averages.  
The synthetic controls' ability to predict pre-intervention trends in homicide or nonfatal 
shooting rates in the Safe Streets police posts using weighted combinations of select posts over 
the use of all non-Safe Streets police posts was assessed by calculating the pre-intervention 
homicide or nonfatal shooting average in the Safe Streets post and contrasting it with the pre-
intervention homicide or nonfatal shooting average for the entire pool of comparison posts.   
The synthetic control method does not produce traditional tests of statistical significance, so 
a demonstrated way to assess the likelihood that the estimates generated by the synthetic control 
method are due to the interventions is to perform “in-space placebo tests” with each of the 
comparison units and run the analyses with each unit in the donor pool as if it received the 
intervention at the same time as the treated unit (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller 2010; 
Abadie, Diamon and Hainmueller 2015; Rudolph et al., 2015; Crifasi et al., 2015).  Because the 
variance in homicides and nonfatal shootings across police posts in Baltimore is so wide, the 
police posts used for the placebo tests were restricted to only those 64 non-Safe Streets posts in 
the top 50th percentile for homicide and nonfatal shooting counts over the study period (2003-
2017) in order to generate relatively comparative results to the posts where Safe Streets has been 
implemented.  The percent difference in total post-implementation homicide or nonfatal shooting 
counts between the observed and estimated counterfactual from each synthetic control model 
was then calculated.  This allowed for a comparison of the estimated percent change associated 
with the Safe Streets intervention to the percent change estimate derived from the placebo tests 
with the control posts in each respective donor pool.  Finally, the proportion of control posts with 
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an estimated change in homicides or nonfatal shootings that was more favorable than the percent 
change estimated in the Safe Streets posts was calculated.  This proportion, similar to a p-value, 
provided an assessment of how much one can attribute the estimated percent change in 
homicides or nonfatal shootings in the Safe Streets posts to the interventions themselves 




Dependent Variables: Homicides, nonfatal shootings 
Independent Variables: The presence of the Ceasefire enforcement intervention within a 
police district (separate for Western and Eastern Districts) and the cumulative effect of the  
Ceasefire call-ins within a police district (separate for Western and Eastern Districts) 
Control Variables: Drug possession arrests, drug trafficking arrests, weapon possession  
arrests, post-unrest time period 
The homicide, nonfatal shooting, and arrest locations were geo-located as points and then 
aggregated to the police post polygon level using a shapefile of Baltimore’s 142 police posts.  
The data were then totaled for each post for each month between January 2003 and December 
2017 (n=180 months per post).  The outcomes of interest, homicides or nonfatal shootings, were 
individually coded as monthly count dependent variables.  Each police post was assigned to its 
corresponding district number so that the post-level data could also be aggregated to the police 
district level. 
 Although the Ceasefire program team mapped the geographic territories or primary 
locations of individuals and groups identified as being the most violent in the Eastern and 
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Western Districts to neighborhood blocks, the individuals and groups themselves were 
obviously not physically constrained, so enforcement tactics, as well as the messages of 
deterrence and assistance, were also not tightly restricted to just a neighborhood or a police 
post.  Thus, one independent variable, representing the time period following a Ceasefire call-
in, was coded as an indicator variable, with “1” representing a post-call-in month in a police 
post in the Western or Eastern District and “0” otherwise.  If a call-in occurred after the 15th of 
the month, the indicator variable was turned on beginning the following month.  An additional 
independent variable was created to indicate the cumulative total of the call-ins that had 
occurred at a given time, so that each subsequent call-in contributed to the additive effect of the 
intervention in the Western or Eastern District.  The independent variables were coded such that 
there were two variables for each district. 
 Like the homicide and nonfatal shooting data, the drug- and weapon-related arrest data were 
geo-located as points onto a shapefile of Baltimore City, aggregated to the police post polygon 
level, and then totaled for each month of the study period.  Arrest data were then coded as 
monthly count control variables and lagged by one month (t-1) to address endogeneity concerns 
(e.g., shootings can spur increased enforcement in a given area and time).  The civil unrest in 
late April 2015 led to sharp increases in homicides and nonfatal shootings across Baltimore but 
particularly in the Western and Eastern Districts.  Therefore, an indicator variable for the unrest 
was included in all models, with “0” representing the months prior to the unrest and “1” 
representing the months following the unrest. 
Analytic Strategy 
A police post-month panel dataset was created using the data described above, with each 
post coded to its respective police district to capture district-level effects.  Negative binomial 
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regressions were conducted to estimate the incident rate ratio of the relationship between the 
Ceasefire intervention and monthly nonfatal shooting or homicide counts in the Western or 
Districts.  In negative binomial regression, monthly post level counts of homicide or nonfatal 
shooting counts are modeled as a function of covariates through a log-linear link function,   
 ln(it) = 0 + 1X1it + 2X2it … kXkit 
where it = the log of the count of homicides or nonfatal shootings in post i at time t; 0 is the 
intercept; and 1X1it … kXkit represent the set predictor and control variables in the model.  The  
analytic models for this analysis were as follows:   
 ln(it) = 0 + 1CEASEFIREWEST_ENFORCEMENTit +  
 2CEASEFIREWEST_CUMULATIVEit + 3CEASEFIREEAST_ENFORCEMENTit +  
 4CEASEFIREEAST_CUMULATIVEit + 5DRUGPOSSit + 6DRUGTRAFFit +  
 7WPNPOSSit + 8POSTUNRESTit  
An analysis of the aggregate Ceasefire effect was also conducted, using the following model: 
 ln(it) = 0 + 1ANYCEASEFIRE_ENFORCEMENTit +  
 2ANYCEASEFIRE_CUMULATIVEit + 3DRUGPOSSit + 4DRUGTRAFFit +  
 5WPNPOSSit + 6POSTUNRESTit  
The variables in the analytic models are defined as follows:  = homicide or nonfatal shooting 
counts; i = post (n=142); t = month (n = 180); CEASEFIREWEST_ENFORCEMENT = an after-
call-in month in the Western District; CEASEFIREWEST_CUMULATIVE = the number of 
call-ins that had occurred in the Western District in a given month; 
CEASEFIREEAST_ENFORCEMENT = an after-call-in month in the Eastern District; 
CEASEFIREEAST_CUMULATIVE = the number of call-ins that had occurred in the Eastern 
District in a given month; ANYCEASEFIRE_ENFORCEMENT = an after-call-in month in the 
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Western or Eastern District; ANYCEASEFIRE_CUMULATIVE = the number of call-ins that 
had occurred in the Western or Eastern District in a given month; DRUGPOSS = drug 
possession arrests; DRUGTRAFF = drug trafficking/distribution arrests; WPNPOSS = weapon 
possession arrests; POSTUNREST = the months following the civil unrest in Baltimore in late 
April 2015.  
 A Hausman test was conducted to confirm the use of fixed versus random effects due to 
correlation between the unobserved effects and the explanatory variables.  Month- and year-fixed 
effects estimators were included in the models to control for seasonality and other time-variant 
changes in factors not measured in the models.  To control for post-specific unmeasured trends 
throughout the study period that could contribute to variance in homicides or nonfatal shootings, 
a post-level fixed effects estimator was also included.  
 The quantitative analysis was supplemented with semi-structured, one-on-one interviews 
with six key personnel who were instrumentally involved in the Ceasefire intervention.  A copy 
of the interview guide is included in Appendix C.  The key informants were employees of the 
Baltimore Police Department, Baltimore State’s Attorney’s Office, or the Mayor’s Office during 
the design, implementation, and/or execution of Ceasefire.  Recruitment of the key informants 
was conducted based on the researcher’s knowledge of the Ceasefire intervention through the 
researcher’s employment in the Baltimore City Mayor’s Office from February 2013 through 
November 2015.  The key informants were initially contacted for the study by cell phone text, 
email, or Facebook Messenger.  Once the informants agreed to talk by phone, they were called, 
provided an explanation of the study, and asked to participate.  All six of the individuals 
contacted agreed to be interviewed.  The interviews were conducted face-to-face in restaurants or 
office spaces.  The interviewees were instructed that their responses were confidential and would 
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not be reported in a manner that could lead to their identification.  The interviews ranged from 30 
to 75 minutes and were recorded on a laptop using QuickTime Player audio recording software.  
Notes were also taken during the interviews.  After each interview, the recordings were replayed 
and the notes were edited to ensure the details of each conversation were documented in the 
notes.  A grounded analysis was used to identify themes as they emerged from the interview 
data.  The notes from the first interview were reviewed and organized into themes, which were 
used to create a codebook.  The notes from each subsequent interview were reviewed, and words, 
phrases, or sentences were then organized using the codebook.  New themes that emerged were 
added to the codebook.  After reviewing all notes once, the notes were reviewed a second time to 
ensure that content from each interview was properly organized into the appropriate thematic 
category. 
All geocoding of point data and aggregation to police post polygons was completed using 
ESRI Business Analyst 2015 software in ArcGIS Desktop 10.4.1 (ESRI, 2015).  The creation of 
all spatial lag variables was completed using the R Statistical Computing Environment (R Core 
Team, 2018) with R-contributed packages for GEE-based regression inference and spatial 
statistical operations, including gee, rgdal, spdep, and maptools.  All negative binomial 
regressions and synthetic control models were performed in Stata/IC 15.1 for Mac (64-bit Intel) 
(StataCorp, 2017).  Data management was shared across all three software platforms.   
This research project was deemed “not human subject research” by the Johns Hopkins 




Aim 1: Examining the Spatial and Temporal Associations Between Drug Law 
Enforcement Interventions and Gun Violence in Baltimore, Maryland  
 
Introduction 
 Law enforcement agencies in the United States, as well as journalists and crime scholars, 
have long associated much of the violent crime in urban areas with participation in the illegal 
drug trade (Ousey and Lee, 2004; Goldstein, 1985).  Drug law or drug prohibition enforcement, 
defined as “police-, military-, or forced-based responses to illicit drugs that emphasize the 
imposition of criminal laws for drug use and drug-related crimes” (i.e., possession, distribution, 
and production) (Csete et al., 2016), has become a major component of local, state, and federal 
drug prohibition strategies since the 1980s, when laws and sanctions became increasingly 
punitive for drug law violations (Courtwright, 2004).  The use of drug law enforcement 
interventions to address community-level disorder, crime, and violence has become a standard 
operating procedure for many police departments across the country (Reaves, 2015).   However, 
there have been relatively few quantitative research studies on the impact of drug law 
enforcement interventions on violence reduction in the United States.  The available research on 
the relationship between drug law enforcement actions and violent crime suggests that many of 
the actions used by local police agencies to interrupt drug markets may have either an 
undetectable or violence-generating effect on local levels of violence (Werb et al., 2011; 
Mazerolle, Soole and Rambouts, 2006; Csete et al., 2016).  Without a clearer understanding of 
both the real and perceived impact that drug prohibition enforcement interventions have on the 
communities where they are implemented, police department tactics to disrupt illicit drug 
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markets, reduce violence, and ultimately protect and serve their communities may 
unintentionally contribute to quite opposite effects. 
 Data to examine the mechanisms and processes that influence the relationship between drug 
prohibition enforcement and violent crime are difficult to obtain.  Based on research showing 
that individuals involved in the illicit drug trade sometimes engage in the use of violence to 
gain/maintain market share or settle disputes (Donohue and Levitt, 1998; Brownstein, Crimmins 
and Spunt, 2000; Blumstein, 1995), one might theorize that the removal of participants in illegal 
drug markets via arrest and incarceration has the potential to reduce violence and other drug-
related crime.  Alternatively, the disruption of drug distribution networks might instead lead to 
increases in violence through myriad mechanisms.  Dependence on income resulting from drug 
sales by individuals who might have scarce opportunities to make money in the legal economy 
could lead to violence that is motivated by economic desire, such as robbery of other drug 
dealers for money or product (Miron, 1999).  The complex relationship between groups, drugs, 
and violence also plays an important role in the manner in which disruptions in illicit drug 
markets could increase violence (Bellair and McNulty, 2009).  Internal group disputes within 
drug crews over market share and unofficial contractual agreements may arise due to the 
destabilization of business flows (Miron, 1999).  Violence may be utilized as an intimidation or 
elimination strategy to discourage cooperation with law enforcement agents who are targeting 
specific individuals in the drug trade (Reuter, 2009).  Furthermore, the disruption of markets due 
to law enforcement intervention, via the removal of competitors, could also increase profits for 
other sellers, potentially inciting remaining or would-be suppliers to forcefully and violently 
secure the now-unattended market share (Reuter, 2009; Miron, 1999).  Additionally, police 
pressure could unintentionally increase predatory or retaliatory behavior by leading dealers to 
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rush transactions and thus increasing the opportunity for swindling or ambush, creating a 
marketplace for dealers to sell adulterated or fake product, or raising the risk of violence against 
perceived police informants (Jacques and Allen, 2014). 
The association between the illicit drug market and violent crime has helped to justify the 
substantial increase in the late 1980s and 1990s in resource allocation and commitment to drug 
control policies by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies nationwide (Sacco, 2014).  
Billions of dollars are spent in the United States each year at the local, state, and federal levels on 
domestic enforcement of drug control policies (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2015), 
yet there are few existing published studies that have quantitatively examined the impact that 
drug law enforcement in the United States has had on decreasing supply, consumption, or 
violence associated with illicit drug markets.  These studies have analyzed various proxy 
measures for drug law enforcement, such as rates or counts of drug arrests, number of police 
officers assigned to drug law enforcement initiatives, or resource allocation in the police 
departments’ budget for drug-related interventions, on their impact on violent crime rates.  Most 
of the published analyses have found that drug law enforcement actually leads to increases in 
violence.   
 A 2006 meta-analytical review of street drug law enforcement examined evaluations of 
several interventions launched, managed, and/or implemented by local law enforcement to 
prevent or reduce illegal drug use, illegal drug selling, and associated problems in drug selling 
locations (Mazerolle, Soole and Rambouts, 2006).  The researchers assessed pre- to post-
intervention effects on a number of outcome variables, including drug- and nondrug-related calls 
for service, property crimes, and violent offenses, and found that of the reviewed studies that 
measured impact on reported crimes against persons or calls for service for violent crimes 
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demonstrated significant impact.  A 2011 systematic literature review to assess the relationship 
between drug law enforcement approaches and drug market-related violence reduction yielded 
eleven U.S.-based studies that employed longitudinal data analyses of empirical data (Werb et 
al., 2011).  Nine of the eleven quantitative evaluations reviewed reported a significantly positive 
(harmful) relationship between drug law enforcement and drug market violence.  For instance, an 
in-depth economic analysis on financial activities of a drug-dealing street gang in Chicago found 
that the lack of official dispute settlement channels and pressure from drug law enforcement 
contributed to high levels of violence.  A longitudinal observational study of 67 counties in 
Florida and found that drug enforcement measures such as resource allocation, number of sworn 
officers, and number of drug arrests and convictions were positively correlated with Part I 
violent crimes (Benson, 1998).  An examination of violent crime rates to the proportion of drug 
arrests to total arrests in 24 United States Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in 1992 and 
1993 revealed a significant and positive association between the two rates (Resignato, 2000). 
Looking beyond the United States, there is also evidence that drug prohibition enforcement 
may contribute to violent crime.  The Johns Hopkins Lancet-Commission on Drug Policy and 
Health reviewed existing literature on public health issues stemming from drug policy and found 
that much of the drug-related violence worldwide is associated with the protection of illicit drug 
markets by drug cartels against armed government or paramilitary forces.  The researchers also 
highlighted that “some experts have suggested that heavy crackdowns by drug police can lead to 
major increases in violence when disruption of a criminal network leads rival groups to intensify 
their efforts to capture the territory of the weakened group" (Csete et al., 2016, p. 7), using 
Mexico and Central America as examples.  Mexico has experienced a historic rise in homicides 
in since 2006, unprecedented for any country not formally involved in war.  This dramatic 
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increase in homicide has been linked to the government's decision to utilize the military to fight 
drug traffickers in civilian areas (Heinle, Ferreira and Shirk, 2015).  Other research found that 
approximately 25% of Colombia’s homicide rate between 1994 and 2008 could be explained by 
law and militarized enforcement of drug laws surrounding the illicit cocaine trade, and that 
homicides spiked when drug law enforcement was most intense (Mejia and Restrepo, 2014).  
While one can recognize that there are substantial differences between the United States and 
Mexico or Colombia, given the findings in existing literature, the potential correlations between 
drug law enforcement tactics and violence associated with the illicit drug trade in this country 
cannot be ignored. 
The existing peer-reviewed research on the relationship between law enforcement-led drug 
market disruptions and violent crime in the United States are ptimarily based on data from the 
1980s, 1990s and very early 2000s.  Furthermore, the majority have either been descriptive 
studies in one city (Goldstein et al., 1997) or cross-sectional analyses across multiple localities 
(Rasmussen, Benson and Sollars, 1993; Benson, 2001), so they do not allow for estimations of 
trends over time.  Also, given that illicit drug markets may be geographically localized – 
potentially operating only within specific sections of a given neighborhood – it is important to 
conduct research on the effects of drug law enforcement on violence at the smallest geographic 
unit of analysis possible.  
The current study expands the literature examining the impact of drug law enforcement on 
gun violence in the United States by analyzing changes over space and time in counts of 
homicides or nonfatal shootings in Baltimore, Maryland, following interventions used by the 
Baltimore Police Department to explicitly enforce drug prohibition laws.  The study objectives 
were as follows: 
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1. Examine the spatial-temporal association of drug law enforcement interventions – drug 
possession arrests, drug trafficking/distribution arrests, and major drug busts – and 
homicides or nonfatal shootings in Baltimore. 
2. Examine whether there are differential effects of the spatial-temporal association 
between major drug busts and gun violence if the arrests in those busts are of individuals 
alleged to be violent actors in the illicit drug trade.  
3. Examine whether the spatial-temporal association between major drug busts and gun 
violence in Baltimore differs based on the involvement of at least one federal agency in 
the arrests.   
4. Determine if the spatial-temporal association between drug law enforcement in Baltimore 
and gun violence changed following the civil unrest in April 2015 after the in-custody 





 The study was conducted in Baltimore, Maryland, a city that has had consistently high rates 
of both gun violence and illicit drug use for decades.  In 2014, Baltimore had the sixth highest 
rate of violence among American cities with populations greater than 250,000 people (United 
States Department of Justice, 2014).  Additionally, Baltimore has one of the highest per capita 
rates of injection drug use in the United States (Friedman et. al, 2004), and targeting illicit drug 







 A multiple interrupted time-series study design was used to examine the association between 
drug law enforcement interventions employed by the Baltimore Police Department – specifically, 
drug possession arrests, drug trafficking arrests, and major drug busts - and homicides or 
nonfatal shootings in the months following those interventions.  The interrupted time-series 
design is appropriate for studies of individual treatment groups that are repeatedly measured over 
time to assess an outcome of interest before and after an intervention (Biglan, Ary and 
Wagenaar, 2000).  This design allows for an evaluation of the various interventions’ associations 
with the outcomes of interest: homicides or nonfatal shooting counts in each of the 142 police 
posts (precincts) in Baltimore.  
 
Data Sources 
 The outcomes of interest for this study were homicide or nonfatal shooting counts, as they 
are the most reliably tracked incidents of violence and the majority of homicides committed in 
Baltimore involve firearms; over 84% of all Baltimoreans killed between 2012 and 2017 died 
by gun violence (Baltimore Police Department, 2018).  The Baltimore Police Department 
(BPD) directly provided individual-level information on all homicides and nonfatal shootings 
between January 1, 2003, and November 30, 2015.  The homicide and nonfatal shooting data 
from BPD included the date and physical location of the incident, as well as the victim’s date of 
birth, gender, and age.  Data for homicides and nonfatal shootings occurring between December 
1, 2015, and December 31, 2017, were obtained through the city of Baltimore’s Open Data 
catalog for BPD Part I Victim Based Crime Data (Open Baltimore, 2018).  These data are 
updated weekly by BPD and, in addition to the incident date, include the street block, weapon 
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type, premise, and XY coordinates of each reported crime incident, but they do not include any 
victim-specific information. 
 To measure BPD’s enforcement of drug law prohibitions, individual-level arrests for drug 
possession and drug trafficking or distribution violations between January 1, 2003, and 
December 31, 2015, were obtained directly from BPD.  To attempt to account for any influence 
that BPD’s utilization of proactive policing and prioritization of illegal weapon carrying may 
have had on homicide or nonfatal shooting counts, data on weapon possession arrests for the 
same time period was also obtained from BPD.  The drug- and weapon-related arrest data only 
included the arrest date, time, location, and arrest charge(s).  Drug possession, drug 
trafficking/distribution, and weapon possession arrests from January 1, 2016, through 
December 31, 2017, were obtained by downloading all arrest data from Baltimore’s Open Data 
catalog for BPD Arrests (Open Baltimore, 2018) and then using relevant key words to extract 
arrests for drug possession, drug trafficking/distribution and weapon possession.  The Open 
Baltimore database is updated with individual-level arrest data weekly by the Baltimore Police 
Department and includes the arrestee’s gender and race, in addition to the arrest date, time, 
street block location, XY coordinates of the arrest, and arrest charge.  The online database 
includes a statement that the data on the site represent the most serious arrest charge of an 
individual processed at Baltimore’s Central Booking and Intake Facility and that arrests for 
individuals who were processed at Baltimore’s Juvenile Booking Facility are excluded from the 
site.  This limitation suggests that some arrest data that could be relevant to the analysis may not 
be included in the Open Baltimore database.  However, a comparison by count and arrest type 
(drug possession, drug trafficking, or weapon possession) of Open Baltimore arrest data from 
January 1, 2012, through December 31, 2015, with the corresponding arrest data provided 
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directly by BPD yielded a net 95% match between the two datasets, so the Open Baltimore data 
was chosen as a suitable substitute for this analysis. 
 To measurer larger-scale, more resource-intensive and coordinated drug law enforcement 
activity, information was extracted from articles from The Baltimore Sun, the city’s largest print 
media source, that detailed arrests and indictments for illegal drug sales between January 1, 
2003, and December 31, 2017.  A ProQuest Central search was conducted using the Baltimore 
Sun publication identification number (46036) and the following keywords: ("drug" OR 
"narcotic" OR "cocaine" OR "heroin" OR "marijuana") AND ("arrest" OR "prosecution" OR 
"prosecute" OR "indict" OR "indictment").  The ProQuest Central search yielded 3,693 articles, 
of which 809 were reviewed.  Any event documented in a Baltimore Sun article that mentioned 
an arrest and/or indictment of individuals for drug law violations as a “bust.”  The ProQuest 
Central article search was supported by an article search in Google, using the same keywords as 
above but adding “Baltimore” and each year of the study period in separate searches, to ensure 
that no major drug-related arrests were missed.  A drug bust was categorized as “major” if any of 
the following conditions were met: 1) five or more individuals were arrested in the bust; 2) 
charges included drug conspiracy, drug kingpin statute, running a violent drug gang, continuing a 
criminal enterprise, or Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act violations; 
or 3) one or more suspects faced federal charges and/or federal agents were described as being 
involved in the bust.  If the media article mentioned an indictment only, and the arrest date could 
not be located, the incident was excluded from the analysis.  Articles that mentioned arrests for 
simple drug possession (i.e., individual was not charged with intent to distribute) and articles that 
described law enforcement action being driven by an offense other than illegal drug activity were 




The dependent variables for this study were homicide or nonfatal shootings.  The 
explanatory variables were drug busts, drug possession arrests, drug trafficking/distribution 
arrests.  Weapon possession arrests, as well as a variable indicating the months following the 
civil unrest, were used as control variables.  The homicide, nonfatal shooting, arrest, and major 
drug bust locations were geo-located as points and then aggregated to the police post polygon 
level using a shapefile of BPD’s police posts (142 police posts in Baltimore).  The data were then 
totaled for each post for each month between January 2003 and December 2017 (n=180 months 
per post).  The outcomes of interest, homicides or nonfatal shootings, were individually coded as 
monthly count dependent variables.  The monthly count of major drug busts was coded as a 
series of independent variables to measure the additive effects of the busts after one, two, three, 
four, five, six, nine, and twelve months.  Arrests for drug possession and drug 
trafficking/distribution were also coded as monthly count independent variables and temporally 
lagged by one month (t-1) to avoid endogeneity concerns (e.g., an increase in shootings may 
increase enforcement in the same month).  Additionally, to test for distinct effects of BPD arrests 
of large numbers of individuals for drug trafficking/distribution within the same month and 
police post, a “surge” in drug trafficking/distribution arrests was defined as 15 or more arrests 
within a given post and month and coded as an independent indicator variable.  The one-, two-, 
three-, four-, five-, six-, nine-, and twelve-month temporally lagged variables for drug trafficking 
arrest surges were created to estimate the duration of any association between homicides or 
nonfatal shootings in time t following arrest surges that occurred in the previous months (t-1, t-2, 
t-3, etc.).  To attempt to account for any influence that a focus by BPD on illegal weapon may 
 
54 
have had on gun violence, a monthly count of weapon possession arrests was included in the 
analysis and lagged by one month (t-1). 
 
Analytic Strategy 
A police post-month panel dataset was created and regressions were run using generalized 
linear models with a negative binomial distribution.  Robust standard errors were specified to 
account for intragroup correlation that may occur by police post.  A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
was conducted to confirm the use of fixed versus random effects due to correlation between the 
unobserved effects and the explanatory variables.  Dummy variables for month and year were 
included in the models to control for seasonality and other unmeasured time-variant changes in 
factors.  To control for post-specific trends throughout the study period that could contribute to 
variances in homicides or nonfatal shootings by post, a dummy variable for post was also 
included. 
 To identify and account for any potential displacement effects of law enforcement activity, 
spatial lag versions of the predictor and control variables (drug possession arrests, drug 
trafficking arrests, major drug busts, and weapon possession arrests) were included in all models.  
Neighboring police posts were defined as those that shared a contiguous boundary with the focal 
police post, with contiguity defined as “at least one point on the boundary of one polygon is 
within the snap distance of at least one point of its neighbour,” or analogous to the “queen” move 
in the game chess (Bivand, 2018, p.2).  A spatial lag variable was defined for each focal police 
post as the mean of that variable in the neighboring police posts.  For example, each model 
considers the monthly count of drug possession arrests in the focal police post as well as the 
average number of drug possession arrests in the neighboring police posts.   
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All models were run with and without the corresponding spatial lag variables and tested for 
model fit.  The spatial lag variables generally did not improve model fit or suggest spillover 
effects of violence and were excluded from the final models; exceptions are detailed in the 
Results section.  Estimates were exponentiated and are presented as incident rate ratios with 
associated p-values; asterisks delineate the estimates that were significant at the p<0.05, p<0.01, 
and p<0.001. 
All geocoding of point data and aggregation to police post polygons was completed using 
ESRI Business Analyst 2015 software in ArcGIS Desktop 10.4.1 (ESRI, 2015).  The creation of 
all spatial lag variables was completed using the R Statistical Computing Environment (R Core 
Team, 2018) with R-contributed packages for GEE-based regression inference and spatial 
statistical operations, including gee, rgdal, spdep, and maptools.  All negative binomial 
regressions were performed in Stata/IC 15.1 for Mac (64-bit Intel) (StataCorp, 2017).  Data 
management was shared across all three software platforms.   
This study was deemed “not human subject research” by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
School of Public Health. 
 
Results 
During the study period of January 2003 through December 2017, there were 3,936 
homicides and 8,246 nonfatal shootings recorded by the Baltimore Police Department.  Three-














 BPD also recorded 198,056 drug possession arrests, 84,748 drug trafficking arrests, and 
17,571 weapon possession arrests during the same time period.  The three-month moving 
averages for drug possession and drug trafficking/distribution arrest counts are illustrated in 
Figure 2.2.  While the number of drug-related arrests steadily decreased over the study period, 
and drug possession arrests dropped dramatically after the state of Maryland decriminalized 
possession of small amounts of marijuana in 2014, the number of arrests for simple weapon 
possession remained relatively stable, with the exception of a spike in weapon possession arrests 
for about one year following the civil unrest that occurred in Baltimore in late April 2015 (see 





















































































































































The geo-location of the homicide, nonfatal shooting, and arrest data resulted in the retention 
of 98.9% of homicides, 99.2% of nonfatal shootings, 93.6% of drug possession arrests, 93.0% of 
drug trafficking arrests, and 90.7% of weapon possession arrests. 
Out of 160 total drug busts in Baltimore between 2003 and 2017 that were reported in online 
articles from the Baltimore Sun and other local media outlets for this study period, 72 were 
determined to be major drug busts in Baltimore City.  However, details on the respective arrest 
locations, arrest years, and/or arrest months were unavailable for 28 busts, leaving 44 major drug 
busts for inclusion in this study.  There were 815 drug trafficking arrest surges during the study 
period. 
Table 2.1 presents the results from the first set of negative binomial regressions.  Estimates 
for the association between major drug busts and homicides suggested a harmful relationship, 
while the association between major drug busts and nonfatal shootings suggested a protective 
relationship, though none of the estimates for either outcome of interest were statistically 




































































































































Drug Traff. Arrests Drug Poss Arrests
 
58 
was found.  Drug possession arrests in the police post were the arrests took place were associated 
with slight increases in nonfatal shootings in the following month (Incident Rate Ratio (IRR): 
1.005, p=0.043), while the spatial lag (SL) for drug possession arrests suggested that an increase 
in drug possession arrests in neighboring police posts was associated with a decrease in nonfatal 
shootings in the main post in the following month (IRR: 0.986, p=0.043).  Drug trafficking arrest 
surges were associated with a 16-24% increase in nonfatal shootings in the three months (IRR: 
1.237, p=0.002), four months (IRR: 1.164, p=0.051), and five months (IRR: 1.242, p=0.015) 
following those surges. 
 






The second analysis considered whether the relationship between major drug busts and 
homicides and or nonfatal shootings might change if the individuals arrested in those busts were 
alleged to be violent actors in the illicit drug trade.  While it is believed by law enforcement that 
many of the individuals arrested in major drug busts are involved either directly or indirectly in 
illicit drug market violence, this analysis concentrated on specific mentions in news articles of 
the arrested individuals’ alleged ties to homicides or nonfatal shootings in the city.  There were 
13 major drug busts in Baltimore City for which the media articles made explicit note of the 
arrested individuals’ or groups’ ties to homicides or nonfatal shootings; 10 of those 13 busts 
could be geo-located and were included in the analysis. 
 There was no statistically significant association between homicides and major drug busts 
with or without explicit, alleged ties to homicides or nonfatal shootings (Table 2.2).  On the 
other hand, taking into account major drug busts of individuals who were not linked to alleged 
homicides or nonfatal shootings, major drug busts of individuals who were alleged to be 
connected to homicides or nonfatal shootings were associated with a 52% reduction in nonfatal 
shootings after four months, (IRR: 0.481, p=0.045), a 49% reduction in nonfatal shootings after 
five months (IRR: 0.507, p=0.018), and a 47% reduction in nonfatal shootings after six months 




















 There were 22 of 44 major drug busts in this study for which at least one federal agency 
shared credit - the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or United States Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement.  No significant associations were found between homicides or nonfatal 
shootings and major drug busts stratified by federal agency involvement; estimates are available 
in Appendix A. 
 The final analysis considered whether the civil unrest in April 2015 following the in-
custody death of Freddie Gray, Jr. changed the magnitude or direction of the association 
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between drug law enforcement and homicides or nonfatal shootings.  Table 2.3 details the total 
numbers of homicides, nonfatal shootings, arrests, and major drug busts that occurred before 
and after the unrest.   
 
Table 2.3: Total Events Included in Study, Pre- and Post-Civil Unrest in April 2015 
 Before/During Civil Unrest After Civil Unrest 
Homicide Victims 2,964 932 
Nonfatal Shooting Victims 6,291 1,888 
Drug Possession Arrests 174,842 10,455 
Drug Trafficking Arrests 74,544 4,280 
Weapon Possession Arrests 13,106 2,832 
Drug Trafficking Arrest Surges 801 14 
Major Drug Busts 31 13 
 
 Two separate models were used to test the associations between major drug busts and drug 
trafficking arrest surges and the dependent variables, though the results are presented together in 
Table 2.4.  The inclusion of spatial lag variables improved the fit for both models but were 
overall nonsignificant and did not add value to the analysis, so with the exception of the drug 
possession arrests spatial lag, the lag estimates for these models are only presented in Appendix 
A.  For homicides, the only significant estimate was for the “post unrest” indicator variable (in 
the major drug bust models, IRR: 1.499, p=0.015; in the drug trafficking arrest surges model, 
IRR: 1.470, p=0.022).  Estimates for the major drug busts prior to the unrest, at any temporal 
duration, were in the harmful direction but nonsignificant.  Estimates for major drug busts 
following the unrest were generally in the protective direction, but the estimates were not 
significant.  There was no consistent pattern for the association between drug trafficking arrest 
surges and homicide, before or after the civil unrest.   
The regression analyses for nonfatal shootings, on the other hand, yielded several interesting 
findings.  First, as expected, the “post unrest” indicator variable showed that shootings increased 
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over 71% following the unrest.  Also, the associations between drug possession arrests and 
nonfatal shootings appeared to only hold prior to the unrest, as the estimates for “post unrest” 
interacted with drug possession arrests or the lag variable for drug possession arrests were no 
longer significant.  The control variable, weapon possession arrests, was associated with a 6% 
increase in nonfatal shootings in the months following their execution (IRR: 1.063, p=0.016).  
The associations between major drug busts and nonfatal shootings prior to or following the 
unrest appeared to be protective after the first month following the busts, although none of the 
estimates were significant in the analysis.  In models examining the differential temporal effects 
of drug trafficking arrest surges, the arrest surges prior to the unrest were associated with a 16-
27% increase in nonfatal shootings in the three to five months following their execution.  No 
clear pattern of association between nonfatal shootings and drug trafficking arrest surges after 
the unrest could be ascertained, given that the statistically significant estimates varied greatly in 




Table 2.4: Results for Pre- and Post-Unrest Analyses, Major Drug Bust and Drug Trafficking Arrest 





This research sought to understand the relationship between drug law enforcement and gun 
violence by considering how small- and large-scale arrests of individuals involved in the illicit 
drug trade may lead to changes in homicide or nonfatal shooting rates in the areas where the 
arrests or drug activity occurred.  The analyses presented in this study suggest that drug 
possession arrests, drug trafficking arrests, and major drug busts, regardless of the presence of 
federal agency involvement or the potential apprehension of violent individuals in those busts, 
did not led to an appreciable reduction in homicides in Baltimore over the fifteen-year study 
period.  Major drug busts overall also did not lead to reductions in nonfatal shootings.  There is 
evidence that major drug busts of individuals who were allegedly and explicitly linked to 
violence may have some protective effect on nonfatal shootings, but this needs to be further 
explored with future research, given that most estimates were nonsignificant and this analysis 
only found protective effects when comparing those busts to busts of individuals not explicitly 
linked to violence.  Drug possession arrests, as well as drug trafficking/distribution arrest surges, 
were associated with statistically significant increases in nonfatal shootings in the months 
following their occurrences.  The estimates for the spatial lag variable for drug possession arrests 
suggest potential displacement of illicit drug activity following the arrests.  Many individuals 
who are arrested for drug possession may also be low-level drug sellers, as the user and seller 
populations often overlap (Floyd et al., 2010; Vaughn et al., 2015).  Thus, one theory to explain 
the potential displacement is that arrests of individuals in one neighborhood leads to sellers in 
bordering areas moving in to supply the now-unattended market, and this migration of sellers 
translates into less violence in the areas from which the sellers came.  However, additional 
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research is needed to further understand the dynamics related to illicit drug activity following the 
arrests of individuals for drug possession and to determine if there is support for this theory.   
Weapon possession arrests in the post-unrest period were associated with increases in 
nonfatal shootings in the one month following their occurrences.  This finding is difficult to 
interpret; although one might theorize that an arrest of a group member for weapon possession 
could sometimes cause concern regarding law enforcement cooperation and could potentially 
lead to intra-group disputes or even violence, it is hard to comprehend how the arrest of 
individuals for weapon possession would consistently lead to increases in shootings in the 
following month.   
The findings from this study are congruent with the existing literature on the relationship 
between drug law enforcement and violence in cities in the United States and countries around 
the world.  These results suggest that drug law enforcement has little, if any, protective impact 
on gun violence, and is more likely to instead be associated with increased violence in the 
neighborhoods where the law enforcement interventions occur.  The Drug Market Intervention 
(DMI), or “pulling levers” policing, is a strategy first implemented in High Point, North 
Carolina, to reduce crime and violence associated with open-air drug markets (Corsaro et al., 
2012).  The intervention combines various components of other strategies found to be effective 
at reducing various types of crime, such as problem-solving policing, focused deterrence, 
targeted enforcement, reconciliation between law enforcement and communities, and community 
engagement.  Large reductions in drug market-related crime and violence were attributed to the 
DMI strategy in High Point; however, most replications of the intervention in other cities have 
not yielded similar reductions in violent crime and, similar to the findings in this study, the 
intervention has at times been associated with increases in violence instead (Braga, Weisburd 
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and Turchan, 2018; Webster and Buggs, 2017).  Thus, little evidence supports the notion that 
drug law enforcement, even with incorporated elements of successful crime-reduction 
approaches, can lead to decreased gun violence.  The market forces that affect the demand for 
illicit drugs, as well as the potential profits to be made, especially for those who have lack 
alternative economic opportunities, appear to be overwhelmingly difficult to overcome through 
the threats of incarceration and sanctions that come with the enforcement of drug prohibition. 
The finding that major drug busts focused on individuals believed to be involved in violence 
may lead to better outcomes than busts of those not explicitly linked to violence is also consistent 
with existing literature on focused deterrence, which devotes law enforcement and community 
resources to identifying and apprehending violent, group-involved individuals (Kennedy, 2006).  
The focused deterrence approach to group violence reduction has been found to have significant 
reductions in violent crime, even in communities with high rates of drug activity (Braga, 
Weisburd and Turchan, 2018).  Concentrating law enforcement efforts on individuals most 
responsible for violence and coordinating their strategies with community organizations and 
residents is far more likely to help achieve desired public safety gains than continuing to direct 
enforcement on drug law prohibitions.   
The limitations of this research are important to acknowledge.  The use of police arrest data 
as a measure of the extent and location of illicit drug markets is limited in that it reflects the 
actions of the police department itself, rather than capturing an accurate measure of drug market-
related activity.  Lagged effects of the drug law enforcement interventions were included in this 
study to help minimize concerns of endogeneity.  Another issue with the use of police arrest data 
is that they do not capture federal drug-related arrests, as those arrested individuals are not 
processed through the same system as those arrested by the Baltimore Police Department.  There 
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is not a reliable database of federal drug-related arrests, but future research in this area would 
ideally include those arrests in the analyses.  
There are also limitations of the use of media reports to account for the details of major drug 
busts, as it is possible that the number of busts included in this study is an underestimate of the 
total major drug busts over the study period.  However, the use of print or online media to 
document events is a common way to utilize publicly available data for research, and it seems 
logical that the arrests of major actors in the illegal drug trade, particularly those believed to be 
tied to violence, would be documented in the media and emphasized to the public as 
accomplishments by law enforcement.  An additional limitation of this project is that there are 
assumptions made about the appropriate geographic unit of analysis.  Gun violence is more 
likely to occur at the street or block level, and thus the aggregation of data to the police post level 
can result in loss of precision.  However, prior research on gun and drug market-related violence 
has utilized police beats or police posts as the unit of analysis, primarily since this is the smallest 
unit for which law enforcement-specific incident-level data are available, and effect sizes have 
been detected at this unit in numerous studies, including this one. 
This study also has several strengths.  This research is only one of two known studies to use a 
longitudinal data analysis to estimate a spatial-temporal association between drug law 
enforcement interventions and gun violence, and it is the only study that explored potential 
differential effects of major drug busts due to the involvement of federal agents or the alleged 
connections to violence among the arrestees.  The study relied on study designs and analytic 
methods used reliably in previous research on drug market-related violence and/or the 
concentration of violent victimization among vulnerable populations.  It also will help shed 
important light on how drug law enforcement interventions may impact the public safety, and 
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thus the health and well-being, of communities impacted by high rates of illicit drug activity and 
violent crime. 
 Policymakers at the local, state, and federal levels must seriously consider the harms of drug 
control policy versus its benefits.  By continuing to invest heavily in drug law enforcement 
strategies that are not increasing public safety, they are undercutting efforts and investments that 
could provide the public with effective and sustainable public safety strategies.  There must be 
candid discussions about the true costs of current drug law enforcement policies and the 
implementation of new strategies that will improve the quality of life for all citizens and 
communities impacted by illicit drug markets without imposing harm to communities, especially 





Aim 2: Evaluating the effects of Safe Streets Baltimore on gun violence 
 
Introduction 
 City leaders in Baltimore, Maryland, have long grappled with how to address the city’s 
stubbornly high rates of gun violence.  In 2007, the city introduced a community-based public 
health intervention that had demonstrated success in reducing homicides and nonfatal shootings 
in other cities in the United States (Webster et al., 2013).  Modeled after the CeaseFire (now 
called Cure Violence) program in Chicago, the intervention was designed to reduce the incidence 
of violence, change behaviors of youth at high risk of violence perpetration by providing 
alternative methods of issue resolution and increasing the perceived risks and costs of 
involvement in violence, and change social and community norms about the acceptability of 
using guns to resolve conflict.  In Baltimore, the program was implemented under the name Safe 
Streets.  Since its inception in 2007, Safe Streets has been implemented in a total of seven 
neighborhoods over the past decade, although as of June 2018, the program was in operation in 
only four neighborhoods.  An early evaluation of Safe Streets found that the program was 
associated with statistically significant reductions in homicides and/or non-fatal shootings in 
three of the four neighborhoods where it was implemented, as well as in neighboring 
communities (Webster et al., 2013).  However, the researchers found that the intervention effects 
were inconsistent across sites and noted that further reductions in gun violence might have been 
possible with stronger program implementation and greater fidelity to the original Chicago 
model.  Since the original evaluation of the Safe Streets program, Safe Streets was expanded to 
three additional neighborhoods in Baltimore, yet no formal evaluation of the program’s impact 
on gun violence incidents has since been conducted.  The purpose of this study was to build on 
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the earlier analysis of Safe Streets’ impact on gun violence and examine the effectiveness of the 
program in all of the neighborhoods where it has existed.  
 
The Cure Violence Model 
 Cure Violence is a multi-component, community-level intervention that employs street 
outreach workers to develop relationships and engage with individuals at high risk for 
committing or being victims of violence.  The program model entails three key components: 
interrupting transmission of violence by mediating conflicts and limiting the likelihood of 
retaliation; identifying those at highest risk of perpetration of violence and reducing their risk 
through behavior change and linkage to needed services; and changing community norms around 
violence through community organization and anti-violence messaging (Cure Violence, 2018).  
The outreach workers often themselves have had extensive criminal histories, previous 
incarcerations, and/or former gang affiliations and are generally well known in the communities 
in which they work.  Being formerly engaged in and familiar with the very behaviors and 
activities they hope to change increases the likelihood that the outreach workers will be seen by 
their intended clients as credible messengers and thus potentially trustworthy resources.  The 
outreach staff serve as role models who can exhibit prosocial behavior while also helping to link 
the individuals to critical supports and services (educational, financial, health, job training, etc.).  
Through the relationships built by the outreach workers and the connections to systems and 
supports that can help address the needs of clients and their families, these at-risk individuals 
will ideally choose positive paths of development and conflict resolution.   
 The program also employs special outreach workers who operate primarily as violence 
interrupters, working to identify, resolve and de-escalate potentially dangerous conflicts that 
could lead to shootings.  These staff play an essential part in working with individuals with high 
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risk of violence perpetration to teach them how to resolve conflict and situations that elicit 
negative affect without resorting to lethal violence, recognizing that while the program cannot 
always intervene at the initial act of violence, it can minimize the spread of violence by 
interrupting that transmission through conflict mediation.  The third key component of the 
intervention involves community mobilization and addressing social norms that perpetuate 
violence.  The program staff help to organize responses to homicide and nonfatal shooting 
incidents and engage with community partners to promote anti-violence messages and an 
intolerance for using guns to resolve conflicts, often through public events or social campaigns 
(Butts et al., 2015). 
 The Cure Violence program model has been implemented and evaluated in numerous cities 
around the United States.  Impact studies of the program have found mixed results of the 
intervention’s success at reducing gun homicides and nonfatal shootings (Butts et al., 2015; 
Cerdá, Tracy and Keyes, 2017).  For example, in Chicago, an interrupted time series analysis of 
the program found that the program was associated with 16-28% reductions in nonfatal shootings 
in four of seven Cure Violence communities and had varying impact across sites on outcomes 
such as gang involvement in homicide and retaliatory shootings by gang members (Skogan et al., 
2009).  An independent evaluation of Philadelphia’s Cure Violence program found that the 
intervention led to a statistically significant 30% reduction in nonfatal shootings after two years 
(Cure Violence, 2018), while an analysis of a program based upon the Cure Violence model in 
Phoenix, Arizona, found that the intervention was actually associated with a significant increase 
in nonfatal shootings and a significant decrease in assaults (Fox et al., 2015). 
 Several evaluations of Cure Violence model replications have also examined the program’s 
influence on social and community norms about gun violence.   These studies found that the 
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intervention positively influenced youth’s willingness to use violence to settle conflict (Delgado, 
Alsabahi and Butts, 2017) and increased confidence in the intervention’s engagement with 
community around antiviolence messaging (Picard-Fritsche and Cerniglia, 2013).  
 
Safe Streets in Baltimore, Maryland 
 In 2007, the Baltimore City Health Department received a $1.6 million grant from the U.S. 
Department of Justice to implement the Cure Violence program model in Baltimore (Webster et 
al., 2013).  The program, named Safe Streets, serves youth ages 14 to 25 who are at the highest 
risk of perpetrating violence and living in communities that experience high rates of gun 
homicides and nonfatal shootings.  Safe Streets was initiated in single police posts within four 
neighborhoods – McElderry Park, Elwood Park, Madison-Eastend, and Cherry Hill - between 
2007 and 2008.  A fifth site was planned in a police post in the Union Square neighborhood but 
encountered substantial implementation challenges and was terminated within one year.  The 
Safe Streets program expanded to Baltimore’s Mondawmin community in 2012 and Lower Park 
Heights in 2013.  Following the civil unrest that occurred following the death of Freddie Gray, 
Jr., in April 2015, and the sharp increase in gun violence across the city but particularly in West 
Baltimore, city officials opened a Safe Streets site in the Sandtown-Winchester community in 
2016.   
 Researchers analyzed Safe Streets’ impact on gun violence several years after the program 
was implemented in Baltimore.  Using a difference-in-differences analytic strategy to compare 
homicide and nonfatal shooting incident rates in intervention sites to rates in bordering 
communities and other communities with high rates of violence, and controlling for law 
enforcement activities and arrests, the researchers found that only the Cherry Hill program was 
associated with significant reductions in both homicides (-56%) and nonfatal shootings (-34%) 
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(Webster et al., 2013), while the other sites had reductions in either homicides or nonfatal 
shootings but not both.  
 Researchers have also examined the Safe Streets program’s influence on youth’s attitudes 
about the acceptability of the use of guns to settle conflicts (Milam et al., 2016a) and found that 
respondents in Lower Park Heights had significant improvements in attitudes towards violence 
and a greater magnitude of improvement in violent attitudes to personal conflict than did those in 
the comparison community.  (Milam et al, 2016b).  Additionally, the presence of anti-violence 
signs and interactions with Safe Streets workers led to significant increases in nonviolent 
attitudes toward conflict. 
 The Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research recently examined various 
interventions, including Safe Streets, used in Baltimore to reduce homicides or nonfatal 
shootings (Webster, Buggs and Crifasi, 2018).  Using negative binomial regressions and 
controlling for law enforcement activities, baseline differences in homicide and nonfatal shooting 
rates, and the citywide impact of the April 2015 civil unrest, the researchers found no aggregate 
effects of all Safe Streets sites on homicides from 2007-2017.  Models that estimated site-
specific effects of Safe Streets found that only Cherry Hill experienced a statistically significant 
homicide reduction (-45%) from program inception to the period of civil unrest.  The Safe 
Streets sites in Lower Park Heights and McElderry Park were associated with slight, 
nonsignificant reductions in homicides prior to the unrest, while the Mondawmin site was 
associated with an unfavorable but nonsignificant increase in homicides.  Analyzing the 
program’s impact on nonfatal shootings, the researchers found only a small but nonsignificant 
reduction when aggregating the effects across all Safe Streets sites.  The site-specific analyses 
yielded no statistically significant reductions, although the estimates for Cherry Hill, showing a 
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30% reduction in nonfatal shootings prior to the civil unrest and a 34% reduction following the 
unrest, did approach significance.  The directions of the program effects for the other Safe 
Streets sites varied widely.   
 This research study was designed to further examine the effectiveness of Safe Streets on 
reducing gun violence using an increasingly popular analytic approach, the synthetic control 







 The Safe Streets program has been implemented in a total of seven police posts in Baltimore 
neighborhoods since 2007.  The communities were chosen due to their high rates of homicides 
and nonfatal shootings; each police post was in the top 25th percentile of homicides and 
shootings in the city.  The site locations and dates of operation are listed in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1: Safe Streets Locations and Operation Dates 
Neighborhood Dates of Operation 
McElderry Park July 2007 – July 2015; September 2015 – present 
Elwood Park March 2008 – July 2010 
Madison-Eastend November 2008 – June 2010 
Cherry Hill January 2009 – present 
Mondawmin July 2012 – December 2013; January 2014 – June 2016 
Lower Park Heights June 2013 – present 




 This study used a quasi-experimental research design with monthly, police-post level counts 
of homicides or nonfatal shootings to contrast differences before and after the implementation of 
Safe Streets in the seven neighborhoods in Baltimore where the intervention has been in effect 
compared with police posts that did not have a Safe Streets site.  The synthetic control method 
allowed for a single-jurisdiction analysis to compare pre- and post-intervention outcomes to 
outcomes over the same time period in a weighted combination of comparison jurisdictions. 
 
Data Sources 
The outcomes of interest for this study were homicide or nonfatal shooting counts, as they 
are the most reliably tracked incidents of violence and the majority of homicides committed in 
Baltimore involve firearms; over 84% of all Baltimoreans killed in the past six years died by 
gun violence (Baltimore Police Department).  The Baltimore Police Department (BPD) directly 
provided individual-level information on all homicides and nonfatal shootings between January 
1, 2003, and November 30, 2015.  The homicide and nonfatal shooting data from BPD included 
the date and physical location of the incident, as well as the victim’s date of birth, gender, and 
age.  Data for homicides and nonfatal shootings occurring between December 1, 2015, and 
December 31, 2017, were obtained through the city of Baltimore’s Open Data catalog for BPD 
Part I Victim Based Crime Data (Open Baltimore, 2018).  These data are updated weekly by 
BPD and, in addition to the incident date, include the street block, weapon type, premise, and 
XY coordinates of each reported crime incident, but they do not include any victim-specific 
information. 
 Data on the police posts in which the Safe Streets sites were located, as well as the sites’ 
dates of operation, were provided by the Baltimore City Health Department, which has 
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overseen Safe Streets since its inception.  The Safe Streets site location in Madison-Eastend was 
not bounded by police post borders but instead encompassed two different posts.  To account 
for this, a composite “faux post” was created to represent the program boundaries in Madison-
Eastend.   
 To control for law enforcement activity aimed at suppressing gun violence, data on 
individual-level arrests for drug possession, drug trafficking or distribution, or illegal weapon 
possession violations were obtained directly from BPD for the years 2003-2015 and from 
Baltimore’s Open Data catalog for BPD Arrests (Open Baltimore, 2018) for years 2016-2017.   
 
Measures 
The dependent variables for this study were homicide or nonfatal shootings.  The 
independent variable was the presence of the Safe Streets intervention within a police post.  Drug 
possession arrests, drug trafficking arrests, and weapon possession arrests were included in the 
synthetic control models to help estimate the pre-intervention trends in homicides or nonfatal 
shootings in the police post where the Safe Streets program was implemented, given that high 
rates of drug and weapon possession arrests in Baltimore correlate with high rates of violence.   
The homicide, nonfatal shooting, and arrest locations were geo-located as points onto a 
shapefile of Baltimore City and then aggregated to the police post polygon level using a 
shapefile of the Baltimore Police Department’s police posts.  The data were totaled for each 
month between January 2003 and December 2017 (n=180).  All police posts were then coded to 
delineate the respective Safe Streets posts and months in which the program was/has been in 






 The synthetic control method was used to estimate the effects of Safe Streets in each of the 
police posts where the intervention was implemented.  Given the substantial heterogeneity 
among neighborhoods in Baltimore and the inability to directly measure factors that impact 
trends that vary from one neighborhood to the next, it is challenging to find fitting comparison 
police posts to compute the intervention’s effect.  The synthetic control method creates an 
estimate of the counterfactual for the treated police post, or a “synthetic control,” that is 
generated from a weighted combination of comparison police posts from the donor pool, where 
the weights are chosen based on the comparison posts’ ability to most accurately predict the pre-
intervention trends in the outcome variable in the treated police post (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 
2003; Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2010; Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2015).  
This approach creates a vector of weights that minimizes the root mean squared prediction error 
between the homicides or nonfatal shootings during the pre-intervention period and the weighted 
vector of outcomes and covariates in the control police posts during the pre-intervention period.  
Because the method uses data from only those police posts in the door pool that best fit the 
trends of the treated post prior to the intervention, it can produce a more accurate estimate of the 
counterfactual for the treated police post and the impact of the intervention post-implementation 
than analytic approaches that estimate the treatment effects on a much broader set of data, 
including non-intervention comparison posts that may be substantially different from the 
intervention post.  The synthetic control method also avoids the assumption that an intervention’s 
effects are constant across all observations, which underlies estimates gleaned from traditional 
regression analyses.  This methodology is appropriate for comparative case studies and allows 
for the separate estimation of the effects of each Safe Streets site on homicides or nonfatal 
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shootings.    
 To construct the appropriate synthetic controls for each Safes Street site and both outcomes 
of interest, the donor pool of comparison police posts was restricted to the 136 Baltimore City 
police posts that have not implemented a Safe Streets program.  Annual lagged averages of 
homicides, nonfatal shootings, and arrests for weapon possession, drug possession, and drug 
trafficking for each year leading up to the intervention were used as pre-intervention covariates 
to estimate the trend for the synthetic control prior to the implementation of Safe Streets in a 
particular police post.  Due to the volatility of homicide or nonfatal shooting count data and to 
ease interpretation, the use of six-month cumulative averages, twelve-month cumulative 
averages, three-month moving averages, and five-month moving averages of the dependent 
variable was tested (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller 2015; Rudolph et al., 2015; Crifasi et al., 
2015).  The five-month averages (t-1, t-1, t, t+1, and t+2) created the most consistent fit and were 
a logical approach for this analysis when considering that the impact of Safe Streets would likely 
not be seen for a couple months following the program implementation.  Homicides or nonfatal 
shootings that occurred during the intervention month were excluded from the pre-intervention 
averages.  
The synthetic control method does not produce traditional tests of statistical significance, so a 
demonstrated way to assess the likelihood that the estimates generated by the synthetic control 
method are due to the interventions is to perform “in-space placebo tests” with each of the 
comparison units and run the analyses with each unit in the donor pool as if it received the 
intervention at the same time as the treated unit (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller 2010; 
Abadie, Diamon and Hainmueller 2015; Rudolph et al., 2015; Crifasi et al., 2015).  Because the 
variance in homicides and nonfatal shootings across police posts in Baltimore is so wide, the 
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police posts used for the placebo tests were restricted to only those 64 posts in the top 50th 
percentile for homicide and nonfatal shooting counts over the study period (2003-2017) in order 
to generate relatively comparative results to the posts where Safe Streets has been implemented.  
The percent difference in total post-implementation homicide or nonfatal shooting counts 
between the observed and estimated counterfactual from each synthetic control model was then 
calculated.  This allowed for a comparison of the estimated percent change associated with the 
Safe Streets intervention to the percent change estimate derived from the placebo tests with the 
control posts in each respective donor pool.  Finally, the proportion of control posts with an 
estimated change in homicides or nonfatal shootings that was more favorable than the percent 
change estimated in the Safe Streets posts was calculated.  This proportion, similar to a p-value, 
provided an assessment of how much one can attribute the estimated percent change in 
homicides or nonfatal shootings in the Safe Streets posts to the interventions themselves 
(Rudolph et al., 2015).  
 All geocoding of point data and aggregation to police post polygons was completed using 
ESRI Business Analyst 2015 software in ArcGIS Desktop 10.4.1 (ESRI, 2015).  All data 
management and synthetic control analyses were performed in Stata/IC 15.1 for Mac (64-bit 
Intel) (StataCorp, 2017).  This study was deemed to be “not human subjects research” by the 
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional Review Board. 
 
Results 
Synthetic control models, first for homicides and then nonfatal shootings, were run for each 
of the seven Safe Streets police posts.  Table 4.2 shows the root mean squared prediction error 
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(RMSPE) for each of the models.  Each RSMPE was relatively low, which traditionally suggests 
that the synthetic control fits well with the pre-intervention outcome trend in the treated unit.   
 
Table 4.2: Root Mean Square Prediction Error (RMSPE) for Pre-Intervention Period in Safe Streets 
Sites 
Safe Streets Sites Homicides 
Nonfatal 
Shootings 
McElderry Park 0.290 0.451 
Ellwood Park 0.226 0.526 
Madison-Eastend 0.253 0.639 
Cherry Hill 0.237 0.596 
Lower Park Heights 0.173 0.306 
Mondawmin 0.163 0.314 
Sandtown 0.150 0.310 
 
In prior research, the RMSPE has been compared to a simple average of the RMSPE for all 
units in the donor pool (Rudolph et al., 2015; Crifasi et al., 2015).  This comparison provides a 
logical way to demonstrating model fit when estimating the effects of policy changes in 
geographic areas containing large populations of people and using county- or state-level rates.  
However, due to the rarity of both homicides and nonfatal shootings in a much smaller unit of 
analysis, such as police posts, there is less confidence that the RMSPE is providing useful 
information about the ability of the synthetic control to better predict the pre-intervention trends 
in the outcome variable than using all data from all of the police posts in the control pool.  
Therefore, Table 4.3 lists the pre-intervention averages of the outcome in both the Safe Streets 
police posts and the police posts in the donor pool.  This table illustrates how different the 
homicide or nonfatal shooting levels in each of the areas where Safe Streets was implemented 
were in comparison to all of the other police posts in Baltimore.  For example, prior to the 
implementation of Safe Streets, McElderry Park was experiencing 2.4 times the average number 
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of nonfatal shootings compared to the areas in Baltimore that did not receive the Safe Streets 
intervention (0.87 vs. 0.36 per month).  These differences in the pre-intervention homicide or 
nonfatal shooting averages  in the Safe Streets posts compared to the non-Safe Streets control 
posts support the use of the synthetic control to create a combination of weighted averages of 
predictors from select control units to estimate the pre-intervention outcome trend, versus the use 
of traditional regression analyses that take into account data from all control units, even those 
that are dissimilar to the treated unit. 
 
Table 4.3: Pre-Intervention Homicide and Nonfatal Shooting Averages in Safe Streets or Control 
Posts 
  McElderry Park Control Posts 
Homicides 0.26 0.15 
Nonfatal Shootings 0.87 0.36 
  Elwood Park Control Posts 
Homicides  0.36 0.15 
Nonfatal Shootings 1.02 0.35 
  Madison-Eastend Control Posts 
Homicides  0.21 0.15 
Nonfatal Shootings 0.87 0.35 
  Cherry Hill Control Posts 
Homicides  0.40 0.15 
Nonfatal Shootings 0.92 0.35 
  Lower Park Heights Control Posts 
Homicides  0.16 0.14 
Nonfatal Shootings 0.46 0.30 
  Mondawmin Control Posts 
Homicides  0.16 0.14 
Nonfatal Shootings 0.35 0.30 
  Sandtown Control Posts 
Homicides  0.17 0.14 
Nonfatal Shootings 0.44 0.29 
 
The panels of the synthetic control analyses for homicides and nonfatal shootings in each 
Safe Streets police post, as well as the values of the predictors in each treated police post and its 
respective synthetic control for the pre-intervention period and the non-zero weighted police 
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posts that contributed to each synthetic control, are available in Appendix B.  Table 4.4 lists the 
estimated effects of Safes Streets by site, shown as percent increases or decreases in homicides 
or nonfatal shootings post-program implementation.  The effects of the program varied widely by 
both site and outcome.  To test the significance of the effects, as described in the Methods 
section, placebo tests were run for each of the Safe Streets synthetic control models using the 64 
control posts in the top 50th percentile for homicides and nonfatal shootings.  The range of the 
percent changes in homicides or nonfatal shootings derived from the control police posts in the 
placebo tests is presented in Table 4.4.  The proportion of control posts that had more favorable 
percent changes, or “better outcomes” in the placebo permutation tests, is also shown in Table 
4.4.  Based on the proportion estimates, only the 36% decrease in homicides in McElderry Park 
was approaching significance and can be considered a confident estimate of the program’s 



























Table 4.4: Estimated Safe Streets Program Effects, Range of Percent Change in Control Posts in 
Placebo Tests, and Proportion of Control Posts with Better Outcomes in Placebo Tests than the Safe 





Range of % 
Change in Control 
Posts 
Proportion of 
Control Posts with 
Better Outcomes  
McElderry Park    
Homicides -36.28% (-53.65, 100.69) 0.06 
Nonfatal Shootings 18.97% (-61.43, 86.32) 0.69 
Elwood Park    
Homicides  95.59% (-82.95, 338.72) 0.94 
Nonfatal Shootings -3.59% (-87.62, 82.47) 0.50 
Madison-Eastend    
Homicides  78.56% (-100.00, 555.00) 0.92 
Nonfatal Shootings 96.19% (-95.83, 166.99) 0.92 
Cherry Hill    
Homicides  -28.78% (-52.14, 94.74) 0.17 
Nonfatal Shootings -4.65% (-55.28, 129.90) 0.38 
Lower Park Heights    
Homicides  -15.79% (-66.19, 99.83) 0.41 
Nonfatal Shootings -19.05% (-64.60, 108.47) 0.25 
Mondawmin    
Homicides  75.00% (-67.48, 131.08) 0.98 
Nonfatal Shootings 40.84% (-55.37, 102.15) 0.77 
Sandtown    
Homicides  -9.93% (-82.16, 119.57) 0.50 
Nonfatal Shootings 12.45% (-76.27, 215.09) 0.61 
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  One assumption of the synthetic control method is that there are no unmeasured changes in 
the post-intervention period that might confound the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables (Rudolph et al., 2015).  However, one major change that occurred in 
Baltimore following the implementation of six of the seven Safe Streets sites was the unrest in 
April 2015 and the citywide increase in homicides and nonfatal shootings that has occurred since 
that time.  The synthetic control method does not allow for more than one change at a time, so to 
examine how the unrest may have impacted the estimated effects of Safe Streets in the four sites 
that were in operation pre- and post-unrest - McElderry Park, Cherry Hill, Lower Park Heights, 
and Mondawmin -, additional synthetic control analyses were conducted with a truncated post-
intervention period so that the analyses ended in March 2015.  Table 4.5 displays the estimated 
program effects for the four sites for the pre-unrest time period and the full study period.  The 
analyses suggest that the unrest had differential impacts on the Safe Streets sites.  For example, 
compared to the pre-unrest estimate, Lower Park Heights appears to have had a reduction in 
nonfatal shootings following the unrest, while Mondawmin saw dramatic increases in both 
homicides and nonfatal shootings following the unrest.  However, none of the findings were 

















Table 4.5: Estimated Safe Streets Program Effects for Pre-Unrest and Full Study Periods (Proportion 
of Control Posts with Better Outcomes) 
 Pre-Unrest Full Study Period 
McElderry Park   
Homicides -31.38%  (0.12) -36.28%  (0.06) 
Nonfatal Shootings 39.80%  (0.92) 18.97%  (0.69) 
Cherry Hill   
Homicides  -23.13%  (0.33) -28.78%  (0.17) 
Nonfatal Shootings -23.66%  (0.27) -4.65%  (0.38) 
Lower Park Heights   
Homicides  -9.99%  (0.50) -15.79%  (0.41) 
Nonfatal Shootings 16.30%  (0.64) -19.05%  (0.25) 
Mondawmin   
Homicides  32.35%  (0.78) 75.00%  (0.98) 
Nonfatal Shootings -5.98%  (0.52) 40.84%  (0.77) 
 
 A related concern regarding the use of the synthetic control is the assumption that the impact 
of the intervention remains constant over the examined post-intervention period.  Prior research 
has suggested that the ability of the synthetic control model to accurately forecast counterfactual 
post-intervention trends for state- or country-level policy changes may be limited to 
approximately ten years (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2010; Abadie, Diamond and 
Hainmueller, 2015; Rudolph et al., 2015).  However, it is possible that the effects of a more 
local-level intervention such as Safe Streets may decrease over an even shorter time span, due to 
changes in leadership, program staff, and unmeasured neighborhood-level factors.  Thus, for the 
two longest-running sites, McElderry Park and Cherry Hill, varying post-intervention duration 
periods were considered.  Table 4.6 shows the three-, five-, and seven-year program effect 
estimates for these two sites.  When comparing the site-specific estimated effects to the 
proportion of controls in the placebo tests with better outcomes, only the homicide reduction in 
McElderry Park after three years approached significance (0.078). 
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Table 4.6: Three-, Five-, and Seven-Year Estimated Effects for McElderry Park and Cherry Hill 
(Proportion of Control Posts with Better Outcomes)   
 3-Year Effect 5-Year Effect 7-Year Effect 
McElderry Park    
Homicides -64.20%  (0.08) -51.04%  (0.11)   -31.25%  (0.17) 
Nonfatal Shootings 52.37%  (0.27) 32.21%  (0.81) 39.46%  (0.91) 
Cherry Hill    
Homicides  -23.81%  (0.31) -17.68%  (0.36)   -28.45%  (0.16) 




 The 2012 evaluation of Safe Streets found that the program led to statistically significant 
reductions in homicides and/or nonfatal shootings in three of the four areas where the program 
had been implemented.  A more recent analysis of Safe Streets’ program effects suggested that 
the beneficial effects of the intervention had lessened over time and found statistically significant 
reductions in homicides only in Cherry Hill.  This study sought to more closely examine the 
effects of Safe Streets using a statistical approach that allows for a comparison of observed 
homicide and nonfatal shooting rates after the program’s implementation to the rates we would 
have expected if the program had not been implemented.  The synthetic control analyses found 
that only one Safe Streets site – McElderry Park - had reductions in homicides that approached 
significance over the course of the study period.  Two sites that have been shut down, 
Mondawmin and Madison-Eastend, experienced dramatic increases in both homicides and 
nonfatal shootings after the sites opened, with Mondawmin’s largest increases occurring after the 
unrest.   An examination of program effect attenuation revealed uneven effects as well, with the 
three-year effect of McElderry Park’s program on homicide reduction approaching significance 
after three years but diminishing over time.  The findings in this study are not incongruent with 
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existing literature, which suggests that replications of the Cure Violence model have yielded 
inconsistent program-related reductions in homicides and nonfatal shootings.  Recent evaluations 
of programs in Philadelphia and New York have found encouraging evidence of the program’s 
ability to effectively reduce gun violence, but taken in aggregate, evaluations of the program 
model have shown that the protective effects have differed across space and time, as seen in this 
study. 
 This research project did not explore factors that could explain the attenuation of Safe 
Streets’ impact on gun violence across time.  The 2018 evaluation by the Johns Hopkins Center 
for Gun Policy and Research noted various implementation and operational challenges in a 
number of the Safe Streets sites, as well as geographic, social, and economic factors that may 
help or hinder program success in the various Baltimore communities.  The authors also 
highlighted that the successful programs in New York City and Philadelphia have been 
supported by both the mayor’s offices and foundations in those cities.  Importantly, those 
programs have been strengthened with financial resources for their staff and clients, as well as 
wraparound services for the individuals engaged by outreach workers.  Future research in this 
area should closely examine the components of successful replications of the Cure Violence 
model to better understand how factors such as worker salaries, number and type of services 
available to program participants, collaboration with community-based organizations, and 
program oversight may explain discrepancies in program impact.  Additionally, it is possible that 
differences within neighborhood-level behaviors may affect how outreach work and conflict 
mediation take place.  For example, a cross-sectional study of conflict mediation records in 
Baltimore found that program-associated reductions in homicides were associated with a higher 
proportion of gang-related conflict mediations, while neighborhoods without similar program-
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associated homicide reductions saw more weapons and retaliatory conflicts (Whitehill, Webster 
and Vernick, 2013).  Thus, additional analysis of norms and behaviors within the neighborhoods 
where Safe Streets is or will operate may allow for a more appropriately tailored approach to 
conflict mediation and violence interruption. 
 One limitation of this study is the varying amount of observation data available to estimate 
either the pre-intervention outcome trends or the post-intervention program effects.  The 
synthetic control models for Safe Streets in Mondawmin and Sandtown, which began in 2013 
and 2016, respectively, had better model fit (per their RMSPEs) than did sites such as McElderry 
Park and Cherry Hill.  Conversely, the earlier sites benefited from much more post-intervention 
data than did the sites that opened more recently.  There was no appealing strategy for addressing 
this limitation.  However, none of the RMPEs were found to be large, and the examination of 
program effects over different time periods, although the findings were not significant, provided 
insight into variance across sites over time, irrespective of program length.  Another limitation is 
that the synthetic control model is unable to account for breaks in the intervention, such as the 
program suspensions in McElderry Park and Mondawmin.  The suspensions were of short 
duration and thus likely did not have a major impact on the program’s overall effect, but the 
breaks could nonetheless be incorporated into the models.  Similarly, the program effects 
following the civil unrest in April 2015, which was a known shock to many neighborhoods in 
Baltimore, could not be isolated.  Future research will further examine whether Safe Streets had 
protective effects following the unrest.  An additional limitation of the study is that covariates 
used to estimate the counterfactual in the synthetic control models did not include socio-
demographic characteristics.  However, communities across Baltimore with high rates of gun 
violence, like in other urban cities in the United States, have similar socio-economic and socio-
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demographic characteristics, such as high residential segregation, low economic mobility, and 
high rates of criminal justice contact.  Therefore, it is unlikely that additional demographic or 
economic data would improve model fit. 
 This study is the first known of its kind to examine site-specific effects of the Cure Violence 
program model on gun violence using the synthetic control method, which has clear advantages 
for estimating impact over traditional regression analyses.  The study also considered differential 
program effects over time, offering insight into the challenges faced by policymakers and 
program leaders following program implementation.  The promising findings in evaluations of 
the Cure Violence model in New York and Philadelphia, as well as the evidence of beneficial 
program effects in McElderry Park in Baltimore, suggest that the program would greatly benefit 
from increased resources and operational support, in addition to stronger connections to services 
for program participants.  The Safe Streets program has just recently transitioned from the 
Baltimore City Health Department to the Mayor’s Office.  As plans to expand the program to 
additional neighborhoods are considered, discussions about the disparate impacts of the program 
to-date, action plans for increasing support, and deeper understanding about the operations of 






Aim 3: Understanding the impact of Operation Ceasefire Baltimore on gun 
violence through quantitative analysis and key informant interviews 
 
Introduction 
 City leaders in Baltimore, Maryland, have long grappled with how to address the city’s 
stubbornly high rates of gun violence.  Though the city continues to search for effective, long-
term plans for reducing gun crime, Baltimore has experienced its lowest rates of homicides and 
nonfatal shootings when law enforcement prioritized the identification and apprehension of the 
most violent individuals, rather than using a broader approach that includes directing significant 
resources and manpower towards nonviolent lawbreakers (Nuckols, 2010).  This strategy, known 
broadly as focused deterrence, has been found to help curb gun violence in cities around the 
world, consistently yielding moderate to substantial reductions (Braga, Weisburd and Turchan, 
2018).  As a program model, focused deterrence seeks to deter gun violence by homing in on 
those individuals believed to be involved in gun violence and applying pressure via legal and 
social levers.  The intervention also offers to provide assistance by way of social services to 
individuals who want to stop participating in violence.  
 In 2014, Baltimore city leadership implemented its own focused deterrence program called 
Operation Ceasefire Baltimore (Ceasefire).  Advised by David Kennedy, a criminologist who 
developed and popularized the focused deterrence model, Ceasefire initially claimed major 
reductions in gun violence in the area where it was applied.  However, the program was quietly 
ended in 2017 and had virtually ceased all operations well before the Mayor’s Office confirmed 
in June 2017 that the program had ended (Rodricks, 2017,).  The purpose of this study was to 
evaluate the effect of Ceasefire on gun violence in Baltimore and provide understanding into 
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how a violence reduction program with demonstrated success in other cities was terminated in 
Baltimore, particularly during a time when the city is experiencing historic rates of gun violence. 
 
The Focused Deterrence Model 
 Focused deterrence, also known as Group Violence Intervention (GVI) or “pulling levers” 
policing, is a violence reduction strategy designed to identify and reach individuals and groups 
believed to be violent actors in communities with high rates of gun violence.  The intervention is 
supported by research showing that a substantial amount of the violence in a given community or 
city is committed by a small percentage of individuals, and thus directing resources and 
enforcement efforts toward those individuals will yield considerable community- or citywide 
reductions in violence.  
 The focused deterrence program model is comprised of the following key components: a 
cross-agency enforcement team; the identification of individuals responsible for violence and 
their associated groups; the development of an enforcement strategy that targets all the 
individuals and their associates; direct messaging to the individuals that violence will no longer 
be tolerated and severe consequences will follow if the warning is not heeded; direct pleas from 
community members who also want the violence to end; and the offer of social services to 
support lifestyle and behavioral changes relevant to specific risk and protective factors 
(Kennedy, 2006; National Network for Safe Communities, 2013; Braga, Weisburd and Turchan, 
2018).  The threat of the law enforcement actions that will be taken against the identified 
individuals if the criminal activity does not stop is ideally communicated by those who receive 
the messages to other group-involved individuals to deter them from committing future acts of 
violence.  
 The focused deterrence program model was first developed and implemented in Boston 
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under the leadership of criminologist David Kennedy in the 1990s; it has since been replicated in 
dozens of cities across the country.  A 2018 systematic review found that 19 of 24 evaluations of 
focused deterrence programs were associated with strong, statistically significant crime 
reductions where implemented (Braga, Weisburd and Turchan, 2018).  For example, Project Safe 
Neighborhoods, in Lowell, Massachusetts, was associated with a 44% reduction in gun assault 
incidents and no displacement effects of the intervention (Braga et al., 2008).  The Group 
Violence Reduction Strategy in New Orleans, Louisiana, was credited with a 17% reduction in 
total homicides and firearm homicides, a 17% reduction in nonfatal firearm assaults, and a 32% 
reduction in group member-involved homicides (Corsaro and Engel, 2015).  The similarly named 
Group Violence Reduction Strategy in Chicago, Illinois, was associated with a 32% reduction in 
shooting victimizations among groups represented at the call-ins, compared to those groups that 
did not directly receive the call-in messages (Papachristos and Kirk, 2015).  Boston has 
implemented two versions of the group-member violence reduction strategy, once to address 
youth violence and again to curb a growing gang violence issue, and saw significant reductions 
in gun violence in both iterations of the program (Braga et al., 2001; Braga, Hureau, and 
Papachristos, 2014).  The authors of the systematic review noted that the strongest crime 
reduction impacts have come from focused deterrence strategies concentrated on the most violent 
actors, and that focused deterrence approaches aimed at reducing crime associated with illicit 
drug markets had the smallest effects (Braga, Weisburd and Turchan, 2018).  Additionally, 
several evaluation studies have found that threats to treatment fidelity can occur at several stages 
of program implementation, potentially undermining the success of the intervention in a given 




Focused Deterrence in Baltimore 
 Prior to Ceasefire in 2014, Baltimore had utilized pieces of the focused deterrence approach 
to supplement its violence reduction efforts, but due to leadership and strategy changes, the 
program was never fully implemented.  In early 2014, however, Baltimore’s mayor contracted 
with National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC) at City University of New York’s John 
Jay College of Criminal Justice and began implementing the focused deterrence program 
(Fenton, 2014).  The program leaders chose to focus the initiative on homicides and to begin 
implementation in the Western District of the city, due to the district’s historically high rate of 
gun violence.  Eighteen narcotics detectives and two sergeants from the Western District were 
chosen to be the Ceasefire unit within the Baltimore Police Department.  The NNSC advisory 
team conducted an extensive problem analysis in conjunction with leaders and representatives 
from local, state, and federal law enforcement, correctional, and criminal justice agencies.  The 
problem analysis included a case incident review of recent homicides in the Western District and 
a group audit to gather intel from front-line law enforcement personnel on the active and violent 
groups within the district.  The advisory team also conducted a social network analysis, with the 
help of local law enforcement, to link violent individuals and groups to their associates.   
 The law enforcement arm of the Ceasefire intervention then held a meeting with heads of 
various city and state agencies to develop the enforcement strategy that would be executed if, 
following a call-in or custom notification, a member of the intended population was involved in a 
homicide.  The Ceasefire program manager also invited service providers and leaders of 
community-based organizations to a meeting with both law enforcement and service providers to 
discuss the need and plan of action for supporting the individuals who would receive the call-in 
or notification messages.   
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 Working through the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services’ Parole and 
Probation department, Operation Ceasefire Baltimore contacted approximately 40 individuals in 
the Western District believed to be involved in violent activity and directed them to attend the 
first call-in on June 10, 2014.  All call-ins generally followed the program model, with city and 
law enforcement leaders first giving warnings of prosecution and crackdown if future shootings 
occur, and then members of the community who had experienced gun violence or undergone 
their own lifestyle changes away from violence sharing their stories and pleading for the violence 
to end.  An offer of assistance was made to those individuals who wanted and needed help to put 
their lives on a path of nonviolence.  Following the call-in, the enforcement strategy was put into 
action when a homicide that occurred anywhere in the city was tied to one of the groups 
represented at a prior call-in.  The strategy directed all legal punitive actions against those 
involved and was carried out for approximately two to three months, at which time the next call-
in occurred and the process repeated.  To reach individuals who were linked to violence but were 
not on parole and probation and thus could not be directed by the Maryland Department of 
Public Safety and Correctional Services to attend a call-in, personal custom notifications were 
delivered to individuals’ places of residence.  The overall message of the custom notification was 
the same as that of the call-in but was conveyed on an individual basis versus in the group setting 
of the call-in. 
 A total of five call-in meetings was completed in the Western District.  Additionally, the 
Ceasefire intervention expanded to the Eastern District in early 2015 and held four call-ins in the 
Eastern through 2016.  The last call-in, in September 2016, was centrally located and included 
individuals from both Eastern and Western Districts.  The dates for all call-ins are shown in 
Table 5.1.  The Ceasefire program initially reported steep reductions in group-member-involved 
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homicides and nonfatal shootings compared to the same time periods in the previous year 
(National Network for Safe Communities, 2018).  However, following the in-custody death of 
Freddie Gray, Jr., and the civil unrest that primarily occurred in Baltimore’s Western District in 
April 2015, the city experienced a sharp rise in homicides and nonfatal shootings, followed by a 
change in Baltimore Police Department leadership in July 2015 and a new priority violence 
reduction strategy within the police department announced in August 2015 (Campbell and 
Anderson, 2015).  The Ceasefire intervention team continued to hold call-ins through September 
2016 and deliver custom notifications through early 2017, but in June 2017, the program was 
declared to be no longer in operation (Rodricks, 2017). 
 
Table 5.1: District and Dates for Operation Ceasefire Baltimore Call-ins 
District Date 
Western June 10, 2014 
September 24, 2014 
February 5, 2015 
July 15, 2015 
November 12, 2015 
Eastern March 31, 2015 
August 27, 2015 
February 24, 2016 
July 16, 2016 
Western/Eastern September 29, 2016 
 
 The overall aim of this study was to evaluate the impact of the Ceasefire program in 
Baltimore.  The objective was to examine the spatial-temporal association between the Ceasefire 
call-ins and subsequent homicides or nonfatal shootings in the districts where the call-ins 
occurred and to gain insight into Ceasefire’s structure, processes, and execution through 






 The study was conducted in Baltimore, Maryland, a city that has had consistently high rates 
of gun violence.  Baltimore has one of the highest violence rates per capita of American cities 
with populations greater than 250,000 (United States Department of Justice, 2015).  The 
Ceasefire intervention was eventually implemented in two of Baltimore’s nine police districts, 
Eastern and Western.  The districts selected for Ceasefire are historically two of the most violent 
districts in the city; in the ten years preceding the intervention, 30% of all homicides and 31% of 
all nonfatal shootings in Baltimore occurred in either Eastern or Western (Baltimore Police 
Department, 2018).   
 
Study Design 
 A multiple interrupted time-series study design was used to examine the association between 
each Ceasefire call-in and gun violence within the districts where the call-ins occurred in the 
months following the call-ins, during which the Baltimore Police Department conducted 
enforcement on any groups whose members had attended the call-in or received a custom 
notification and were believed to be connected to a homicide after the law enforcement warning.  
 
Data Sources 
 The outcomes of interest for this study were homicide or nonfatal shooting counts, as they 
are the most reliably tracked incidents of violence and the majority of homicides committed in 
Baltimore involve firearms; over 84% of all Baltimoreans killed in the past six years died by 
gun violence (Baltimore Police Department, 2018).  Additionally, although the Ceasefire 
intervention was officially focused only on homicides, several key informants suggested that 
 
97 
the intervention was sometimes applied to individuals involved in nonfatal shootings as well.  
The Baltimore Police Department (BPD) directly provided individual-level information on all 
homicides and nonfatal shootings between January 1, 2003, and November 30, 2015.  The 
homicide and nonfatal shooting data from BPD included the date and physical location of the 
incident, as well as the victim’s date of birth, gender, and age.  Data for homicides and nonfatal 
shootings occurring between December 1, 2015, and December 31, 2017, were obtained 
through the city of Baltimore’s Open Data catalog for BPD Part I Victim Based Crime Data 
(Open Baltimore, 2018).  These data are updated weekly by BPD and, in addition to the 
incident date, include the street block, weapon type, premise, and geographic coordinates of 
each reported crime incident, but they do not include any victim-specific information. 
 To assess whether the Ceasefire program effects are mediated by increases in drug or gun 
law enforcement, drug possession, drug trafficking/distribution arrests, and illegal weapon 
possession arrests were included as independent variables.  Data on individual-level arrests for 
drug possession, drug trafficking or distribution, or illegal weapon possession violations were 
obtained directly from BPD for the years 2003-2015 and from Baltimore’s Open Data catalog for 
BPD Arrests (Open Baltimore, 2018) for years 2016-2017.  
 The dates and districts for the Operation Ceasefire Baltimore call-ins were obtained from 
the Baltimore Mayor’s Office on Criminal Justice, which staffed the Ceasefire program 
manager position and was tasked with oversight of the intervention.  
 
Measures  
 The dependent variables for this study were homicide or nonfatal shootings.  The 
explanatory variables were drug busts, drug possession arrests, drug trafficking/distribution 
arrests, and weapon possession arrests, as well as a variable indicating the months following the 
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civil unrest.  The homicide, nonfatal shooting, and arrest locations were geo-located as points 
and then aggregated to the police post polygon level using a shapefile of BPD’s police posts 
(142 police posts in Baltimore).  The data were then totaled for each post for each month 
between January 2003 and December 2017 (n=180 months per post).  The arrest variables were 
lagged by one month (t-1) to address endogeneity concerns (e.g., shootings can spur increased 
enforcement in a given area and time).  Each police post was assigned to its corresponding 
district number so that the post-level data could also be aggregated to the police district level.  
An indicator variable was created to denote the months following the civil unrest in late April 
2015, with “0” representing the months prior to the unrest and “1” representing the months 
following the unrest. 
 Although the geographic territories or primary locations of individuals and groups identified 
as being the most violent in the Eastern and Western Districts were mapped to neighborhood 
blocks for the purpose of the Ceasefire problem analysis, the individuals and groups themselves 
were obviously not physically constrained, so enforcement tactics, as well as the messages of 
deterrence and assistance, were also not tightly restricted to just a neighborhood or a police 
post.  Thus, one independent variable, representing the time period following a Ceasefire call-
in, was coded as an indicator variable, with “1” representing an after-call-in month in a police 
post in the Western or Eastern District and “0” otherwise.  If a call-in occurred after the 15th of 
the month, the indicator variable was turned on beginning the following month.  An additional 
independent variable was created to indicate the cumulative total of the call-ins that had 
occurred at a given time, so that each subsequent call-in contributed to the additive effect of the 
intervention in the Western or Eastern District.  The independent variables were coded such that 




A police post-month panel dataset was created and regressions were run using generalized 
linear models with a negative binomial distribution.  Robust standard errors were specified to 
account for intragroup correlation that may occur by police post.  A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
was conducted to confirm the use of fixed versus random effects due to correlation between the 
unobserved effects and the explanatory variables.  Dummy variables for month and year were 
included in the models to control for seasonality and other unmeasured time-variant changes in 
factors.  To control for post-specific trends throughout the study period that could contribute to 
variances in homicides or nonfatal shootings by post, a dummy variable for post was also 
included.  Estimates were exponentiated and are presented as incident rate ratios with associated 
p-values; asterisks delineate the estimates that were significant at the p<0.05, p<0.01, and 
p<0.001.  All geocoding of point data and aggregation to police post polygons was completed 
using ESRI Business Analyst 2015 software in ArcGIS Desktop 10.4.1 (ESRI, 2015).  All 
negative binomial regressions were performed in Stata/IC 15.1 for Mac (64-bit Intel) (StataCorp, 
2017).  Data management was shared between the two software platforms.   
 The quantitative analysis was supplemented with semi-structured, one-on-one interviews 
with six key personnel who were instrumentally involved in the Ceasefire intervention.  A copy 
of the interview guide is included in Appendix C.  The key informants were employees of the 
Baltimore Police Department, Baltimore State’s Attorney’s Office, or the Mayor’s Office during 
the design, implementation, and/or execution of Ceasefire.  Recruitment of the key informants 
was conducted based on the researcher’s knowledge of the Ceasefire intervention through the 
researcher’s employment in the Baltimore City Mayor’s Office from February 2013 through 
November 2015.  The key informants were initially contacted for the study by cell phone text, 
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email, or Facebook Messenger.  Once the informants agreed to talk by phone, they were called, 
provided an explanation of the study, asked to participate.  All six of the individuals contacted 
agreed to be interviewed.  The interviews were conducted face-to-face in restaurants or office 
spaces.  The interviewees were instructed that their responses were confidential and would not be 
reported in a manner that could lead to their identification.  The interviews ranged from 30 to 75 
minutes and were recorded on a laptop using QuickTime Player audio recording software.  Notes 
were also taken during the interviews.  After each interview, the recordings were replayed and 
the notes were edited to ensure the details of each conversation were documented in the notes.  A 
grounded analysis was used to identify themes as they emerged from the interview data.  The 
notes from the first interview were reviewed and organized into themes, which were used to 
create a codebook.  The notes from each subsequent interview were reviewed, and words, 
phrases, or sentences were then organized using the codebook.  New themes that emerged were 
added to the codebook.  After reviewing all notes once, the notes were reviewed a second time to 
ensure that content from each interview was properly organized into the appropriate thematic 
category.  
 This study was deemed as “not human subject research” by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
School of Public Health. 
 
Results  
For the study period of January 2003 through December 2017, there were 561 homicides 
and 1,278 nonfatal shootings geo-located to the Western District of Baltimore; there were 592 
homicides and 1,334 nonfatal shootings geo-located to the Eastern District.  Three-month 
moving averages for these outcomes are presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.  The graphs also 
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illustrate the month of the first Ceasefire call-in in the district.  Baltimore City as a whole 
experienced a sharp spike in homicides and nonfatal shootings following the civil unrest in late 
April 2015. 
 








 The regression analysis was first run without the arrest control variables and then with the 
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analyses are presented in Table 5.2.  The presence of the Ceasefire intervention did not have an 
appreciable impact on homicides or nonfatal shootings.  However, the cumulative effect of the 
intervention was positively associated with homicides, meaning that, with every call-in, 
homicides increased by 8% (IRR: 1.080, p=0.020).  The overall cumulative intervention effect 
was driven by the Western District, which had an 11% increase in homicides with each 
subsequent call-in.  The presence of the intervention in the Western District was associated with 
a 36% increase in nonfatal shootings (IRR: 1.360, p=0007).  The impact of the intervention, 
whether in general or when considering the cumulative effect of the call-ins, was not mediated 
by drug- or weapon-related arrests. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Results from Negative Binomial Regressions for Homicides or Nonfatal Shootings with 
Treatment Effect of Intervention, IRRs   
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 The key informant interviews offered important insights about successes, challenges, and 
concerns with Operation Ceasefire Baltimore’s implementation and execution.  The responses 
from the interview are presented based on themes that emerged from the discussions. 
 Main Model Main Model + Arrest Variables 
 Homicides Nonfatal Shootings Homicides Nonfatal Shootings 
Any Ceasefire  0.843 (0.233)    1.088 (0.425)   0.837    (0.215)     1.087      (0.429) 
Cumulative Ceasefire 1.080* (0.020)    1.003 (0.928)  1.081*   (0.019)  1.003      (0.927) 
Ceasefire-Western 0.796 (0.266) 1.360** (0.007)   0.793    (0.259) 1.359**   (0.007) 
Cumulative Ceasefire-
Western 1.113* (0.015)   0.979 (0.531)  1.113*   (0.016)  0.979      (0.531) 
Ceasefire-Eastern 0.954 (0.774)   0.958 (0.746)    0.944   (0.728)  0.952      (0.719) 
Cumulative Ceasefire-
Eastern 1.002 (0.971)   0.979 (0.615)    1.002   (0.969)  0.978      (0.596) 
Drug Possession Arrests        0.999   (0.804)  1.003      (0.257) 
Drug Trafficking Arrests        0.998   (0.690)  0.997      (0.518) 
Weapon Possession 
Arrests        0.999   (0.935) 0.995   (0.664) 




Intervention Partnerships and Concept Buy-In 
 Each key informant talked about the initial collective support and buy-in from all partners of 
Ceasefire as being one of the intervention’s greatest successes.  As one interviewee said, “this 
was the second go-round in Baltimore, so people really wanted to see it succeed and worked to 
make it happen.”  There was a high level of commitment from all relevant agencies: The 
Mayor’s Office, the Baltimore Police Department, the State’s Attorney’s Office, Parole and 
Probation, the United States’ Attorney’s Office, the Department of Public Safety and 
Correctional Services, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area office in the 
Maryland/Virginia/DC region, Code Enforcement, Department of Transportation, Department of 
Social Services, Animal Control, and more.  All of the representatives from those agencies who 
came to the table held the appropriate positions to demonstrate the importance of the program 
and to collaboratively develop and execute strategies and action plans for the intervention.  There 
was also cautious but optimistic buy-in from the social service providers and community-based 
organizations that were requested to extend support to the individuals who took up the offer of 
assistance and help to change their lives.  Although several of the community leaders expressed 
apprehension about trusting law enforcement to correctly identify the violent individuals and 
groups and to work collaboratively with community members to implement the program with 
precision and diplomacy, as one interviewee put it, “it originally united the police and the 
Mayor’s Office and some community leaders around this idea that violence needs to stop and we 






Identification of Violent Individuals and Groups 
 The interviewees were in agreement with their articulation of the overall objectives and goals 
of the Ceasefire intervention.  The focus of the program was on homicides committed by group-
involved individuals, and the program would identify individuals linked to groups that had 
participated in violence, send the message to those individuals and groups that they would face 
severe sanctions and charges for any and all law violations if they committed a future act of 
violence, and then follow through with intense enforcement to demonstrate that the warning was 
legitimate, using a “root to branch” approach of cracking down on everyone in the group.  
 Several of the interviewees expressed concerns about the accuracy of the problem analysis 
and the individuals identified as the intended audience for the intervention.  The qualitative 
component of the problem analysis relied heavily on the perceptions of front-line law 
enforcement personnel, which, to some, was arbitrary and anecdotal instead of being data-driven.  
There were also questions about the reliance on Parole and Probation to reach individuals for the 
call-ins.  If individuals were not on parole or probation, there was no way to make them attend a 
call-in, and many of the individuals involved in violence were not on parole or probation, so the 
ability to reach a number of violent actors was limited.  Some interviewees did suggest that the 
one-on-one nature of the custom notifications allowed for a more personal and directed 
conversation to the individual and/or his or her family members who were present.  Overall, 
though, there was skepticism among the interviewees that the right individuals – those 
committing violence in the districts - were not consistently identified and reached by the 
intervention, as homicides that were not connected to any of the groups in the Ceasefire database 





Call-ins and Enforcement  
 Nearly every Ceasefire call-in was attended and involved an address by the mayor, the police 
commissioner, the State’s Attorney or a representative from the office, a representative from the 
Assistant United States’ Attorney’s Office, and the major in the corresponding police district.  
There were also presentations from at least one formerly incarcerated individual and a mother of 
a gun violence victim or the member of the clergy who pleaded with the call-in attendees to stop 
the violence.  The Ceasefire program manager spoke as well, explaining the service offerings 
that would be available if the individuals decided that they wanted to begin the process of 
changing their lives.   
 The key informants had mixed perspectives on the effectiveness of the call-ins to 
appropriately deliver the message that violence would not be tolerated.  Some felt that the 
delivery of the warnings regarding future violence was clear and meaningful.  Others objected to 
the manner in which the warnings were delivered and felt that the leaders who threatened harsh 
consequences were unable to skillfully connect with the individuals and authentically convey the 
“stop the violence” intent of the intervention.  More than one interviewee expressed concern that 
the message at the call-ins was supposed to focus solely on ending the violence, but that often the 
message that was instead conveyed to the call-in attendees was that they needed to “get out of 
the (drug) game” or else they would face the heavy hand of the law.  
 Following the call-ins, the enforcement strategy, as previously described, was employed if 
any future homicides were linked to individuals or groups represented at the prior call-ins.  The 
interviewees overall expressed satisfaction with the initial enforcement strategy and felt that the 
intervention led to reductions in group-involved homicides and the arrests of key violent 
individuals, particularly in the Western District.  Some said that the focus on extracting entire 
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groups of violent actors was far more successful than arresting a few individuals at a time and 
leaving the opportunity open for lower-level group members to step up and simply continue the 
group’s activity.  Others talked about the high level of coordination among the Ceasefire partners 
to execute the enforcement strategy and use “every kind of law enforcement possible” to crack 
down on the violent individuals and their associates, including outstanding warrants, drug or 
weapon possession, illegal cable or electricity connections, traffic tickets, or any other law 
violations, and build conspiracy, kingpin, or Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO) cases against them.  Weekly intel meetings with all law enforcement and agency 
partners allowed for feedback sharing on the strategy.  The intervention appeared to be spreading 
by word of mouth; at least one incarcerated individual was recorded on a call saying, “they’re 
coming after everybody.”  However, there were again concerns among some interviewees about 
the extent to which individuals had been accurately linked by the Ceasefire team to groups 
involved in violence and how they were surveilled by Ceasefire detectives.  One interviewee 
recalled multiple occasions when individuals stated at the call-ins or afterward to a member of 
the Ceasefire team that they were not involved in violence and were upset by the perceived 
association.  Several interviewees also discussed uneasiness about the lack of data produced 
about who was getting arrested and for what.   
 
Social Service Support and Community Engagement 
 The key informant interviewees universally agreed that the greatest weakness of the 
Ceasefire intervention was the lack of genuine social service support offered to individuals who 
wanted to stop being involved in violence.  The budget for Operation Ceasefire Baltimore only 
covered technical assistance to the National Network for Safe Communities advisory team and 
the Ceasefire program manager.  City officials and Ceasefire program leaders disagreed publicly 
 
107 
about the need for additional upfront resources for social services (Fenton, Broadwater and 
Donovan, 2015), but nearly all of the interviewees in this study expressed concern that there 
were no wraparound rehabilitation services offered to these individuals prior to their targeting by 
law enforcement, and that the services provided through Ceasefire were insufficient.  There were 
no funds provided to the service providers who were asked to partner with the intervention and to 
prioritize assistance to this highest-risk and extremely disconnected population.  The city’s 
Community Action Partnership, which is operated by the Mayor’s Office of Human Services and 
is devoted to supporting Baltimore’s low-income population, was found to be ill-equipped to 
handle the need, lacking capacity and resources.  And while some interviewees cited a low rate 
of individuals reaching out at or after the call-ins to accept help from the city, others pointed to 
the city’s inability to provide adequate support to the few individuals who did seek assistance 
and the impact that the failure to deliver on the promise of assistance would have on others.  As 
one interviewee stated, “[Robust support services and outreach] has to have the same legitimacy 
as the enforcement side.  Otherwise, you’re selling a bill of goods.”  Another interviewee was 
more pointed: “a carrot and stick model with only the stick is basically contributing to mass 
incarceration.”   
 Another related expressed concern of the Ceasefire intervention was the lack of engagement 
with the community about the intervention, its objectives, and the overall perception and success 
of the program.  According to several interviewees, crucial opportunities were missed to actively 
engage the Ceasefire communities in candid conversations about reconciliation, the importance 
of demonstrating fairness and respect, and ways in which they might work together to achieve a 





Other Program Shortcomings 
 All interviewees talked about the unrealized potential of the Ceasefire intervention and each 
pointed to certain steps or decisions that significantly altered the course of the program.  In 
addition to the lack of resources available for social service support and outreach, the police 
department was given no additional resources to operate the Ceasefire unit, which was comprised 
of two sergeants and eighteen detectives.  Thus, after approximately six months, the Ceasefire 
unit, which had originally been a supplemental crime-fighting strategy in the Western District, 
was left to be the primary strategy in the Western District due to resource constraints.  The 
intervention then expanded to the Eastern District in early 2015, further taxing the department by 
pulling experienced detectives from other operations and specialized units in the district without 
replacement.  There was also no dedicated data analyst within the police department for long 
stretches at a time, which raised concerns about the department’s ability to continuously analyze 
data to ensure that the individuals sought through the intervention were the ones responsible for 
violent activity.  As one interviewee said when speaking to the shortage of resources available to 
BPD for this new intervention, “police with fewer resources aren’t going to be better police.”  
Although there was a sense of urgency among some in leadership to move quickly to expand the 
intervention to the Eastern District and to make Ceasefire the primary violence reduction 
approach in the city, all interviewees talked about the expansions as examples of the lack of 
patience among Baltimore’s city leaders to “give a good thing time to get better.”  Another 
interviewee stated, “Baltimore’s problems are long-term problems.  The city is looking for a 
quick fix, but instant gratification isn’t gonna be won here.” 
 The interviewees also spoke to the lack of continuity in leadership as a major challenge to 
Ceasefire’s success.  Within approximately eighteen months of the first call-in, there was the 
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election of a new State’s Attorney, the resignation of the deputy mayor who oversaw the 
Baltimore Police Department and the Mayor’s Office on Criminal Justice, as well as the 
resignations of the original Ceasefire program director, the resignations of the director and 
assistant directors of the Mayor’s Office on Criminal Justice, the termination of the police 
commissioner, the reassignment of the BPD Ceasefire program coordinator, and the 
reassignment of one of the original leaders of the BPD Ceasefire team.  Although the NNSC 
advisory team continued to support the Ceasefire intervention throughout the leadership changes, 
and Ceasefire continued to conduct call-ins through September 2016, the interviewees talked 
about the difficulty of maintaining organization and keeping external partners at the table.  
Several interviewees also spoke to a shift in priority in BPD after the appointment of a new 
police commissioner in July 2015.  Facing historic increases in homicides and nonfatal 
shootings, BPD announced a new violence reduction strategy that concentrated on violent 
individuals versus groups, and the enforcement strategy reportedly shifted accordingly, relying 
increasingly on custom notifications to reach individuals identified as violent.  Additionally, the 
weekly intel meetings ceased, and though BPD maintained a Ceasefire unit in both the Western 
and Eastern districts, the level of collaboration and coordination among the various agencies 
diminished, and the BPD program coordinator was replaced with someone who did not have 
rank over the detectives within the unit, leading to less strategic organization.   
 Finally, all interviewees recognized the incredible legitimacy challenge faced by police after 
the civil unrest in April 2015.  The in-custody death of Freddie Gray on April 19, 2015, helped to 
intensely ratchet up tensions between police and Baltimore city residents, and the frustration and 
anger boiled over on April 27, 2015, resulting in massive protests, looting, and intense 
encounters between law enforcement and community members. After the subsequent weeklong 
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citywide curfew was lifted, police were confronted with new challenges when conducting day-
to-day operations and investigations, with routine stops drawing crowds of residents and some 
confrontations leading to police confronting crowds while in riot gear and being pelted with 
rocks.  These dynamics virtually erased the legitimacy of the police department in the eyes of 
many community members; not only was the threat of arrest “no longer present,” as one 
interviewee stated, but new questions emerged about the department’s ability to perform 
procedurally and justly. 
 
Discussion 
 Operation Ceasefire Baltimore was implemented in 2014 with the intention of bringing an 
evidence-based strategy with proven success in other cities to Baltimore at a time when 
homicides and nonfatal shootings, while generally on the decline over the previous years, 
remained stubbornly high in the two most violent districts in the city.  This study found that the 
program effect was in the harmful direction for homicides and nonfatal shootings in the Western 
District.  Each call-in in the Western District was associated with an 8% increase in homicides.  
Furthermore, the presence of the intervention in the Western District was associated with a 36% 
increase in nonfatal shootings.  Ceasefire personnel reported initial reductions in group-involved 
homicides and nonfatal shootings in both the Western and Eastern Districts, but the analyses in 
this study did not yield similar reductions.  The discrepancy between the initial internal program 
findings and the findings in this study could possibly be explained by different criteria used to 
assess program success.  This research did not examine individual- or group-level violence 
because of the police department’s restrictions on sharing personally identifiable data and law 
enforcement intel with external researchers.   
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 The key informant interviews shed light on the promise and initial qualitative successes of 
the intervention but also revealed how various elements of the focused deterrence program 
model were not properly implemented in Baltimore.  Per the interviewees, the lack of funding for 
the intervention greatly compromised its ability to properly equip the police department and 
social service providers with the data and resources necessary to both consistently identify the 
individuals most responsible for violence and to deliver on services needed to support those who 
wanted them. Furthermore, the interviewees believed that the frequent turnover in key leadership 
positions jeopardized the consistency in messaging to internal enforcement units and external 
partners. 
 Having an ill-framed message at the call-ins, with law enforcement possibly telling 
individuals that they must “get out of the game” or face penalties versus focusing entirely on gun 
violence, is an important concern.  Individuals have various motivations for joining gangs or 
groups (Taylor, 2013; Sanchez-Jankowski, 1991; Grant and Feimer, 2007; Klemp-North, 2007), 
and the sense of structure, belonging, and loyalty related to group membership, or even concerns 
about consequences of disavowing their group, may cause individuals to dismiss the message of 
the call-in entirely.  Similarly, factors like market forces that impact profits to be made from 
selling illicit drugs, or the lack of economic opportunities for many individuals who sell illicit 
drugs could lead those who receive the call-in message as a demand for them to stop selling 
illicit drugs to discount the legitimacy of the intervention as a viable alternative to their lifestyles.  
Indeed, most evaluated focused deterrence strategies that have directed their efforts towards 
illicit drug market-related violence have not been found to be effective at reducing gun violence 
(Braga, Weisburd and Turchan, 2018).  
 The importance of proactively addressing community distrust of law enforcement and 
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gaining the community’s trust and acceptance of the enforcement strategy cannot be understated.  
Residents in Baltimore have long reported high levels of distrust of law enforcement (Leger, 
2015; The Melior Group, 2015), and as a 2016 United States Department of Justice Civil Rights 
Division report stated, the Baltimore Police Department has consistently “engaged in a pattern or 
practice of conduct that violates the United States Constitution and laws, and conduct that raises 
serious concerns” (United States Department of Justice, 2018).  Simultaneously, the Baltimore 
Police Department has a distressingly low rate of homicide arrests, with nearly 60% and 70% of 
all murders occurring without arrests in 2014 and 2015, respectively (Maryland Department of 
State Police, 2016).  The inverse relationship between community trust and homicide clearance 
rates has been documented in prior research (Wellford and Cronin, 2000).   
 Research has also shown that incidents of police misconduct have a depressing effect on the 
community’s willingness to cooperate with law enforcement and to engage the police when 
violence occurs (Desmond, Papachristos and Kirk, 2016).  Zero-tolerance policing in Baltimore 
during the early 2000s, applied disproportionately to black males, led to the arrests of thousands 
of residents for low-level offenses and greatly damaged the relationship between the community 
and the police (Collins, 2007; The Real News, 2016).  The Ceasefire enforcement strategy relied 
on the use of all available legal levers to arrest individuals and their associates when homicides 
occurred, but without effective communication with the community about the strategy and its 
goals, the arrests may have appeared to be yet another tool for sweeping apprehensions of black 
men.  The potential failure of the police department to connect with community members about 
the intervention’s objectives and to openly discuss and adequately address valid community 
concerns would likely have had significant consequences for the program’s ability to identify 
those individuals most responsible for gun violence in the districts.  Focused deterrence relies on 
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the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement in the eyes of the violent individuals and groups, as 
well as residents, community-based organizations and service providers, to be successful.  As 
stated in the systematic review of program evaluations: “in the focused deterrence approach, 
emphasis is not only on increasing the risks associated with offending, but it is also on 
decreasing opportunity structures for crime, deflecting offenders away from crime, increasing the 
collective efficacy of communities, and increasing the legitimacy of police actions.” (Braga, 
Weisburd and Turchan, 2018, p. 8).  
 Future research should integrate the viewpoints of a member of the NNSC advisory team to 
better understand the achievements and challenges the team encountered when attempting to 
advise city leadership on the implementation of a strategy that requires such attention to detail, 
appropriate leadership, and community engagement.  The focused deterrence model, as earlier 
stated, has been largely found to have violence-reducing effects in the areas where it has been 
fully implemented.  It is possible that the advisory team can provide greater awareness of 
additional implementation and sustainability challenges encountered in Baltimore that were 
overcome in other cities.  Future research should also seek to identify the specific components of 
the focused deterrence model that are most critical to the success of the intervention. 
 Important limitations of this research must be noted.  First, as mentioned, access to the 
Ceasefire database of the names of identified violent individuals, their groups, or their 
geographic locations was not granted, so the researcher was unable to more precisely measure 
enforcement that may have disrupted or reduced violence at a more granular level than police 
district.  Also, without details about specific enforcement activities taken against individuals, 
there could not be an examination of whether certain enforcement tactics had more protective or 
harmful effects on subsequent gun violence than others.  Moreover, while key Ceasefire 
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personnel about the design, implementation, and execution of the program were interviewed for 
this research, service providers, who were tasked with engaging and supporting individuals who 
sought assistance and who could potentially offer different perspectives of the program’s 
successes and challenges, were not contacted for interview.  There was additionally the potential 
for recall bias by the interviewees, given the time lapse between their involvement in the 
intervention and the interviews for this study.  However, the general consistency in the responses 
across participants suggests that concerns regarding this internal validity threat were minimized. 
 This study is the first to consider systems-level processes and actions related to the 
effectiveness and execution of Operation Ceasefire Baltimore.  It incorporated invaluable insight 
from key local players in the intervention, who provided important assessments of how the 
program fit within the larger context of the socio-political environment in Baltimore at the time.  
It also offers vital feedback to city leaders in Baltimore and beyond who are considering the 







 The first study in this dissertation research project sought to understand the relationship 
between drug law enforcement and gun violence by considering how small- and large-scale 
arrests of individuals involved in the illicit drug trade may lead to changes in homicide or 
nonfatal shooting rates in the areas where the arrests or drug activity occurred.  The analyses 
suggested that drug possession arrests, drug trafficking arrests, and major drug busts, regardless 
of the presence of federal agency involvement or the potential apprehension of violent 
individuals in those busts, did not led to an appreciable reduction in homicides in Baltimore over 
the fifteen-year study period.  Major drug busts overall also did not lead to reductions in nonfatal 
shootings.  There was evidence that major drug busts of individuals who were allegedly and 
explicitly linked to violence may have some protective effect on nonfatal shootings, but this 
needs to be further explored with future research, given that most estimates were not significant 
and this analysis only found protective effects when comparing those busts to busts of 
individuals not explicitly linked to violence.  Drug possession arrests, as well as drug 
trafficking/distribution arrest surges, were associated with statistically significant increases in 
nonfatal shootings in some of the months following their occurrences.  There was also an 
indication that drug possession arrests could lead to displacement of illicit drug activity, though 
further examination of the dynamics of illicit drug markets following arrests is needed.   
 The second study in this research project sought to closely examine the effects of Safe Streets 
using a statistical approach that allows for a comparison of observed homicide and nonfatal 
shooting rates after the program’s implementation to the rates we would have expected if the 
program had not been implemented.  The synthetic control analyses found that only one Safe 
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Streets site – McElderry Park - had reductions in homicides that approached significance over 
the course of the study period.  Two sites that have been shut down, Mondawmin and Madison-
Eastend, experienced dramatic increases in both homicides and nonfatal shootings after the sites 
opened, with Mondawmin’s largest increases occurring after the unrest.   An examination of 
program effect attenuation over time revealed uneven effects as well.   
 The third study in this dissertation research examined the effect of Operation Ceasefire 
Baltimore on reducing gun violence in the Western and Eastern Districts.  The study found that 
the program effect was in the harmful direction for homicides and nonfatal shootings in the 
Western District.  Each call-in in the Western District was associated with an 8% increase in 
homicides.  Furthermore, the presence of the intervention in the Western District was associated 
with a 36% increase in nonfatal shootings.  Key informant interviews shed light on the promise 
and initial qualitative successes of Ceasefire but also revealed how various elements of the 
focused deterrence program model were not properly implemented in Baltimore.  Per the 
interviewees, the lack of funding for the intervention greatly compromised its ability to properly 
equip the police department and social service providers with the data and resources necessary to 
both consistently identify the individuals most responsible for violence and to deliver on services 
needed to support those who wanted them.  The interviewees believed that frequent turnover in 
key leadership positions jeopardized the consistency in messaging to internal enforcement units 
and external partners.  Also, questions were raised among the interviewees about program’s 
ability to succeed in Baltimore without active engagement with community members and actions 






 The limitations of this research are important to acknowledge.  First, this project relied solely 
on data related to programs implemented in Baltimore, Maryland.  Thus, the generalizability of 
the findings may be limited, although the results were not incongruent with findings from 
previous evaluations of these programs in other jurisdictions.  Also, the use of police arrest data 
as a measure of the extent and location of illicit drug markets is restrictive in that it reflects the 
actions of the police department itself, rather than capturing an accurate measure of drug market-
related activity.  Lagged effects of the drug law enforcement interventions and arrests for drug 
and weapon law violations were included in this study to help minimize concerns of 
endogeneity, but the challenge remained in being able to account for drug market locations and 
shifts in those markets that may be associated with law enforcement activity.  This study also 
was unable to incorporate federal drug-related arrest data, which are not publicly available but 
would help provide a fuller picture of all law enforcement-related activity to disrupt drug 
markets.  Another limitation of this project is that there were necessary assumptions made about 
the appropriate geographic unit of analysis.  Gun violence is more likely to occur at the street or 
block level, and thus the aggregation of data to the police post level can result in loss of 
precision.  However, prior research on gun and drug market-related violence has utilized police 
beats or police posts as the unit of analysis, primarily since this is the smallest unit for which law 
enforcement-specific incident-level data are available, and effect sizes have been detected at this 
unit in numerous studies, including this one. 
 One limitation related to the use of the synthetic control method for the Safe Streets 
evaluation is that the amount of observation data available to estimate either the pre-intervention 
outcome trends or the post-intervention program effects varied by site.  The synthetic control 
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models for Safe Streets in Mondawmin and Sandtown, which began in 2013 and 2016, 
respectively, had better model fit, per their RMSPEs, than did sites such as McElderry Park and 
Cherry Hill.  Conversely, the earlier sites benefited from much more post-intervention data than 
did the sites that opened more recently.  There was no appealing strategy for addressing this 
limitation.  However, none of the RMPEs were found to be large, and the examination of 
program effects over different time periods, although the findings were not significant, provided 
insight into variance across sites over time, irrespective of program length.  Another limitation is 
that the synthetic control model is unable to account for breaks in the intervention, such as the 
program suspensions in McElderry Park and Mondawmin.  The suspensions were of short 
duration and thus likely did not have a major impact on the program’s overall effect, but the 
breaks could nonetheless be incorporated into the models.  Similarly, the program effects 
following the civil unrest in April 2015, which was a known shock to many neighborhoods in 
Baltimore, could not be isolated.   
 Access to the Ceasefire database of the names of identified violent individuals, their groups, 
or their geographic locations was not granted for this dissertation project, so the researcher was 
unable to more precisely measure enforcement that may have disrupted or reduced violence at a 
more granular level than police district.  Additionally, without details about specific enforcement 
activities taken against individuals, there could not be an examination of whether certain 
enforcement tactics had more protective or harmful effects on subsequent gun violence than 
others.  Another limitation in the Ceasefire evaluation was the possibility of recall bias by the 
key informants interviewed for the project, given the amount of time that passed between their 
involvement in the intervention and the interviews.  However, the general consistency in the 
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interviewees’ responses suggested minimal likelihood of recall bias threatening the internal 
validity of the study.  
 
Policy Implications 
The findings from this dissertation research project were largely congruent with existing 
literature on the relationship between drug law enforcement and gun violence in cities in the 
United States and countries around the world.  These results suggest that drug law enforcement 
has little, if any, protective impact on gun violence, and is more likely to instead be associated 
with increased, versus decreased, violence in the neighborhoods where the interventions occur.  
This research contributes to the literature by providing a 15-year analysis of the impact of drug 
law enforcement activity on gun violence in a city with high rates of both illicit drug activity and 
gun violence.  It also showed that the negative effects of drug law enforcement may take months 
to realize.  Policymakers at the local, state, and federal levels must seriously consider the harms 
of drug control policy versus its benefits.  By continuing to invest heavily in drug law 
enforcement strategies that are not increasing public safety, they are undercutting efforts and 
investments that could provide the public with effective and sustainable public safety strategies.  
There must be candid discussions about the true costs of current drug law enforcement policies 
and the implementation of new strategies that will improve the quality of life for all citizens and 
communities impacted by illicit drug markets without imposing harm to communities, especially 
those that are already plagued with disparate rates of community violence.  
 The findings in the analysis of the Safe Streets program’s effects on gun violence were also 
not incongruent with existing literature, which suggests that replications of the Cure Violence 
model have yielded inconsistent program-related reductions in homicides and nonfatal shootings.  
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Recent evaluations of model implementations have found encouraging evidence of the program’s 
ability to effectively reduce gun violence, but taken in aggregate, evaluations of the program 
model have shown that the protective effects have differed across space and time, as seen in this 
study.  Successful replications of the Cure Violence program in New York City and Philadelphia 
have been supported by both the mayor’s offices and foundations in those cities.  Importantly, 
these programs have been strengthened with financial resources for their staff and clients, as well 
as wraparound services for the individuals engaged by outreach workers.  Future research in this 
area should closely examine the components of successful replications of the Cure Violence 
model to better understand how factors such as worker salaries, number and type of services 
available to program participants, collaboration with community-based organizations, and 
program oversight may explain discrepancies in program impact.  Additionally, it is possible that 
differences within neighborhood-level behaviors may affect how outreach work and conflict 
mediation take place.  For example, a cross-sectional study of conflict mediation records in 
Baltimore found that program-associated reductions in homicides were associated with a higher 
proportion of gang-related conflict mediations, while neighborhoods without similar program-
associated homicide reductions saw more weapons and retaliatory conflicts (Whitehill, Webster 
and Vernick, 2013).  Thus, additional analysis of norms and behaviors within the neighborhoods 
where Safe Streets is or will operate may allow for a more appropriately tailored approach to 
conflict mediation and violence interruption. 
 The Ceasefire evaluation offers important insights into challenges regarding the 
implementation and execution of focused deterrence programs.  In addition to legitimate 
questions about leadership stability and program funding raised during key informant interviews, 
the concerns expressed about the identification of the right individuals most responsible for gun 
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violence underscore the importance of utilizing accurate data and information to inform law 
enforcement practices aimed at increasing public safety.  Furthermore, the importance of 
proactively addressing community distrust of law enforcement and gaining the community’s 
trust and acceptance of the enforcement strategy cannot be overstated.  Residents in Baltimore 
have long reported high levels of distrust of law enforcement (Leger, 2015; The Melior Group, 
2015), and as a 2016 United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division report stated, the 
Baltimore Police Department has consistently “engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct that 
violates the United States Constitution and laws, and conduct that raises serious concerns” 
(United States Department of Justice, 2018).  Research has found that the perceived legitimacy 
of law enforcement is essential to lowering crime rates and eliciting cooperation from 
communities to help make them safer (Tyler and Fagan, 2008), and that compromised police 
legitimacy is a predictor of violent crime in structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods (Kane, 
2005) such as those that received the Ceasefire intervention.  Addressing the contentious 
relationship in Baltimore between law enforcement and community residents is critical to the 
success of the police to lower gun violence and increase the public’s trust. 
 
Conclusion 
 The benefits of a fuller understanding of the relationship between drug law enforcement and 
related violent crime as it relates to public health policy are quite noteworthy.  The impact of 
drug law enforcement and related sentencing policies on the increase in incarceration in America 
over the past forty years has been well documented.  The number of individuals incarcerated in 
United States jails and prisons for drug law violations has grown from approximately 41,000 in 
1980 to over 488,000 in 2014 (The Sentencing Project, 2016).  However, rates of overall drug 
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use, based on findings from large-scale population surveys, have remained fairly constant in the 
United States since the 1990s (Schulden, Thomas and Compton, 2009), suggesting that the 
increases that we have seen in arrests and incarceration for drug use and sales have not translated 
into substantial gains related to the goal of drug policy to decrease supply and thus decrease 
demand for drugs.  Furthermore, the findings in this study are in alignment with the growing 
evidence that drug law enforcement does little to improve public safety and instead can lead to 
violence increases. 
 We are currently experiencing a national debate around the role and tactics of American 
policing and the benefits and harms of traditional approaches.  While many of the individuals in 
the communities impacted by illicit drug markets have experienced the devastation of illicit 
drugs themselves or through their friends’ or family members’ experiences with drugs, there is 
increasing awareness that drug laws are not being enforced evenly, with individuals and 
communities of color being disproportionately affected by punitive approaches to drug laws 
despite no evidence that substance use, misuse, and/or dependence rates are significantly 
different among black and white populations (Schulden, 2009; Swendsen et al., 2012; Delker, 
Brown and Hasin, 2015).  This disparate impact of drug law enforcement not only harms the 
communities that police are sworn to protect, but it also helps to drive resentment and distrust 
among communities and police.  Providing a clearer picture of this association between 
interventions and outcomes to law enforcement agencies, local governments, and communities 
can allow for more efficient and effective strategy development and resource allocation aimed at 
violence reduction so as to minimize unintended consequences and enhance public safety. 
 The Safe Streets program in Baltimore has previously been shown to be effective at both 
reducing gun violence and improving social and community norms around the use of guns to 
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resolve conflict.  However, this study found that the program’s effects have diminished over 
time.  Although this study did not examine the factors which may have led to the program’s 
decreased impact on gun violence, the promising findings in evaluations of the Cure Violence 
model in New York and Philadelphia suggest that the program would greatly benefit from 
increased resources and operational support, in addition to stronger connections to services for 
program participants.  The transition of Safe Streets from the Baltimore City Health Department 
to the Mayor’s Office, as well as plans to expand the program to additional neighborhoods, 
should include discussions about the disparate impacts of the program to-date, action plans for 
increasing support, and deeper understanding about the operations of successful program in other 
cities. 
 Finally, focused deterrence has been shown to be a model strategy for reducing gun violence 
in other cities.  For the intervention to be successful in Baltimore, there needs to be a clear focus 
on the goal of violence reduction, and the program must be supported through leadership and 
wraparound services for those individuals reached who decide to move toward a path of 
nonviolence.  There must also be genuine strides made to build trust between the Baltimore 
Police Department and community members and to engage residents on the violence-fighting 
strategy.  The effectiveness of policing is dependent upon the public’s perceived legitimacy of 
law enforcement’s actions, and the police department must take every measure to demonstrate 








































































































































































MAIN VARIABLES  Homicides Nonfatal Shootings 
Drug Poss Arrests 0.999 (0.852) 1.005* (0.042) 
 0.997 (0.607) 0.986*** (0.001) 
Drug Traff Arrests 0.998 (0.716) 0.998 (0.697) 
Weapon Poss Arrests 1.000 (0.985) 0.996 (0.734) 
Drug Bust, 1-mo effect w/ fed inv. 1.278 (0.467) 1.309 (0.340) 
Drug Bust, 1-mo effect w/o fed inv. 2.548 (0.191) 0.512 (0.186) 
Drug Bust, 2-mo effect w/ fed inv. 0.914 (0.765) 0.936 (0.705) 
Drug Bust, 2-mo effect w/o fed inv. 1.204 (0.705) 0.634 (0.232) 
Drug Bust, 3-mo effect w/ fed inv. 0.980 (0.927) 0.838 (0.291) 
Drug Bust, 3-mo effect w/o fed inv. 1.069 (0.842) 0.708 (0.186) 
Drug Bust, 4-mo effect w/ fed inv. 1.051 (0.797) 0.869 (0.443) 
Drug Bust, 4-mo effect w/o fed inv. 1.308 (0.270) 0.864 (0.400) 
Drug Bust, 5-mo effect w/ fed inv. 1.011 (0.945) 0.864 (0.359) 
Drug Bust, 5-mo effect w/o fed inv. 1.295 (0.198) 0.948 (0.697) 
Drug Bust, 6-mo effect w/ fed inv. 0.960 (0.771) 0.874 (0.390) 
Drug Bust, 6-mo effect w/o fed inv. 1.367 (0.053) 0.875 (0.310) 
Drug Bust, 9-mo effect w/ fed inv. 1.042 (0.750) 0.908 (0.409) 
Drug Bust, 9-mo effect w/o fed inv. 1.158 (0.304) 0.887 (0.342) 
Drug Bust, 12-mo effect w/ fed inv. 1.078 (0.539) 0.911 (0.343) 
Drug Bust, 12-mo effect w/o fed inv. 1.028 (0.816) 0.845 (0.132) 
Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets 

























Table A1: Objective 3 Results for Major Drug Busts Stratified by Fed Involvement, Incident Rate 
Ratios (p-values)  
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Table A2: Analyses of Major Drug Busts, Including Spatial Lags (SL), Incident Rate Ratios (p-values) 
 Homicides Nonfatal Shootings 
Drug Poss Arrests 0.999 (0.714) 1.005* (0.039) 
Drug Poss Arrests SL 1.000 (0.955) 0.987** (0.005) 
Drug Traff Arrests 1.001 (0.916) 0.998 (0.769) 
Drug Traff Arrests SL 0.990 (0.310) 0.997 (0.697) 
Weapon Poss Arrests 1.003 (0.859) 0.980 (0.145) 
Weapon Poss Arrests SL 1.026 (0.477) 1.026 (0.407) 
Drug Busts, 1-mo effect 2.013 (0.200) 1.182 (0.481) 
Drug Busts, 1-mo effect SL 0.984 (0.991) 1.246 (0.864) 
Drug Busts, 2-mo effect 1.014 (0.974) 0.868 (0.315) 
Drug Busts, 2-mo effect SL 0.541 (0.564) 2.275 (0.265) 
Drug Busts, 3-mo effect 1.038 (0.897) 0.802 (0.061) 
Drug Busts, 3-mo effect SL 1.098 (0.909) 2.612 (0.101) 
Drug Busts, 4-mo effect 1.191 (0.460) 0.860 (0.304) 
Drug Busts, 4-mo effect SL 2.761 (0.103) 2.209 (0.071) 
Drug Busts, 5-mo effect 1.134 (0.564) 0.894 (0.409) 
Drug Busts, 5-mo effect SL 2.225 (0.125) 1.582 (0.257) 
Drug Busts, 6-mo effect 1.056 (0.784) 0.864 (0.279) 
Drug Busts, 6-mo effect SL 1.607 (0.306) 1.889 (0.067) 
Drug Busts, 9-mo effect 1.075 (0.591) 0.947 (0.599) 
Drug Busts, 9-mo effect SL 1.424 (0.358) 2.118* (0.016) 
Drug Busts, 12-mo effect 1.070 (0.560) 0.925 (0.380) 
Drug Busts, 12-mo effect SL 1.277 (0.418) 1.747 (0.058) 
Post Unrest     1.499* (0.015) 1.717*** 0.000  
Drug Poss Arrests*Post Unrest 1.019 (0.156) 0.997 (0.784) 
Drug Poss Arrests*Post Unrest SL 1.026 (0.292) 0.998 (0.940) 
Drug Traff Arrests*Post Unrest 1.001 (0.960) 1.009 (0.667) 
Drug Traff Arrests*Post Unrest SL 0.974 (0.520) 0.988 (0.748) 
Weapon Poss Arrests*Post Unrest 0.971 (0.362) 1.063* (0.016) 
Weapon Poss Arrests*Post Unrest SL 0.961 (0.547) 0.921 (0.182) 
Drug Busts, 1-mo effect*Post Unrest 0.635 (0.516) 0.359 (0.169) 
Drug Busts, 1-mo effect*Post Unrest SL 0.270 (0.504) 0.170 (0.288) 
Drug Busts, 2-mo effect*Post Unrest 1.051 (0.935) 0.739 (0.580) 
Drug Busts, 2-mo effect*Post Unrest SL 0.988 (0.994) 0.111* (0.028) 
Drug Busts, 3-mo effect*Post Unrest 0.946 (0.921) 0.885 (0.745) 
Drug Busts, 3-mo effect*Post Unrest SL 0.500 (0.517) 0.160* (0.031) 
Drug Busts, 4-mo effect*Post Unrest 0.921 (0.861) 0.985 (0.960) 
Drug Busts, 4-mo effect*Post Unrest SL 0.247 (0.096) 0.338 (0.144) 
Drug Busts, 5-mo effect*Post Unrest 0.995 (0.990) 0.984 (0.943) 
Drug Busts, 5-mo effect*Post Unrest SL 0.338 (0.157) 0.674 (0.557) 
Drug Busts, 6-mo effect*Post Unrest 1.228 (0.486) 0.982 (0.933) 
Drug Busts, 6-mo effect*Post Unrest SL 0.435 (0.250) 0.565 (0.358) 
Drug Busts, 9-mo effect*Post Unrest 1.067 (0.719) 0.818 (0.303) 
Drug Busts, 9-mo effect*Post Unrest SL 0.573 (0.363) 0.460 (0.180) 
Drug Busts, 12-mo effect*Post Unrest 0.972 (0.887) 0.823 (0.293) 
Drug Busts, 12-mo effect*Post Unrest SL 0.898 (0.833) 0.746 (0.544) 
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Table A3: Analyses of Drug Traff. Surges, Including Spatial Lags (SL), Incident Rate Ratios (p-values) 
 Homicides Nonfatal Shootings 
Drug Poss Arrests 0.999 (0.725) 1.005* (0.043) 
Drug Poss Arrests SL 1.001 (0.918) 0.986** (0.003) 
Drug Traff Arrests 1.005 (0.440) 1.004 (0.560) 
Drug Traff Arrests SL 0.978 (0.106) 1.001 (0.929) 
Weapon Poss Arrests 1.002 (0.903) 0.979 (0.120) 
Weapon Poss Arrests SL 1.029 (0.420) 1.025 (0.430) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 1-mo lag 0.869 (0.275) 0.863 (0.174) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 1-mo lag SL 1.434 (0.176) 0.879 (0.552) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 2-mo lag 0.884 (0.234) 1.077 (0.347) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 2-mo lag SL 0.734 (0.182) 1.109 (0.573) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 3-mo lag 1.111 (0.312) 1.232** (0.004) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 3-mo lag SL 1.001 (0.998) 1.075 (0.601) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 4-mo lag 0.970 (0.742) 1.163 (0.053) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 4-mo lag SL 1.285 (0.231) 0.942 (0.676) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 5-mo lag 1.091 (0.378) 1.269** (0.008) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 5-mo lag SL 0.995 (0.981) 1.001 (0.997) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 6-mo lag 0.939 (0.480) 1.014 (0.872) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 6-mo lag SL 1.065 (0.763) 1.100 (0.518) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 9-mo lag 0.903 (0.377) 1.134 (0.106) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 9-mo lag SL 1.090 (0.682) 0.808 (0.172) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 12-mo lag 1.106 (0.198) 1.145 (0.094) 
Traff Arrest Surge, 12-mo lag SL 1.389 (0.075) 0.853 (0.341) 
Post Unrest 1.470* (0.022) 1.712*** 0.000 
Drug Poss Arrests*Post Unrest 1.019 (0.156) 0.997 (0.804) 
Drug Poss Arrests*Post Unrest SL 1.024 (0.337) 1.000 (0.998) 
Drug Traff Arrests*Post Unrest 1.005 (0.801) 1.014 (0.587) 
Drug Traff Arrests*Post Unrest SL 0.989 (0.811) 0.983 (0.676) 
Weapon Poss Arrests*Post Unrest 0.970 (0.347) 1.062* (0.019) 
Weapon Poss Arrests*Post Unrest SL 0.954 (0.483) 0.917 (0.165) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 1-mo lag 0.626 (0.308) 0.555 (0.065) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 1-mo lag SL 0.499 (0.672) 1.155 (0.908) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 2-mo lag 1.850 (0.063) 1.191 (0.680) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 2-mo lag SL 0.269 (0.470) 0.592 (0.639) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 3-mo lag 0.546 (0.091) 1.054 (0.857) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 3-mo lag SL 2.236 (0.522) 2.458 (0.421) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 4-mo lag 1.476 (0.314) 1.439 (0.354) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 4-mo lag SL 0.424 (0.504) 1.366 (0.765) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 5-mo lag 0.208 (0.194) 0.412*** 0.000 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 5-mo lag SL 0.584 (0.766) 0.959 (0.972) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 6-mo lag 1.935 (0.087) 3.024*** 0.000 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 6-mo lag SL 1.335 (0.828) 0.689 (0.638) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 9-mo lag 1.402 (0.330) 1.027 (0.929) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 9-mo lag SL 1.223 (0.850) 3.703* (0.042) 
Traff Arrest Surge*Post Unrest, 12-mo lag 1.116 (0.708) 0.798 (0.313) 
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Table B3: Predictor Balances and Non-Zero Weights from Synthetic Control Analyses 
 
McElderry Park - Homicides 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.33 0.31 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.17 0.12 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.25 0.21 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.42 0.27 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 0.50 0.75 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 1.58 1.03 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 0.83 0.82 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 0.50 0.78 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 2.08 1.02 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 2.50 1.35 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 1.25 1.40 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 1.83 1.25 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 28.00 25.69 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 26.08 19.97 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 29.75 24.91 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 29.42 31.83 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 30.50 18.48 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 17.33 13.84 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 10.83 10.06 


























































Elwood Park - Homicides 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.33 0.31 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.50 0.32 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.50 0.34 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.25 0.25 
homicide_yr_avg(60) 0.25 0.35 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 1.00 0.80 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 1.17 0.66 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 1.00 0.70 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 1.08 0.69 
shooting_yr_avg(60) 1.00 0.84 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 1.67 0.83 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 0.92 1.00 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 2.33 1.30 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 2.08 1.18 
wpnposs_yr_avg(60) 1.25 1.48 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 13.33 14.65 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 20.08 17.88 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 28.67 23.60 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 26.25 19.34 
drugposs_yr_avg(60) 22.92 20.12 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 10.58 10.49 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 16.08 11.15 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 11.92 9.73 
drugtraff_yr_avg(48) 9.42 9.01 




























































Madison-Eastend - Homicides 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.20 0.20 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.20 0.20 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.20 0.20 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.20 0.20 
homicide_yr_avg(60) 0.20 0.20 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 0.71 0.60 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 0.71 0.66 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 0.71 0.68 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 0.71 0.74 
shooting_yr_avg(60) 0.71 0.65 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 0.99 0.92 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 0.99 0.91 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 0.99 0.97 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 0.99 1.04 
wpnposs_yr_avg(60) 0.99 1.06 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 12.25 11.56 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 12.25 11.82 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 12.25 12.58 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 12.25 12.60 
drugposs_yr_avg(60) 12.25 13.21 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 6.58 7.40 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 6.58 7.50 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 6.58 6.48 
drugtraff_yr_avg(48) 6.58 6.23 


























































Cherry Hill - Homicides 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.33 0.22 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.42 0.31 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.42 0.34 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.67 0.41 
homicide_yr_avg(60) 0.17 0.25 
homicide_yr_avg(72) 0.42 0.30 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 1.00 0.75 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 1.00 0.71 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 0.67 0.88 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 2.00 0.67 
shooting_yr_avg(60) 0.17 0.58 
shooting_yr_avg(72) 0.67 0.47 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 0.92 0.85 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 1.42 1.13 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 0.92 1.32 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 1.33 0.99 
wpnposs_yr_avg(60) 1.08 1.22 
wpnposs_yr_avg(72) 1.33 0.91 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 11.08 13.77 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 15.17 17.61 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 15.67 15.77 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 19.50 15.89 
drugposs_yr_avg(60) 21.33 13.68 
drugposs_yr_avg(72) 12.17 15.34 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 5.42 7.42 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 8.67 6.93 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 6.00 6.23 
drugtraff_yr_avg(48) 4.92 4.80 
drugtraff_yr_avg(60) 1.42 3.97 






















































Mondawmin - Homicides 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.17 0.15 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.08 0.13 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.00 0.09 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.00 0.13 
homicide_yr_avg(60) 0.25 0.17 
homicide_yr_avg(72) 0.17 0.15 
homicide_yr_avg(84) 0.08 0.16 
homicide_yr_avg(96) 0.33 0.27 
homicide_yr_avg(108) 0.33 0.24 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 0.50 0.20 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 0.33 0.49 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 0.00 0.32 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 0.42 0.53 
shooting_yr_avg(60) 0.25 0.58 
shooting_yr_avg(72) 0.17 0.34 
shooting_yr_avg(84) 0.25 0.35 
shooting_yr_avg(96) 0.67 0.58 
shooting_yr_avg(108) 0.67 0.26 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 0.17 0.47 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 0.83 0.67 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 0.92 0.57 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 0.67 0.61 
wpnposs_yr_avg(60) 0.75 0.70 
wpnposs_yr_avg(72) 0.58 0.87 
wpnposs_yr_avg(84) 0.67 0.81 
wpnposs_yr_avg(96) 1.08 0.76 
wpnposs_yr_avg(108) 1.00 0.70 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 2.92 6.62 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 3.58 5.57 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 4.42 7.29 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 8.33 11.27 
drugposs_yr_avg(60) 15.50 11.87 
drugposs_yr_avg(72) 15.58 13.56 
drugposs_yr_avg(84) 9.75 11.23 
drugposs_yr_avg(96) 8.00 10.31 
   
   
   
drugposs_yr_avg(108) 8.50 9.49 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 2.08 3.71 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 2.17 3.79 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 1.17 3.25 
drugtraff_yr_avg(48) 2.42 4.70 
drugtraff_yr_avg(60) 4.83 4.20 
drugtraff_yr_avg(72) 5.42 5.50 
drugtraff_yr_avg(84) 9.08 5.87 
drugtraff_yr_avg(96) 5.25 4.50 
































Lower Park Heights - Homicides 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.17 0.22 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.08 0.13 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.17 0.23 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.17 0.19 
homicide_yr_avg(60) 0.17 0.24 
homicide_yr_avg(72) 0.25 0.17 
homicide_yr_avg(84) 0.17 0.16 
homicide_yr_avg(96) 0.17 0.16 
homicide_yr_avg(108) 0.08 0.14 
homicide_yr_avg(120) 0.25 0.23 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 0.42 0.69 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 0.67 0.42 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 0.08 0.46 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 0.58 0.62 
shooting_yr_avg(60) 0.83 0.69 
shooting_yr_avg(72) 0.58 0.55 
shooting_yr_avg(84) 0.42 0.31 
shooting_yr_avg(96) 0.50 0.32 
shooting_yr_avg(108) 0.58 0.44 
shooting_yr_avg(120) 0.08 0.24 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 1.08 0.75 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 1.17 0.97 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 0.67 0.95 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 1.08 1.15 
wpnposs_yr_avg(60) 1.50 1.17 
wpnposs_yr_avg(72) 1.58 1.08 
wpnposs_yr_avg(84) 0.67 1.15 
wpnposs_yr_avg(96) 0.42 0.89 
wpnposs_yr_avg(108) 0.83 0.82 
wpnposs_yr_avg(120) 0.17 0.97 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 15.83 15.66 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 33.67 19.40 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 28.17 23.04 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 24.58 23.87 
drugposs_yr_avg(60) 17.83 18.93 
   
   
   
drugposs_yr_avg(72) 22.17 21.65 
drugposs_yr_avg(84) 16.83 16.30 
drugposs_yr_avg(96) 18.67 16.49 
drugposs_yr_avg(108) 15.08 14.50 
drugposs_yr_avg(120) 15.83 15.57 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 11.08 10.86 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 10.75 10.08 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 7.17 6.08 
drugtraff_yr_avg(48) 7.17 7.73 
drugtraff_yr_avg(60) 4.17 6.41 
drugtraff_yr_avg(72) 4.33 6.65 
drugtraff_yr_avg(84) 4.17 5.57 
drugtraff_yr_avg(96) 6.92 5.67 
drugtraff_yr_avg(108) 6.17 5.84 


























Sandtown - Homicides 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.25 0.20 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.08 0.15 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.33 0.21 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.25 0.22 
homicide_yr_avg(60) 0.17 0.20 
homicide_yr_avg(72) 0.17 0.19 
homicide_yr_avg(84) 0.08 0.11 
homicide_yr_avg(96) 0.08 0.16 
homicide_yr_avg(108) 0.08 0.09 
homicide_yr_avg(120) 0.17 0.18 
homicide_yr_avg(132) 0.17 0.21 
homicide_yr_avg(144) 0.00 0.11 
homicide_yr_avg(156) 0.33 0.33 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 0.42 0.49 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 0.58 0.57 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 0.75 0.41 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 0.58 0.47 
shooting_yr_avg(60) 0.17 0.48 
shooting_yr_avg(72) 0.58 0.57 
shooting_yr_avg(84) 0.42 0.29 
shooting_yr_avg(96) 0.33 0.27 
shooting_yr_avg(108) 0.33 0.24 
shooting_yr_avg(120) 0.17 0.29 
shooting_yr_avg(132) 0.08 0.27 
shooting_yr_avg(144) 0.50 0.26 
shooting_yr_avg(156) 0.75 0.56 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 0.92 0.57 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 1.33 0.71 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 1.08 0.90 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 0.50 0.73 
wpnposs_yr_avg(60) 0.75 0.83 
wpnposs_yr_avg(72) 0.58 0.80 
wpnposs_yr_avg(84) 0.67 0.78 
wpnposs_yr_avg(96) 0.50 0.57 
wpnposs_yr_avg(108) 0.67 0.66 
   
   
   
wpnposs_yr_avg(120) 0.33 0.64 
wpnposs_yr_avg(132) 0.67 0.66 
wpnposs_yr_avg(144) 0.42 0.68 
wpnposs_yr_avg(156) 0.58 0.75 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 11.00 12.67 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 11.00 11.65 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 12.08 15.07 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 13.42 19.19 
drugposs_yr_avg(60) 25.75 19.83 
drugposs_yr_avg(72) 25.67 21.98 
drugposs_yr_avg(84) 13.75 15.14 
drugposs_yr_avg(96) 12.50 14.75 
drugposs_yr_avg(108) 16.33 13.36 
drugposs_yr_avg(120) 19.25 14.07 
drugposs_yr_avg(132) 11.17 13.44 
drugposs_yr_avg(144) 8.50 9.05 
drugposs_yr_avg(156) 3.75 4.02 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 7.42 8.34 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 7.92 7.13 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 4.75 5.27 
drugtraff_yr_avg(48) 4.17 6.68 
drugtraff_yr_avg(60) 7.75 6.40 
drugtraff_yr_avg(72) 6.58 7.26 
drugtraff_yr_avg(84) 5.92 6.57 
drugtraff_yr_avg(96) 5.92 5.67 
drugtraff_yr_avg(108) 7.50 6.02 
drugtraff_yr_avg(120) 4.25 4.72 
drugtraff_yr_avg(132) 3.08 4.56 
drugtraff_yr_avg(144) 4.00 3.55 



























































McElderry Park – Nonfatal Shootings 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.33 0.24 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.17 0.16 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.25 0.16 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.42 0.29 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 0.50 0.49 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 1.58 1.33 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 0.83 0.90 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 0.50 0.52 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 2.08 0.87 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 2.50 1.27 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 1.25 1.28 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 1.83 0.90 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 28.00 25.52 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 26.08 18.37 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 29.75 22.66 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 29.42 30.00 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 30.50 18.45 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 17.33 16.48 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 10.83 11.66 



































































Elwood Park – Nonfatal Shootings 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.33 0.33 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.50 0.21 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.50 0.16 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.25 0.28 
homicide_yr_avg(60) 0.25 0.43 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 1.00 0.91 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 1.17 1.05 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 1.00 0.91 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 1.08 0.94 
shooting_yr_avg(60) 1.00 1.06 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 1.67 0.96 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 0.92 1.30 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 2.33 1.58 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 2.08 1.39 
wpnposs_yr_avg(60) 1.25 1.40 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 13.33 18.45 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 20.08 14.95 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 28.67 19.64 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 26.25 20.91 
drugposs_yr_avg(60) 22.92 18.99 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 10.58 15.60 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 16.08 12.42 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 11.92 10.23 
drugtraff_yr_avg(48) 9.42 9.00 




























































Madison-Eastend – Nonfatal Shootings 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.20 0.20 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.20 0.20 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.20 0.20 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.20 0.20 
homicide_yr_avg(60) 0.20 0.20 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 0.71 0.60 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 0.71 0.66 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 0.71 0.68 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 0.71 0.74 
shooting_yr_avg(60) 0.71 0.65 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 0.99 0.92 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 0.99 0.91 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 0.99 0.97 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 0.99 1.04 
wpnposs_yr_avg(60) 0.99 1.06 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 12.25 11.56 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 12.25 11.82 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 12.25 12.58 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 12.25 12.60 
drugposs_yr_avg(60) 12.25 13.21 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 6.58 7.40 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 6.58 7.50 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 6.58 6.48 
drugtraff_yr_avg(48) 6.58 6.23 


























































Cherry Hill – Nonfatal Shootings 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.33 0.31 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.42 0.28 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.42 0.21 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.67 0.25 
homicide_yr_avg(60) 0.17 0.23 
homicide_yr_avg(72) 0.42 0.20 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 1.00 0.98 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 1.00 0.67 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 0.67 0.70 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 2.00 1.13 
shooting_yr_avg(60) 0.17 0.64 
shooting_yr_avg(72) 0.67 0.61 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 0.92 0.74 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 1.42 0.95 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 0.92 0.94 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 1.33 1.09 
wpnposs_yr_avg(60) 1.08 0.94 
wpnposs_yr_avg(72) 1.33 1.13 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 11.08 8.91 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 15.17 12.75 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 15.67 13.30 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 19.50 15.68 
drugposs_yr_avg(60) 21.33 14.27 
drugposs_yr_avg(72) 12.17 14.75 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 5.42 5.39 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 8.67 6.91 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 6.00 5.53 
drugtraff_yr_avg(48) 4.92 5.63 
drugtraff_yr_avg(60) 1.42 5.97 























































Mondawmin – Nonfatal Shootings 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.17 0.12 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.08 0.17 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.00 0.11 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.00 0.19 
homicide_yr_avg(60) 0.25 0.23 
homicide_yr_avg(72) 0.17 0.15 
homicide_yr_avg(84) 0.08 0.19 
homicide_yr_avg(96) 0.33 0.23 
homicide_yr_avg(108) 0.33 0.16 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 0.50 0.26 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 0.33 0.38 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 0.00 0.20 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 0.42 0.48 
shooting_yr_avg(60) 0.25 0.50 
shooting_yr_avg(72) 0.17 0.26 
shooting_yr_avg(84) 0.25 0.32 
shooting_yr_avg(96) 0.67 0.49 
shooting_yr_avg(108) 0.67 0.34 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 0.17 0.42 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 0.83 0.70 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 0.92 0.70 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 0.67 0.50 
wpnposs_yr_avg(60) 0.75 0.72 
wpnposs_yr_avg(72) 0.58 0.84 
wpnposs_yr_avg(84) 0.67 0.75 
wpnposs_yr_avg(96) 1.08 0.73 
wpnposs_yr_avg(108) 1.00 0.65 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 2.92 6.08 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 3.58 5.55 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 4.42 8.04 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 8.33 10.55 
drugposs_yr_avg(60) 15.50 10.93 
drugposs_yr_avg(72) 15.58 12.26 
drugposs_yr_avg(84) 9.75 10.69 
drugposs_yr_avg(96) 8.00 8.91 
   
   
   
drugposs_yr_avg(108) 8.50 8.57 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 2.08 3.71 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 2.17 4.25 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 1.17 3.65 
drugtraff_yr_avg(48) 2.42 4.04 
drugtraff_yr_avg(60) 4.83 4.38 
drugtraff_yr_avg(72) 5.42 5.95 
drugtraff_yr_avg(84) 9.08 5.79 
drugtraff_yr_avg(96) 5.25 4.79 
































Lower Park Heights – Nonfatal Shootings 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.17 0.21 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.08 0.18 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.17 0.26 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.17 0.23 
homicide_yr_avg(60) 0.17 0.32 
homicide_yr_avg(72) 0.25 0.20 
homicide_yr_avg(84) 0.17 0.20 
homicide_yr_avg(96) 0.17 0.14 
homicide_yr_avg(108) 0.08 0.18 
homicide_yr_avg(120) 0.25 0.20 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 0.42 0.57 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 0.67 0.52 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 0.08 0.45 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 0.58 0.58 
shooting_yr_avg(60) 0.83 0.82 
shooting_yr_avg(72) 0.58 0.60 
shooting_yr_avg(84) 0.42 0.36 
shooting_yr_avg(96) 0.50 0.41 
shooting_yr_avg(108) 0.58 0.43 
shooting_yr_avg(120) 0.08 0.26 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 1.08 0.77 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 1.17 1.10 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 0.67 0.84 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 1.08 1.15 
wpnposs_yr_avg(60) 1.50 1.14 
wpnposs_yr_avg(72) 1.58 1.07 
wpnposs_yr_avg(84) 0.67 0.89 
wpnposs_yr_avg(96) 0.42 0.85 
wpnposs_yr_avg(108) 0.83 0.81 
wpnposs_yr_avg(120) 0.17 1.04 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 15.83 14.94 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 33.67 21.94 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 28.17 22.47 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 24.58 24.05 
drugposs_yr_avg(60) 17.83 18.66 
   
   
   
drugposs_yr_avg(72) 22.17 21.81 
drugposs_yr_avg(84) 16.83 16.68 
drugposs_yr_avg(96) 18.67 15.66 
drugposs_yr_avg(108) 15.08 13.34 
drugposs_yr_avg(120) 15.83 14.40 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 11.08 10.95 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 10.75 10.86 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 7.17 6.25 
drugtraff_yr_avg(48) 7.17 9.11 
drugtraff_yr_avg(60) 4.17 6.60 
drugtraff_yr_avg(72) 4.33 7.10 
drugtraff_yr_avg(84) 4.17 6.14 
drugtraff_yr_avg(96) 6.92 5.55 
drugtraff_yr_avg(108) 6.17 5.34 


























Sandtown – Nonfatal Shootings 
 
Predictor Balance 
 Treated Synthetic 
homicide_yr_avg(12) 0.25 0.22 
homicide_yr_avg(24) 0.08 0.18 
homicide_yr_avg(36) 0.33 0.21 
homicide_yr_avg(48) 0.25 0.21 
homicide_yr_avg(60) 0.17 0.18 
homicide_yr_avg(72) 0.17 0.19 
homicide_yr_avg(84) 0.08 0.17 
homicide_yr_avg(96) 0.08 0.19 
homicide_yr_avg(108) 0.08 0.12 
homicide_yr_avg(120) 0.17 0.17 
homicide_yr_avg(132) 0.17 0.23 
homicide_yr_avg(144) 0.00 0.15 
homicide_yr_avg(156) 0.33 0.35 
shooting_yr_avg(12) 0.42 0.46 
shooting_yr_avg(24) 0.58 0.60 
shooting_yr_avg(36) 0.75 0.52 
shooting_yr_avg(48) 0.58 0.49 
shooting_yr_avg(60) 0.17 0.42 
shooting_yr_avg(72) 0.58 0.52 
shooting_yr_avg(84) 0.42 0.35 
shooting_yr_avg(96) 0.33 0.36 
shooting_yr_avg(108) 0.33 0.30 
shooting_yr_avg(120) 0.17 0.28 
shooting_yr_avg(132) 0.08 0.30 
shooting_yr_avg(144) 0.50 0.34 
shooting_yr_avg(156) 0.75 0.66 
wpnposs_yr_avg(12) 0.92 0.67 
wpnposs_yr_avg(24) 1.33 0.77 
wpnposs_yr_avg(36) 1.08 0.92 
wpnposs_yr_avg(48) 0.50 0.76 
wpnposs_yr_avg(60) 0.75 0.85 
wpnposs_yr_avg(72) 0.58 0.86 
wpnposs_yr_avg(84) 0.67 0.75 
wpnposs_yr_avg(96) 0.50 0.67 
wpnposs_yr_avg(108) 0.67 0.72 
   
   
   
wpnposs_yr_avg(120) 0.33 0.74 
wpnposs_yr_avg(132) 0.67 0.78 
wpnposs_yr_avg(144) 0.42 0.75 
wpnposs_yr_avg(156) 0.58 0.80 
drugposs_yr_avg(12) 11.00 12.88 
drugposs_yr_avg(24) 11.00 12.52 
drugposs_yr_avg(36) 12.08 14.99 
drugposs_yr_avg(48) 13.42 18.34 
drugposs_yr_avg(60) 25.75 19.51 
drugposs_yr_avg(72) 25.67 22.75 
drugposs_yr_avg(84) 13.75 15.93 
drugposs_yr_avg(96) 12.50 14.67 
drugposs_yr_avg(108) 16.33 12.70 
drugposs_yr_avg(120) 19.25 14.59 
drugposs_yr_avg(132) 11.17 13.43 
drugposs_yr_avg(144) 8.50 9.52 
drugposs_yr_avg(156) 3.75 3.91 
drugtraff_yr_avg(12) 7.42 7.86 
drugtraff_yr_avg(24) 7.92 7.36 
drugtraff_yr_avg(36) 4.75 5.50 
drugtraff_yr_avg(48) 4.17 6.32 
drugtraff_yr_avg(60) 7.75 6.36 
drugtraff_yr_avg(72) 6.58 7.21 
drugtraff_yr_avg(84) 5.92 6.42 
drugtraff_yr_avg(96) 5.92 5.81 
drugtraff_yr_avg(108) 7.50 6.18 
drugtraff_yr_avg(120) 4.25 5.01 
drugtraff_yr_avg(132) 3.08 4.74 
drugtraff_yr_avg(144) 4.00 3.54 








































Interview Guide for Ceasefire Interviews 
February 11, 2018 (Version 2) 
 
 
Thank you for meeting with me today.  I am conducting research on the Ceasefire intervention in 
Baltimore between 2014 and 2016.  I am interviewing a number of individuals who were 
involved with the planning and implementation of the intervention, and I would like to hear your 
thoughts about the intervention.    
 
 
1. What are your initials?  
 
2. What was your role as it related to the Ceasefire intervention?  
 
3. Approximately how long were you involved with Ceasefire? 
 
4. How many call-ins or custom notifications did you participate in? 
 
5. What was your understanding of the role of law enforcement in targeting individuals 
identified by Ceasefire?   
 
6. What criteria were used to determine when and which individuals were targeted for 
arrest? 
 
7. What do you think were the successes of Ceasefire? 
 
8. What do you think were the challenges of Ceasefire? 
 
9. If the Ceasefire intervention were to return to Baltimore, what changes would need to be 
made in order for it to be successful? 
 
10. Is there anything else you would like to share with me as it relates to Ceasefire? 
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      Principal Investigators: Daniel Webster, ScD, MPH, and Jon Vernick, JD, MPH 
      Researched state firearm licensing laws to understand differences in requirements in order to help inform 
      Maryland state policymakers during their implementation of the Maryland Firearm Safety Act of 2013. 
 
Technical Advisor     CO Department of Public Health and the Environment, Denver, CO      April 2016 – March 2017 
Lead Advisor, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health: Renee Johnson, PhD, MPH 
Co-conducted a systematic review of the relationship between marijuana use and intimate partner violence among 





Dissertation Editor        Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health                                    February 2017 
    Completed proofreading and copy editing of the dissertation, “Neighborhood Variation in the Rate of Child  
      Welfare Contact,” of Stacey W. Williams in the Department of Mental Health. 
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Baltimore City Results Team Member               Mayor’s Office, Baltimore, MD                     June 2015 – February 2016 
    Served on eight-member team responsible for reviewing all Baltimore Police Department and other city agency  
      budget proposals related to public safety for fiscal year 2017 and providing recommendations to Mayor  
      Stephanie Rawlings-Blake and the Baltimore City Department of Finance. 
    Rated program enhancements and resource allocation requests on proposed value, effectiveness, and reach. 
 
Violent Crime Reduction Strategist     Mayor’s Office, Baltimore, MD                  February 2013 – November 2015 
Under the direction of Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake and her then-Deputy Mayor of Emergency 
Management and Public Safety, coordinated initiative designed to dramatically and sustainably reduce violent 
crime through a comprehensive plan involving city agencies, nonprofit organizations, researchers, and community 
groups.  
    Organized regular meetings with the Baltimore City Mayor, Police Commissioner, Health Commissioner, 
      members of the Mayor’s cabinet, heads of city agencies, and other key stakeholders to discuss crime trends  
      and current/future strategies geared toward crime prevention and public safety enhancement. 
    Collaborated with staff from the Mayor’s Offices on Criminal Justice and Emergency Management/Public Safety    
      to identify and help implement evidence-based, innovative solutions used in other local jurisdictions to address  
      violent crime. 
    Conducted research and policy analysis and evaluation related to youth violence, reintegration, intimate  
      partner violence, gun crimes, and human trafficking to make recommendations to Baltimore policymakers for   
      establishing and improving violence prevention programs.  
    Assisted with grant proposal writing and implementation strategies to secure funding for juvenile justice and  
      violence prevention initiatives aimed at reducing crime and recidivism rates. 
 
Senior Manager, Wellness Value Planning and Delivery     OptumHealth, Atlanta, GA     February 2011 – June 2012 
Directed activities of client implementation, coach communication and training, coach process and technology 
enhancement, and consumer quality and value delivery evaluation for the 200-person Wellness Coaching 
Operations. 
    Led team of project coordinators responsible for supporting Wellness Coaching Operations through new hire 
training, effective client updates, process and technology improvements, program execution, and evaluative 
tools.   
    Developed and evaluated performance metrics to deliver training and enrichment programs to individual 
      coaches, teams of coaches and supervisors/managers to drive consumer outcomes, client return on investment  
      and productivity improvements from better processes and technology. 
    Supported short- and long-term strategic business activities by identifying needs of the operation and 
      translating operational data into actions and enhancements. 
    Collaborated with business subject matter experts to understand existing business processes and future 
      business needs to create key deliverables and process improvements. 
    Researched and identified strategic growth and cost containment opportunities; communicated findings and 
      provided recommendations to various levels of the organization, including directors, site executives, account 
      managers, wellness consultants, and vice presidents. 
 
Operations Manager, Wellness Coaching                           OptumHealth, Atlanta, GA     August 2008 – February 2011 




  Provided leadership, support, and quality training to Atlanta Wellness Coaching team, which serves hundreds of 
thousands of consumers through education, collaboration, and consumer activation in the areas of weight 
management, exercise, nutrition, diabetes, heart health, tobacco cessation, and stress management. 
    Led implementation and expansion of Wellness presence in OptumHealth’s Atlanta site from two to six 
      designated and dedicated accounts and from six to twenty coaches. 
    Led weekly team meetings, trainings, and monthly 1:1 feedback sessions with each coach, focusing on 
      productivity and program outcome goals, employee engagement, interim and annual reviews, quality  
      improvement, and career development. 
    Facilitated successful URAC accreditation site review, resulting in the division’s first full Comprehensive 
Wellness Program Accreditation. 
    Improved coach performance and productivity through live call monitoring, real-time performance 
      discussions, weekly metric reviews, case documentation evaluations, and call quality audits. 
    Conducted hiring interviews and acted as primary leader on hiring offers and training plans for all new Wellness  
      hires in Atlanta. 
    Partnered with clinical managers, account executives, and product consultants to understand client-specific  
      needs and develop or maintain processes that ensure truly integrative and co-managed care among the  
      different health solutions teams.  
    Communicated with upstream departments to address scheduling or utilization issues that could affect 
      customer commitments and performance guarantees. 
 
Transportation/Logistics Manager, Sales Department              McMaster-Carr, Atlanta, GA     July 2005 – June 2008 
Managed 25-member support team that provided day-to-day operational assistance to a 120-member Sales force 
at a multimillion-dollar industrial supply company. 
  Implemented critical decisions regarding price breaks, supply chain management, expedited delivery, and other 
exceptional services for over 400,000 customers. 
 Coordinated and monitored daily transportation logistics for over 10,000 parcel packages and 450 freight 
shipments to achieve next-day delivery to over 97% of customers in the southeastern region of the United 
States. 
 Developed and maintained department staffing model that allowed 90% of work volume to be completed 
within one hour by aligning resources with fluctuating incoming volumes of work. 
 Produced extensive training schedule for all new departmental staff and tracked developmental progress of all 
employees through weekly follow-ups, monthly mini-evaluations, and annual reviews. 
 Reallocated responsibilities and streamlined processes to reduce process time by 30%. 
 Presented weekly transactional topics regarding departmental development and improvements to directors 
and vice presidents. 
 
Operations Manager, Freight Operations              McMaster-Carr, Atlanta, GA     January 2004 – July 2005 
Managed operations of the 20-member Freight department and its daily filling, packing and shipping of over 400 
orders totaling approximately $400,000. 
 Oversaw shipment planning and internal logistics management for all non-parcel orders. 
 Gathered data and organized moving teams in preparation for the complete transfer of Freight Operations to a 
new facility. 
 Maintained fastest and most accurate filling and shipping rates of all five Freight Operations departments 




Warehouse Logistics Supervisor, Parcel Packing               McMaster-Carr, Atlanta, GA     March 2003 – January 2004 
Co-directed the assembly, packing, and shipping of over 5,000 packages daily; supervised eleven employees and 
one staff lead.  
 Succeeded in breaking branch records for orders’ overall time to ship and percentage of orders shipped under 
one hour. 
 Reduced damage-related credits by 15% by identifying trends with highly damaged items and implementing 
operational procedures to address causative factors. 
 Instituted new department staffing model based on the productivity of each employee, allowing for more 
accurate prediction of staffing requirements for projected order forecasts. 
 
Management Trainee, Marketing Department           McMaster-Carr, Atlanta, GA     September 2002 – March 2003 
Performed market analyses to implement strategies for attracting high-potential customers and strengthening 
delivery network. 
 Improved delivery to approximately 75,000 customers in 6 states by working with representatives from major 
package carriers to increase serviceability.  
 Integrated shipping initiatives to begin same-day delivery to metropolitan Atlanta area and large cities within a 
150-mile radius, resulting in faster delivery and 20% growth in those areas. 
 Audited carrier invoices for billing discrepancies and discovered inaccuracies totaling $30,000 in erroneous 
charges; reported findings to the regional finance manager, controller, and assistant vice president. 
 Reviewed and diagnosing all large dollar discrepancies during weekly inventory tasks. 






Teaching Assistant                  Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health        September 2014 – October 2017 
Facilitate instruction of graduate-level courses through management of administrative responsibilities, content 
development, lecture editing, guest lecturing, online course site development, scheduling of guest speakers, 
assignment creation and grading, and student support. 
    Graduate Seminar on Violence and Crime Prevention, 2nd Term, 2014-2015 and 1st Term, 2017-2018 
       Professor: Daniel Webster, ScD, MPH 
    Health Advocacy, 4th Term, 2014-2015, 4th Term, 2015-2016, and 4th Term, 2016-2017 
       Professor: Josh Horwitz, JD 
    Understanding and Preventing Violence, 3rd Term, 2014-2015, 3rd Term, 2015-2016, and 3rd Term, 2016-2017 
       Professor: Daniel Webster, ScD, MPH 
    Public Health and the Law, 3rd Term, 2014-2015, 3rd Term, 2015-2016, and 3rd Term, 2016-2017 
       Professor: Jon Vernick, JD, MPH 
    Master of Public Health Social and Behavioral Sciences Concentration, AY 2014-2015 and AY 2015-2016 
       Professors: Janice Bowie, PhD, MPH, and Caitlin Kennedy, PhD, MPH 
    Graduate Seminar on Occupational Injury Prevention, 3rd Term, 2014-2015 and 2nd Term, 2015-2016 
       Professors: Keshia Pollack, PhD, MPH & Cassandra Crifasi, PhD, MPH 
    Intro to Health Policy, 1st Term, 2014-2015 and 1st Term, 2015-2016 
       Professor: Sosena Kebede, MD, MPH  
    Issues in Injury and Violence Prevention, 1st Term, 2015-2016 
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       Professor: Jon Vernick, JD, MPH 
    Center for Injury Research and Policy Summer Institute, Summer Session, 2014-2015 
       Professor: Carolyn Fowler, PhD, MPH 
    Graduate Seminar on Injury Prevention and the Law, 4th Term, 2014-2015 





Dissertation Award                September 2017 – present 
Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research 
 
Executive Alliance Emerging Women Leaders Scholarship                      August 2017 – present 
Central Scholarship of Maryland 
 
Pre-Doctoral Traineeship in Drug Dependence Epidemiology Research (T32)                September 2015 – August 2017 
National Institute of Drug Abuse  
 
Pre-Doctoral Traineeship in Interdisciplinary Research in Violence (T32)                    September 2013 – August 2015 
National Institute of Child Health and Development     
 
Health Resources and Services Administration Trainee Fellowship                  April 2015 – August 2015 
Department of Health and Human Services         
 
National Violent Death Reporting System Surveillance Academy Scholarship                                June 2015 





Webster, DW, Buggs, SAL, Crifasi, CK. (2018). Estimating the Effects of Law Enforcement and Public Health 




Zeoli, AM, McCourt A, Buggs S, Frattaroli S, Lilley D, Webster D. (2017). Analysis of the Strength of Legal Firearms 
Restrictions for Perpetrators of Domestic Violence and Their Association with Intimate Partner Homicide. American 
Journal of Epidemiology, kwx362, https://doi-org.ezp.welch.jhmi.edu/10.1093/aje/kwx362. 
 
Crifasi CK, Buggs SAL, Chosky S, Webster DW. (2017). The Initial Impact of Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act of 2013 
on the Supply of Crime Handguns in Baltimore. The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences, 3(5): 
128-140. 
 
Webster DW, Buggs, SAL. (2017). Can an Efficacious Strategy for Curtailing Illegal Drug Sales Be Counted on to 




Milam AJ, Buggs SA, Furr-Holden CDM, Leaf PJ, Bradshaw CP, Webster D. (2016). Changes in Attitudes Towards 
Guns and Shootings Following Implementation of the Safe Streets Intervention. Journal of Urban Health, 93(4): 
609-626. 
 
Frattaroli S, Buggs SAL. (2015). Decreasing Gun Violence: Evidence-Based Social and Public Health Interventions. In 
LH Gold and RI Simon (Eds.), Gun Violence and Mental Illness. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association 
Publishing. 
 
Webster D, Meyers JS, Buggs, SA. (2014). Youth Acquisition and Carrying of Firearms in the United States: Patterns, 
Consequences, and Strategies for Prevention. Proceedings of Means of Violence Workshop, Forum of Global 





Buggs, S. (2017). “The Role of the Community in Preventing Violence in Baltimore.” Keynote speaker at Baltimore 
Mayor Catherine Pugh’s Call to Action Baltimore Grassroots Leaders Retreat. 
 
Buggs, S. (2016). “Effects of Drug Law Enforcement on Gun Violence in Baltimore.” Poster presenter at the 
American Public Health Association Conference (APHA), Denver, CO. 
 
Buggs, S. (2016). “Understanding and Addressing Violence Through a Public Health Lens.” Panel presenter at the 
Healing Justice Alliance Conference, Baltimore, MD. 
 
 
LEADERSHIP AND SERVICE 
 
Student Board Representative, Society for Advancement of Violence and Injury Research               April 2018-present 
Dean Search Committee      Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health                     2016-2017 
Executive Committee/Task Force Member, My Brother’s Keeper – Baltimore    City of Baltimore         2015-present  
Career Fair Representative      Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health                    2015-present 
Mentor, Diversity Summer Internship Program    Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health        2013-present 
Alumni Interviewer and College Fair Representative    Stanford Alumni Association                   2003-present 
Board Member, Student Coordinating Committee    Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health       2014-2015 
Vice President, Black Graduate Student Association   Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health     2012-2013 
Communications Chair/Board Member     Stanford National Black Alumni Association                                   2009-2012 






    Foundational Quality 
    Cultural Competence 
    Consumer Data Control 
    Situational Leadership 
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    People Styles at Work 
    Building Winning Teams 
 
American Management Association 
    Handling Difficult Conversations 
 
Dale Carnegie 





    American Public Health Association 
    Society for Advancement of Violence and Injury Research 





    Microsoft Office Suite 
    STATA Data Analysis and Statistical Software 
    ArcGIS Mapping and Statistical Analysis Software 
    UCINET Social Network Analysis Software 
    Netdraw Social Network Visualization Software 
 
 
 
 
 
